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Abstract
The impact of potentially traumatic events on Australian Navy personnel is described 
through 2 studies of the long-term psychological experiences of survivors of a fatal fire 
in HMAS Westralia in 1998. Study 1 reports on the prevalence of indicated post 
traumatic stress disorder at three times since the fire, ranging from four months to six 
years, and general psychological distress and alcohol problems at six years. There were 
no significant associations between gender and military rank, and mental health 
disorders. A model of how mental health can be maintained in the aftermath of exposure 
to potentially traumatic events, based on personal construct theory, is then described. 
This model is tested in Study 2, using a sample of participants from Study 1 who 
maintained positive mental health in the years after the fire. Narratives provided by 
participants were analysed using content analysis scales, to assess positive emotions, 
emotions of transition, and social relating. Experiencing positive emotions, having 
resolved guilt, overt hostility directed outwards, and depression, and reporting positive 
interpersonal relationships based on perceived resources and intimacy, were associated 
with positive mental health. These results support aspects of the proposed model and are 
consistent with personal construct theory. Strategies for the management of Navy 
personnel involved in future potentially traumatic events, based on these findings are 
discussed. The focus on positive mental health rather than disorder, and the use of 
content analysis scales are unique features of this study.
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Chapter 1. An introduction to two studies on mental health following exposure to a 
potential traumatic event, in Australian Navy personnel.
2
1.1 Statement of the thesis
In this thesis, I study the mental health of people exposed to a potentially 
traumatic event. My aim is to advance the understanding of distressing psychological 
reactions to potentially traumatic events through developing and testing a model of how 
people maintain mental health in the aftermath of exposure to a potentially traumatic 
event. Firstly, I undertake a prevalence study of the psychological impact of a 
potentially traumatic event; namely survivors of a major fire in an Australian warship - 
HMAS Westralia. Secondly, I develop a personal construct model of maintaining 
mental health in the face of exposure to potentially traumatic events. Thirdly, I will test 
this model using the experiences of the Navy personnel involved in the fire in HMAS 
Westralia. The first study is a prevalence study. While prevalence studies of trauma are 
often undertaken with military samples, most are with Army personnel. There is a 
relative paucity of studies in the field of psychological reactions to potentially traumatic 
events undertaken in the maritime environment or with Navy personnel. This research 
should add to the scant body of research on the experience of Navy personnel who 
experience potentially traumatic events.
The model expands upon existing personal construct psychology research into 
the experience of psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events, and focuses on 
mental health and the processes leading to long-term mental health, rather than the more 
typical focus on disorder. This research will combine both quantitative and qualitative 
data to test aspects of the proposed model.
The importance of this project is based on its clinical usefulness. While mental 
health, rather than disorder, is usually the more prevalent long-term outcome than 
disorder, even following severe traumatic events, most research focuses on disorders, 
rather than on the processes leading to maintaining or restoring mental health. An
3
understanding of these processes should lead to strategies that may increase the 
likelihood of maintaining mental health and avoiding disorder, or restoring mental 
health in people exposed to potentially traumatic events in the future.
1.2 Choosing personal construct theory for the model and as the basis of research into 
the model
The experiences of people involved in potentially traumatic events appear to be 
highly subjective, and range from no lasting impact to ongoing and chronic disorder. 
My clinical experience working with people who have experienced a range of different 
traumatic events, leads me to a conclusion that is consistent with most research in the 
field; that when a group of people are involved in the same event, many may be moved 
or impacted on in the short term, but most also manage to incorporate the memories of 
the event into their life experiences, and move on with their lives without disorder, and 
with distress dissipating over time. They may have differences in the way they manage 
some aspects of their lives, and may be sensitive to reminders of the event, but the 
central aspects of their personalities, and their way of interacting with the world and 
other people, remains largely the same as before the event.
It is only the minority for whom the impact on their lives is much more 
dramatic, life-changing and long-lasting. Disorder following trauma leads to significant 
negative change in almost all aspects of the lives of those afflicted; as-if the memory of 
the event becomes the most dominant aspects of their personality; and as-if they are 
dominated by (or even obsessed with), the same fear and horror that they experienced at 
the time of the event. In essence, this minority just don’t seem to get over the event as 
they do other events in their lives.
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The obvious question is; why can some people incorporate the memories of 
events into their lives, and move on; and why some people are clearly overwhelmed by 
memories of the event? The experience of trauma must be highly subjective; otherwise, 
all people would react the same way when involved in the same event. The differences 
in reactions cannot just be the sensations of the event. Research into trauma, therefore, 
should involve theories and methodologies that are subjective and focus on individual 
experiences.
A focus on meaning-making, and research methodologies that focus on peoples’ 
subjective experiences led me to Personal Construct Theory. Kelly’s (1955/1991) 
original theory of personal constructs predates specific disorders such as Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), and perhaps for this reason, Kelly did not specifically explain 
psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events. However, personal construct 
theory is concerned with the meanings people make of events and experiences, how 
meaning-making develops into construct systems, and how their construct systems 
‘live’, adapt, and are refined through new experiences, and how people use their 
construct systems to anticipate their responses and interactions with their worlds. 
Further, personal construct theory has led to methodologies that allow clinicians and 
researchers to understand and rigorously quantify highly subjective and personal 
experiences.
Personal construct psychology holds that the meanings people ascribe to 
individual events combine to form complex and relatively stable systems of meaning­
making, with hierarchies of importance and centrality. As these systems develop 
complexity, they can be applied to increasingly complex events and situations. More 
importantly, people use construct systems to make predictions about themselves, their 
interactions with other people, and about events in their future. The predictions people
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make are tested through experience, with predictions either validated or invalidated. 
People act as-if they were scientists, experimenting with predictions and their outcomes, 
adding to their growing pool of knowledge and meaning-making. Anticipations that are 
validated by experience are valued and kept in the systems, resulting in positive 
emotions. Anticipations that are invalidated result in unpleasant emotions, indicating the 
need for further experimentation and revision of construing, until they are validated.
Optimal mental health involves people constantly testing and revising 
constructs, and refining their construct systems, based on how effective they are in 
anticipating, and being validated by, their experiences. Kelly (1955/1991 & 1980) 
describes processes by which people revise, test, and reconstrue the meanings events 
ascribe to their experiences as cycles of transition of construing. He described the 
Creativity Cycle, the Circumspection-Pre-emption-Control Cycle, and the Experience 
Cycle. Each involves scientific processes of construct formation, testing, and revision. 
They exemplify Kelly’s (1955/1991) description of people acting in all aspects of their 
lives, as-if they were scientists, engaging in the process of experimentation and 
scientific endeavour to further understanding. Disorders are considered to be failures to 
engage in, or to complete cycles of transition when necessary to resolve invalidation, 
and to continue to, and repeatedly use constructs that have been invalidated by 
experience, to anticipate events and guide their behaviour.
Construct systems are ordered in terms of importance, with those higher in the 
hierarchy being of more central importance to the individual. The systems and 
hierarchies of constructs that people develop are highly individual, being based on their 
meaning-making, their validational experiences, their importance, their ability to 
experiment, and conditions that influencing their processes, such as social interaction 
and the experiences they have in life. With this level of complexity, no two people are
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ever likely to have exactly the same construct systems; although, the greater the degree 
of similarity of these factors between people, the greater the degree of similarity of their 
construct systems is likely to be.
Rayner and Viney (2003) described the important impact of interpersonal 
relating on the experiences of people exposed to potentially traumatic events and their 
recovery from such events, in Navy personnel. This link between interpersonal relating 
or social support, and the experience of trauma is common in trauma research; although 
I argue that it is one that is not well understood. Kelly’s (1955/1991) theory of personal 
constructs places a significant emphasis on interpersonal relating. Firstly, the meaning 
people ascribe to new experiences, and how these meanings are compared to their 
existing construct systems are shaped by the shared expectations and anticipations of 
people. Secondly, validation and invalidation of meanings of events, and of people as 
construers of events and experiences, are strongly influenced by the meanings ascribed 
by other people with whom people interact. Thirdly, people can play different roles in 
their interactions with others, at different times, and with different outcomes for 
validation and the scientific processes of experiment, validation and revision of 
construing. Finally, relationships that contribute new ideas and avoid preoccupation 
with old material, that validate people as they engage in experiments, and contribute as 
co-experimenters in revising meanings, are conditions for the formation of new 
constructs necessary to avoid or recover from, disorders.
With its focus on subjective meaning-making, personal construct psychology has 
developed methodologies that help researchers access and measure aspects of the 
construct systems of other people with scientific and quantifiable rigor. Methods such as 
analysing narratives using content analysis scales, allows researchers to understand the 
psychological states of people, through the language they use to describe themselves
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and their experiences, and then to quantify this for statistical analysis. Content analysis 
scales are more subjective and do not suffer demand characteristics to the same extent 
as more objective questionnaires (that are also used in this research). Content analysis 
scales are more sensitive to individual variations in experience than objective 
questionnaires that are often limited to endorsing, or not endorsing, the construing of 
experiences by the questionnaire designers. While content analysis scales have been 
used to measure the psychological states of people experiencing a range of challenges, 
there are relatively few studies using content analysis scales to measure mental health 
following potentially traumatic events. Content analysis scales, derived from personal 
construct psychology theory, not only provide a unique means of measuring 
psychological states, but are sensitive and ethical tools to research the potentially 
distressing aftermath of exposure to potentially traumatic events.
While content analysis is based on quantitative analysis of text, content analysis 
scales are quantitative measures, and therefore the results can be subjected to statistical 
analysis. The application of content analysis scales to study mental health following 
potential trauma, and the combining of the qualitative data from content analysis scales 
with quantitative data, are unique features of this research.
This brief synopsis of the most important features of personal construct 
psychology describes my choice of the theory to underpin this research and the model I 
will develop, along with providing an appropriate methodology to employ to understand 
the experience of people involved in trauma, in one of my studies.
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1.3 The report of the two studies on maintaining mental health following potential 
trauma, in the Navy.
This report combines two separate studies to come to understand some aspects 
of the experience of mental health following potential trauma, for a sample of 
Australian Navy personnel. I will address the aims of my research through a series of 
literary reviews, the proposing of a personal construct model of mental health following 
exposure to potentially traumatic events, and the two studies.
The first review introduces distressing psychological reactions to potentially 
traumatic events, with a focus on the experience of people in the military, while the 
second review is of existing theories of distressing psychological reactions to potentially 
traumatic events, and notes limitations to these theories. The third review focuses on 
describing personal construct theory. The model is derived from both the literary 
reviews of psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events and personal 
construct theory, and aims to overcome the limitations of existing models.
The two studies have different aims and use different forms of assessment. 
However, they compliment each other to form an understanding of the complex 
experiences of people who have experienced potentially trauma. The first study is 
quantitative, providing an understanding of the prevalence of psychological disorder in 
Navy personnel who all experienced the same potentially traumatic event. A select sub­
set of this sample who maintained positive mental health are the participants in Study 2. 
This is primarily a qualitative study, using content analysis scales, to understand the 
experience of these individuals who have experienced an event that has the potential to 
cause disorder (as evidenced by Study 1), yet who have incorporated the event into then- 
lives and their systems of meaning-making without apparent disorder. The results of this 
study are used to validate the personal construct model of mental health posed, and are
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synthisised to complete the aim of understanding of the process of maintaining mental 
health in the aftermath of potential trauma.
The proposed model, the research methodologies chosen, the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data, the focus on mental health rather than disorder, and the 
sample of Navy people who have maintained mental health in the face of exposure to 
potentially traumatic events, and are unique features of this research.
1.4 Layout of this report
The specific layout of this report is as follows. In Chapter 1, I introduce my 
research and describe in broad terms, what is to follow in the thesis. In Chapter 2, I 
provide a literary review on psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events, 
focusing on the experiences of military personnel.
In Chapter 3, I describe Study 1, a prevalence study of long-term, distressing 
psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events in Australian Navy personnel. I 
introduce as a potentially traumatic event, a fatal fire in an Australian Navy ship. 
Participants for Study 1 and Study 2 will be drawn from the survivors of this event. I 
pose a series of four research questions to guide the quantitative study to follow. Study 
1 describes the short and long-term mental health impact of the fire on those involved 
and makes comparisons with similar samples. While this is a stand-alone study, it also 
provides the context for Study 2.
Chapter 4 is a review of the major theories of psychological reactions to 
potentially traumatic events. I provide a brief description of each theory and how they 
conceptualise psychological reactions, along with comments on their usefulness and 
limitations. In Chapter 5 ,1 detail personal construct theory. I describe the major tenants
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of the theory, focusing on how the theory deals with mental health, disorder and 
movement between the two.
In Chapter 6, I develop and propose a personal construct model of maintaining 
mental health in people exposed to potentially traumatic event. I describe how personal 
construct theorists have conceptualized post traumatic stress disorder, and use this as a 
base to describe a model of maintaining mental health in the face of potential trauma. I 
then state this model in a series of propositions.
Chapter 7 describes Study 2. Using research methods that compliment the 
personal construct theory described, I test aspects of the proposed model of maintaining 
mental health in the face of potential trauma. I use a sub-set of Study 1 participants, who 
report a positive long-term positive mental health outcome since the fire in HMAS 
Westralia, to undertake this study.
Chapter 8 synthesises and concludes the two studies. I summarise and draw 
conclusions from the results and outcomes from the two studies. Further, I make 
recommendations for the future management of personnel exposed to potentially 
traumatic events, and then conclude the research report.
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Chapter 2. A background to distressing psychological reactions to potentially traumatic
events.
3 0009 03412295 7
12
In this chapter I introduce the formal diagnostic criteria and historical context for 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This chapter encapsulates an historical view on 
disorders, and set the scene for the studies to follow. The context will be based on 
military populations, which in general, are mostly male. However, the view that women 
may suffer at least as much from posttraumatic stress disorder - from traumatic events 
that have nothing to do with military services - is also put, albeit briefly. The relative 
space provided to this view reflects the general literature on posttraumatic stress 
disorder. However, it also reflects the focus of the studies to follow.
2.1 A background to psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events
Disorders involving long term adverse psychological reactions to traumatic 
events, are recognised and described by both the American Psychiatric Association 
(1994), in their Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders -  fourth edition 
(DSM-IV); and the World Health Organisation (1994) in their International 
Classification of Diseases -  tenth edition (ICD-10), as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). While there are some differences in these classification systems, the main 
features of PTSD are emotional distress, including a significant impairment in social, 
occupational or some other important area of functioning, resulting from exposure to 
clearly identifiable and extreme events. Events that are likely to result in PTSD include 
those that involve death, threatened death, serious threat to physical integrity, or are 
outside the range or usual human experience, and could reasonably expect to produce 
strong reactions in people. PTSD is seemingly one of the few disorders in either the 
DSM-IV or the ICD-10 where there is a clear link between a specific event and a 
person’s long-term mental health outcomes; i.e.: the disorder develops in response to a
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specific event, and presumably would not have developed if the event had not occurred, 
or if the person had not been intimately involved with the event.
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present:
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that 
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity 
of self or others, and
(2) The person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.
B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, 
or preoccupations;
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event;
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the 
experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including 
those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated);
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or 
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event; and
(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or 
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general 
responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma;
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma;
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma;
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities;
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others;
(6) restricted range of affect (eg: unable to have loving feelings); and
(7) sense of a foreshortened future (eg: does not expect to have a career, marriage, 
children, or a normal life span).
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two (or 
more) of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep;
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger;
(3) difficulty concentrating;
(4) hypervigilance; and
(5) exaggerated startle response.
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than 1 month.
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning.
Specify:
Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than 3 months 
Chronic: if duration of symptoms is 3 months or more
Specify if:
With delayed onset: if onset of symptoms is at least 6 months after the stressor.
(A.P.A., 1996, pp. 427-428)
Figure 1. DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for PTSD.
Diagnostic criteria for PTSD for the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) are presented in Figure 1, while the diagnostic criteria for the ICD-
10 (World Health Organisation) are presented in Figure 2.
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A. The patient must have been exposed to a stressful event or situation (either short- or long-lasting) of 
exceptionally threatening or catastrophic nature, which would be likely to cause pervasive distress in 
almost anyone;
B. There must be persistent remembering of ‘reliving’ of the stressor in intrusive ‘flashbacks’, vivid 
memories or recurring dreams, or in experiencing distress when exposed to circumstances 
resembling or associated with the stressor;
C. The patient must exhibit an actual preferred avoidance of circumstances resembling or associated 
with the stressor which was not present before exposure to the stressor;
D. Either of the following must be present:
(1) inability to recall, either partially or completely, some important aspects of the period of 
exposure to the stressor;
(2) persistent symptoms of increased psychological sensitivity and arousal (not present 
before exposure to the stressor), shown by any two of the following:
(a) difficulty in falling or staying asleep
(b) irritability or outbursts of anger
(c) difficulty in concentrating
(d) hypervigilence
(e) exaggerated startle response; and
E. Criteria B, C, and D must all be met within 6 months of the stressful event or of the end of a period of 
stress. (For some purposes, onset delayed more than 6 months may be included, but this should be 
clearly specified).
Figure 2. ICD-10 diagnosis criteria for PTSD
In addition, the DSM-IV describes associated features of PTSD, including 
painful guilt feelings about survival, phobic avoidance of situation that symbolize the 
traumatic event, interference with interpersonal relationship, and if the trauma was 
predominantly interpersonal, impaired affect modulation, self-destructive and impulsive 
behaviour, dissociative symptoms, somatic complaints, feelings of ineffectiveness, 
shame despair or hopelessness, feeling permanently damaged, loss of previous beliefs, 
hostility, social withdrawal, feeling constantly threatened, impaired relationship or a 
change of personality characteristics.
While the criteria for PTSD are relatively recent (the American Psychiatric 
Association first introduced PTSD in the DSM-III in 1980), the condition of severe and 
enduring psychological disturbance in response to exceptionally stressful circumstances 
is not. Ezra (2001) argues a Sumerian cuneiform tablet from the 2nd century BC, 
describes both a traumatic event and subsequent psychiatric symptoms, and should be
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considered early evidence of PTSD. Van der Kolk, Weisaeth, and van der Hart (1996) 
and Wastell (2005) describes a history of traumatic stress from the late 1800s, where 
terms such as: ‘railway spine’, ‘compensation neurosis’, ‘shellshock’, ‘soldier’s heart’, 
and ‘combat fatigue’, described conditions highly similar to what has more recently 
become known as post traumatic stress disorder. Shakespeare (in Exeter, 1984) wrote a 
description of what today could be described as PTSD in Henry IV, Part I, Scene III. In 
this scene, Lady Percy describes to her husband, Hotspur, what she sees as the enduring 
impact on their lives, of battle.
O, my good lord, why are you thus alone?
For what offence have I this fortnight been 
A banish'd woman from my Harry’s bed?
Tell me, sweet lord, what is't that takes from thee 
Thy stomach, pleasure and thy golden sleep?
Why dost thou bend thine eyes upon the earth,
And start so often when thou sit'st alone?
Why hast thou lost the fresh blood in thy cheeks;
And given my treasures and my rights of thee 
To thick-eyed musing and cursed melancholy?
In thy faint slumbers I by thee have watch'd,
And heard thee murmur tales of iron wars;
Speak terms of manage to thy bounding steed;
Cry 'Courage! to the field!' And thou hast talk'd 
Of sallies and retires, of trenches, tents,
Of palisadoes, frontiers, parapets,
Of basilisks, of cannon, culverin,
Of prisoners' ransom and of soldiers slain,
And all the currents of a heady fight.
Thy spirit within thee hath been so at war 
And thus hath so bestirr'd thee in thy sleep,
That beads of sweat have stood upon thy brow 
Like bubbles in a late-disturbed stream;
And in thy face strange motions have appear'd,
Such as we see when men restrain their breath 
On some great sudden hest. O, what portents are these? 
Some heavy business hath my lord in hand,
And I must know it, else he loves me not.
Figure 3. King Henry IV  -  Part 1 [Act II Scene III] (Exeter, 1984, 395)
From this passage, the major DSM-IV and ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
(repeated intrusive recollections of traumatic events, avoidance of reminders or 
difficulty remembering, and increased physiological arousal to cues that are reminders 
of the event) can be deduced. Further, the interpersonal dysfunction, such as emotional
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detachment and restricted range of affect noted in the DSM-IV, can also be clearly 
inferred. As this passage by Shakespeare is an example of what would now be described 
as PTSD, it is implied that the impact of traumatic events, including the impact on 
interpersonal relationships described with PTSD, have been known of in sufficient 
detail to be reported in popular media, since at least Shakespeare’s time.
Herman (1992) reports that, while historically, the initial focal point of interest 
in post-trauma reactions was with the reaction of soldiers to war (as it is with the 
Shakespeare quotation), the women’s liberation movement of the 1970’s recognized 
that the most common cause of trauma involved women in civilian life. The cause of 
such trauma was ‘sexual trauma’, including rape and domestic violence. Herman reports 
that the syndromes reported by victims of sexual trauma and those of combat veterans 
were essentially the same; indicating that the condition was more generalized than a 
specific response to war or combat. The essential features of trauma as described by 
Herman are threats to life or bodily integrity, or a close personal encounter with 
violence and death, confronting people with extreme helplessness, loss of control, 
terror, and evoking feelings of catastrophe or the threat of annihilation.
Foa and Rothbaum (1998) describe three possible responses to exposure to 
severe trauma such as rape. Firstly, most victims will reduce the severity of symptoms 
of time and resume a normal life, although they may never forget the event, and may 
retain sensitivity to reminders of the event (with some distress). Secondly, some victims 
will develop chronic, but restricted symptoms such as phobias to reminders of the 
traumatic event. The third group, comprising about 10-15% of victims, will develop 
consistent and long-lasting PTSD symptoms.
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2.2 Psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events in the military.
2.2.1 Psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events in war
While the diagnostic descriptor of PTSD didn’t appear until 1980, inferences of 
PTSD symptoms can be made from literature pre-dating 1980. Mareth and Brooker 
(1985) report that by the later stages of World War I one-seventh of all discharges from 
the British Army were for mental disorders and that 20% of soldiers on Britain's 
pension list suffered from a psychiatric disability. They also reported that during WWII, 
30% of casualties in North Africa, and between 20% and 48% of all casualties during 
the war resulted from psychiatric conditions that developed in reaction to events they 
endured. Kidson, Douglas and Holwill (1993) report that of the Australian WWII 
veterans who attended their outpatient clinic in the 1990s, just under half suffer from 
PTSD. Askevold (1976) noted that the symptoms of anxiety amongst Norwegian 
merchant marine sailors in WWII was similar to that of concentration camp survivors; 
noting that brain damage without having sustained physical trauma may be the result of 
prolonged stress and constant fear of dying.
Carson, Butcher, and Coleman (1988) report that during the Korean War, 
psychiatric disorders accounted for 27% of medical discharges from the US Army, and 
Irving, Telfer and Blake (1997) report that 15% of US Vietnam veterans met the criteria 
for PTSD in the years since the end of that war.
Salter (1989) noted that during the Yom Kippur war, Israeli combat stress 
casualties averaged around 30% of all casualties. O'Brien and Hughes (1991) examined 
the effects of the Falklands War on veterans from an elite unit who were still in the 
British Army 5 years after the conflict. Of this group about a quarter were diagnosed 
with PTSD, with a further 18% considered to have possible PTSD and about half
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reporting increased alcohol intake. Only about one-quarter of the sample reported no 
PTSD symptomatology at all.
Coker, Bhatt, Blatchley and Graham (1999) reported that 12% of British 
veterans of the 1991 Gulf War were diagnosed with PTSD. This accounted for just 
under half of all psychiatric disorders. When other reactions to severe stress were 
included, the figure rose to about 15% of the total sample and two-thirds of all 
psychiatric disorders. Further, Southwick, Morgan III, Darnell Bremmer, Nicolaou, 
Nagy and Charney's (1995) study of 1991 Gulf War veterans indicated that the severity 
of symptoms increased for several years after the war. McCarroll, Ursano and Fullerton 
(1995), and Deahl, Gilham, Thomas, Searle and Srinivasan (1994) studied the effect of 
body handling during the 1991 Gulf War. Those involved reported higher levels of 
psychological disturbance over a year after the war compared to those who had not. 
Further, half had evidence of some psychological disturbance suggestive of PTSD and 
about a quarter experience relationship difficulties 9 months after the war.
These reports provide a clear indication of the potential longevity or chronicity 
of the disorder, along with the potential impact on lives, of the disorder.
2.2.2 Psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events in peacekeeping
Peacekeeping duties are a common form of military operation where there may 
be no actual combat, but where military personnel may have constant fear and witness 
atrocities. Hall (1996) contended that the need to show passivity rather than aggression 
in the face of threats was the key stressor in peacekeeping activities -  especially for 
combat trained soldiers.
Rosebush (1998) argues that for Canadian soldiers involved in operational 
peacekeeping deployments in the former Yugoslavia in 1992/93, up to 15% developed
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PTSD, and that this figure is similar to that reported in combat. He contended that 
operational stress is the greatest health risk for deployed soldiers in peacekeeping 
activities, exceeding that of the risk of injuries due to hostilities.
Ward (1997) examined the effect of a UN peacekeeping deployment to Somalia, 
on Australian military personnel, 15 months after their return. About one-fifth had 
significantly higher levels of psychiatric morbidity than a control group. Further, the 
rate of suspected psychiatric disorders was about twice that of the control group, but 
also lessened over time.
Mehlum (1999) looked at the effect of stress during peacekeeping duties for 
Norwegian military personnel who served in Lebanon. Just under half of their sample 
reported that they had increased their alcohol consumption during deployment to nearly 
double pre-deployment levels. Amongst personnel who reported high levels of stress 
during deployment, reasons for the increase in alcohol consumption were related to 
attempting to manage symptoms of stress and anxiety. However, it was also noted that 
following deployment, alcohol use among all peacekeepers returned to pre-deployment 
levels.
Weisaeth, Mehlum and Mortensen (1996) compiled data on UN Peacekeeping 
involvement from a variety of references. They report that: 5% of Dutch UNIFIL 
soldiers in Lebanon suffered from psychosocial problems several years after 
deployment; 0.5% of Swedish soldiers serving in Cyprus suffered from nervous 
breakdown; 30% of Danish personnel serving in ex-Yugoslavia showed some level of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Response (and 7% had severe symptoms); and 11.4% of US 
soldiers in Somalia met criteria for PTSD. Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich and Batres 
(1997) found an 8% rate of PTSD among US peacekeepers serving in Somalia. These 
reports highlight the varied responses to PTSD related peacekeeping.
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2.2.3 Psychological injury from accidents in the military.
McCaughey (1986) studied the effects on personnel of the 1975 collision 
between two US Navy ships, the USS Belknap and USS Kennedy. In comparing the 
Belknap’s crew with the crew of a similar ship with similar duties, significantly more of 
Belknap’s crew were hospitalised because of neurosis. Further, twice as many 
discharged from the Navy for psychiatric reasons and twice as many were considered 
for medical discharge in the following years. Common fears among survivors who 
sought mental health assistance, were of being below decks, being trapped in a closed 
space, or smelling smoke and fumes.
Ursano, Fullerton Tzu-Cheg and Bhartiya (1995) examined the effects on body 
handlers involved with the remains of 47 naval personnel killed in an explosion in a gun 
turret on USS Iowa. While nearly half had some experience working with bodies prior 
to this incident, the effects on all was significant. Fifteen percent reported significant 
levels of symptoms (including intrusion, avoidance, hostility and somatisation) at 13 
months. Eleven percent met PTSD criteria immediately after the incident, with this 
number decreasing over the next year to about two percent.
Hull, Alexander and Klein (2002) studied the long-term effects of a large-scale 
fire at sea, with a large loss of life. Ten years after the 1988 Piper-Alpha Oil rig fire, in 
which 167 of the 226 participants aboard the oil rig were killed, Hull et al., established a 
prevalence rate of PTSD in survivors of 21% (with an estimate that 73% would have 
been indicated in the first three months after the disaster).
Berg, Grieger and Spira (2005) reported on the psychological impact on US 
submariners who had to abandon their submarine at sea, after flooding and fire. None 
percent of the crew developed PTSD in the seven months following the accident. This
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figure was surprising low to the authors and attributed to the unusual selectiveness and 
thoroughness of submariner training.
2.2.4 The impact o f psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events on families 
of military personnel
The effects of traumatic military experiences do not just have an effect on the 
individuals involved. Westerink and Giarratano (1999) reported that partners of 
Vietnam Veterans with PTSD displayed significantly higher levels of somatic 
complaints, anxiety, depression, insomnia, and social dysfunction, than did family 
members of other patients. The family members of Vietnam veterans with PTSD also 
reported poor relationships, low expressiveness of emotions, and high levels of conflict 
in their families. Children of veterans also reported significantly higher levels of 
conflict in their families, than did controls.
Rayner and Viney (2003) described common negative effects on interpersonal 
relationships in Navy veterans with PTSD, including marriage break ups (in the 
majority of subjects), inability to maintain friendships, avoidance of family and lack of 
dependability of relationships. Participants described trying to improve then- 
interpersonal relationships as being as important in treatment as reducing the more 
obvious symptoms of PTSD such as intrusive recollections. Rosebush (1998) reported 
that if military personnel do not have time to emotionally process their experiences prior 
to returning home, they might come into to conflict with family expectations, as well as 
those of those of other individuals and their organisation. These reports highlight the 
impact of psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events on individuals and
their families.
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While PTSD is a relatively recently recognized disorder, it has long historic 
roots. The focus in literature has been on military conflict as the cause of PTSD, and 
that may be where the cause of disorders such as PTSD may be most clearly identified 
and where research may be most convenience. However, sexual assaults on women may 
provide the highest incidence of the type of events likely to result in PTSD. Although, 
they may not be as easy to define or research, and may not receive the same attention. 
As the focus of this paper will be on people in the Australian Navy, the focus of 
literature reviews will be on military samples, which are predominantly male. However, 
this does not diminish the fact that women, rather than men, and non-military personnel, 
may suffer as a result of traumatic events at a potentially higher rate.
Most literature on psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events in the 
military concern Army personnel, with relatively little undertaken with Navy personnel 
who experience traumatic event. The ability to generalise from army data to navy 
populations may be limited. The next chapter will address this relative dearth of mental 
health information regarding Navy personnel, and move from a background or 
theoretical examination, of psychological reactions to potentially traumatic events 
presented so far, to undertake a study determining the prevalence of psychological 
reactions to potentially traumatic events in an Australian Navy sample. The focus will 
be on the outcome of one specific event; however, the event is a typical one that could 
occur during military training or combat.
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Chapter 3. Study 1 -  The prevalence of psychological reactions to potentially traumatic 
events Royal Australian Navy personnel who survived a multiple fatality fire in HMAS
Westralia.
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In this Chapter, I present a prevalence study of psychology trauma, undertaken 
with Royal Australian Navy personnel, who survived a fatal engine room fire in a 
tanker, while underway at sea. The event serves as a reminder of the dangers faced by 
military personnel, even when not in combat. It also serves as a typical incident that 
could reasonably be expected to reoccur in the future (in that risk of fire is an ongoing 
risk at sea). This chapter presents data on the prevalence of mental health disorders on 
survivors, and may help planning for similar events in the future. I anticipate 
highlighting the impact on survivors, of involvement in potentially traumatic incidents 
such as a fire at sea. The aim is to increase our understanding of the impact of such 
events on people’s lives, and to lead to some exploration of how this process works; and 
potentially, how the adverse impact of future events, may be lessened.
3.1 Description of the fire and its aftermath.
On 5th May 1998, a fire erupted in the engine room of a large Australian Navy 
ship, HMAS Westralia. Four members of the crew in the engine room were killed by a 
massive fire-ball that took nearly tow hours to control, and potentially endangered the 
lives of the remaining 94 personnel. As a result of the fire, the Navy established a Board 
of Inquiry (BOI) to examine the cause of the fire, the personnel involved, the ship and 
other units involved in the fire. It is from the report of the BOI, released nine months 
later (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998), that the synopsis of the incident below is 
based.
HMAS Westralia was originally built as a petroleum tanker, and later converted 
for use in replenishment at sea by the Navy. HMAS Westralia displaces 40,000 tonnes 
fully laden, and carried a crew of 98 on the day of the fire. The ship deployed from Fleet 
Base West (south of Perth, in Western Australia) carrying 20,000 tonnes of diesel fuel
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and sailed north, intending to rendezvous with another Australian Navy tanker as part of 
routine exercises. The BOI reported that at about 10:30am a fire in the engine room was 
discovered, resulting from a fuel leak in a hose feeding the engine. High pressure fuel 
sprayed onto one of the hot engines and erupted into a fire ball that developed into a 
major, and out-of-control, fire. The crew had trained for such an event and responded 
with fire-fighting and other emergency responses. However, the fire proved difficult to 
extinguish and a number of different strategies to manage the fire were utilised, until the 
fire was finally extinguished at about 12:30pm. Twelve personnel were in the engine 
room at the time the fire erupted. Eight escaped; however four died as a result of acute 
carbon monoxide toxicity (from smoke inhalation). Five additional casualties were 
treated in a Perth hospital. The ship was towed back to its base, arriving at 
approximately 6:30pm on the same day. The BOI reported that the fire that resulted was 
dangerous and difficult and was: “fought heroically and effectively by the ship’s crew”. 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1998, pl2). A copy of the executive summary of the BOI 
that provides more complete details of the incident is included as Appendix A.
Given the type of incident and its ramifications (sudden fire; death of colleagues; 
threat of death or serious injury; or being confronted by death or serious injury, by all 
personnel on the ship; the ship being badly damaged; and a comprehensive and public 
BOI), I argue that this incident is sufficient to expect it to threaten the mental health of 
those involved, with disorders such as PTSD a foreseeable outcome. As such, I believe 
that the fire in HMAS Westralia was a potentially traumatic event (based on DSM-IV 
and ICD-10 definitions).
To date, no summary or comparative data regarding the longer term impact on 
personnel involved in this incident has been provided. This is consistent with the view 
expressed at a 2005 Australian Senate Inquiry into military justice, where it was stated
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that the Navy acknowledged a lack of understanding of PTSD (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2005). It is also consistent with the opinion of Rayner and Viney (2003), that 
while there is a wealth of trauma-related research conducted with Army, and military 
personnel in general, there is a comparatively very little research on psychological 
reactions to potentially traumatic events with Navy personnel specifically; and that of 
Berg, Grieger and Spira (2005), that studies of military personnel exposed to single, but 
potentially fatal accidence during peacetime, are also limited.
I argue that the fire in HMAS Westralia is an event worthy of research, as a 
large number of people of varying ages and experiences were exposed to the same event 
-  allowing an opportunity to conduct research with a control for the type of triggering 
event. Having a sample who participated in the same event reduces the potential for 
confounding variables. Further, HMAS Westralia and her crew are part of a much larger 
organisation for which there exists normative data on baseline rates of traumatic stress, 
with which to compare those involved in the fire. Therefore, the relevance of this study 
to the field of psychological trauma is:
1. It is an example of a potentially traumatic event (it satisfies DSM-IV and 
ICD-10 definitions of potentially traumatic events);
2. It has group exposure to similar event (good control for incident);
3. It will contribute to research into navy veterans; and
4. The results can be compared to other similar groups (navy and other military
groups).
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3.2 Aims and Research Questions
3.2.1 Aims of the study
The aim of this study is to assess the prevalence and extent of distressing 
psychological reactions in personnel who survived a potentially traumatic event, namely 
the fire in HMAS Westralia.
3.2.2 Research questions
To guide the research process, a series of research questions are proposed:
1. What is the prevalence of distressing psychological reactions linked to the fire in 
HMAS Westralia, on personnel directed involved?
2. What is the prevalence of other mental health problems in survivors of the fire in 
HMAS Westralia?
3 What differences in the prevalence of distressing psychological reactions exist, 
in sub-groups such as gender and rank groupings?
4. What differences in the prevalence of distressing psychological reactions exist 
over time?
and
5. How does the prevalence of distressing psychological reactions associated with 
the fire in HMAS Westralia compare with similar populations?
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Design
This study utilises a combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal methods, 
based on an examination of health records of personnel who survived the fire in HMAS
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Westralia. As a component of mental health management of personnel involved in the 
fire, the Australian Navy instigated mental health screening for PTSD symptoms to 
personnel from HMAS Westralia, approximately 4 months post-fire, again at 11 
months, and again at four to six years after the fire. These screens were primarily 
undertaken by the author of this research as part of his clinical practice within the Navy.
To be eligible for the screening, potential participants had to be in the Navy at 
the time. It is understood that some survivors began to discharge from the Navy within 
months of the event. This creates a potential bias in participation, based on employment, 
with this effect likely to be greatest with elapsed time since the fire (and presumably 
greatest at the four to six screening). At the time of the four to six year screening, 51 of 
the original 94 (54.26%) survivors of the fire were still in the Navy and available to 
participate in the screening program.
Because screening was voluntary, not all personnel who were eligible, 
participated in this study. Therefore, data is not available for all personnel at all times. 
However, these screens provide cross-sectional views of participants at three different 
times (four months, 11 months and four to six years). As some participants were 
assessed at two and three times, some data for use in longitudinal screening was 
available.
All members of the crew of HMAS Westralia who survived the fire are 
considered to satisfy the event criterion for PTSD; namely that they all experienced, 
witnessed or were confronted by an event that involved actually or threatened death, 
serious injury, or a threat to physical integrity. While exposure was not specifically 
tested, it is understandably assumed, given the circumstances of the event. All survivors 
of the fire in HMAS Westralia were trapped on a ship at sea with 20,000 tonnes of fuel 
oil as cargo, and a major and uncontrolled fire, that threatened the ship. The BOI reports
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that the ship was without power and drifting (posing a risk of collision or of running 
aground). Many of the crew were directly involved in fire fighting and it would not be 
unreasonable therefore to assume that all faced either the burning or sinking of the ship, 
with significant risk to all. HMAS Westralia is 171 metres in length; so at the absolute 
maximum, all personnel onboard were within 200 metres (most would have been 
considerably closer) to a major and uncontrolled fuel fire that had killed four personnel, 
with the potential to sink or cause an even larger fire or explosion of 20,000 tonnes of 
fuel. All personnel onboard the ship would have been aware of the fire, as the ship had 
been brought to a state of ‘emergency stations’ by means of warning, alarms, orders and 
updates broadcast throughout the ship. Many were directly involved in approaching the 
fire to conduct fire-fighting activities. The only way to achieve greater distance from the 
fire would have been to be off the ship, and that would have posed potentially even 
greater risks. Some personnel witnessed the bodies of those who perished, and all would 
have been intimately confronted by the reality of death and threat to life, of those 
involved in a major fire. As noted by Cordner, a warship is not just a collection of 
individuals. Rather: “the naval community is very close, so that the victims were well 
known” (Cordner, 2003, p i 10). This closeness could be considered to amplify the sense 
of loss of ship-mates and contributed to at least all survivors being confronted by the 
potential trauma.
In such circumstances (exposure to a potentially traumatic event), it is 
reasonable to foresee PTSD in some of the crew who survived the fire in HMAS 
Westralia. This approach to research (where all participants are assumed to meet the 
exposure criterion of PTSD by examination of circumstances, rather than by assessing 
individual reports), was utilized by O ’Brien and Hughes (1991) in their study of combat 
veterans of the 1982 Falklands War.
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3.3.2 Sampling
Sample 1 comprises all available personnel who survived the fire and who were 
still in the Navy four to six years after the fire. The names of personnel who survived 
the fire in HMAS Westralia were published in the report of the BOI. At the time of the 
fire the crew consisted of 73 males (74.5%) and 25 females (25.5%) for a total of 98 
personnel. Commonly used rank groupings in the Navy are Junior Sailors (Seaman, 
Able Seaman and Leading Seaman), Senior Sailors (Petty Officers, Chief Petty Officers 
and Warrant Officers), and Officers (Sub-Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Lieutenant­
Commander, Commander, Captain, Commodore and Admiral). There were 60 Junior 
Sailors (61.2%), 18 Senior Sailors (18.4%), and 20 Officers (20.4%).
Four personnel died in the fire, leaving 70 males (74.5%) and 24 females 
(25.5%) as survivors. This group comprised 58 Junior Sailors (61.70%), 17 Senior 
Sailors (18.08%) and 19 Officers (20.21%). Those who survived the fire were virtually 
identical to those who sailed with the ship on the day, with regard to gender and rank 
distribution. The age range was 1 8 - 4 4 ,  with an average age of 27.45 years, and a 
modal age of 20 years. The gender and rank distribution of survivors is presented in 
Figure 4.
Rank Categories
m Male 
□  Female
Figure 4. Rank and sex distribution of Sample 1 (n=94)
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As can be seen in Figure 4, there are more males in each rank category and 
overall, more Junior Sailors than either Senior Sailors or Officers, and similar numbers 
of Senior Sailors and Officers.
Screening for symptoms of distressing psychological reactions in Sample 1 was 
conducted at different times with different numbers of participants. The size and 
frequency distribution of gender and rank within each group at each time point is 
presented in Table 1.
Table 1.
Total number of participants and distribution by Gender and Rank, of Sample 1, and of all Survivors of 
the fire in HMAS Westralia.
4 months 11 months 4-6 years Total survivors
(n=44) (n=56) (n=50) (n=94)
Male 30 (68.18%) 41 (73.21%) 38 (76.00%) 70 (74.47%)
Female 14(31.82%) 15 (26.79%) 12(24.00%) 24 (25.53%)
Junior sailor 27 (61.36%) 30 (53.57%) 23 (46.00%) 58(61.70%)
Senior sailor 6 (13.64%) 11 (19.64%) 12(24.00%) 17(18.08%)
Officer 11 (25.00%) 15 (26.79%) 15 (30.00%) 19(20.21%)
With regard to individuals who completed screenings on more than one occasion 
(allowing for comparisons of scores and indicators of disorder over time), 30 
participants completed both the four month and 11 month screening, 22 participants 
completed both the four month and 4-6 year screening, 29 participants completed both
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the 11 month and 4-6 year screening, and 17 participants completed all three screenings 
(four month, 11 month, and 4-6 years).
3.3.3 Generalisations about the sample
Rayner (2005) reported on the mental health of Australian Navy personnel 
involved in operational deployments in the middle-east between 2001 and 2005. This 
sample was considered to represent Navy personnel, although did not include all ship- 
types in the Navy and did not include HMAS Westralia. However, given the large 
number of personnel (n=1739) and the large number of cohort involved (10 separate 
ships), it could be viewed as generally representative of the Royal Australian Navy.
Male
Junior
Sailor
Female Male 
Junior Senior 
Sailor Sailor
t l1
Female Male
Senior Officer
Sailor
Female
Officer
m W estralia 
□  Na\y
Gender and Rank
Figure 5. Comparison of gender and rank distribution between Sample 1 (n=94) and Australian
Navy personnel (Rayner, 2005, n=1739).
Figure 5 and Table 1 display the gender and rank percentage distribution of 
Sample 1 sub-groups at four months, 11 months and four to six years, as well as the 
HMAS Westralia survivor population, and the Navy sample of Rayner (2005). While 
there are some minor variations within the relative distribution of gender and rank, the 
trends across each sample at each time-point are the same as that of the HMAS
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Westralia population at the time of the fire, and the larger Navy sample (i.e.: a 
considerably higher proportion of males and junior sailors, than females, and senior 
sailors or officers). The relatively small sample sizes of each time-sample and the 
HMAS Westralia population, compared to the larger Navy sample, could lead to an 
amplification of the apparent differences in percentage distribution; as one or two 
individual cases may result in a proportionally larger percentage variation. Taking these 
variations into consideration, the trends in the demographic breakdown indicate that 
each subgroup of Sample 1 is considered to be representative of the HMAS Westralia 
population, which in turn, is representative of the larger Navy sample.
3.3.4 Measures used
Of greatest significance in determining prevalence of distressing psychological 
reactions to potentially traumatic events are two questionnaires measuring symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These are the Impact of Events Scale -  Revised 
(IES-R), and the Posttraumatic Check List -  Civilian version (PCL-C). Non-trauma- 
specific questionnaires that measure aspects of mental health related to trauma are the 
General Health Questionnaire -  28 item version (GHQ-28), and the Alcohol Use 
Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT). Different measures were used at different times. 
The IES-R was used only at the four and eleven month screenings. The other measures 
were used only at the four to six screening. The measures were administered in 
accordance with the instructions for each measure. The principal researcher was one of 
approximately three Department of Defence Psychologists who administered the IES-R 
at the four and eleven month screening, and administered nearly all of the measures at
the four to six year screen.
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3.3.4.1 Impact o f Events Scale -  Revised
The IES-R is a development of the original Impact of Events Scale (IES) 
developed by Horowitz, Wilner and Alvarez (1979) for studying the level of 
symptomatic responses to trauma. Weiss and Marmar (1997) describe the original IES 
as being based on Horowitz’s conceptualization of trauma comprising intrusion and 
avoidance. This pre-dated the diagnosis of PTSD by the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (1980) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual -  third edition (which included 
a wider range of symptoms to the diagnosis).
The original IES was a 15-item questionnaire with respondents rating on an 
unequal-interval, five-point scale (scoring 0, 1, 3 or 5), the impact of items related to 
intrusion and avoidance of life events during the past week (but did not include a rating 
of description of the event itseli). Weiss and Marmar (1997) describe the original IES as 
being well regarded, with good reliability, validity and usefulness. However, Weiss and 
Marmar (1997), along with Bryant and Harvey (2000), consider the IES’s diagnostic 
usefulness to be limited by its lack of an indicator of hyperarousal (which was later 
included in the DSM as a diagnostic criterion for PTSD).
With the introduction of the DSM-IV, the IES was revised to include a measure 
of hyperarousal symptoms, and renamed the Impact of Events Scale -  Revised (IES-R). 
Along with six new items addressing hyperarousal, one existing item was split into two 
separate items. The IES-R became a 22-item questionnaire with subscales measuring 
symptoms of intrusion, avoidance, and hyperarousal associated with stressful life 
events. The IES-R items are similar, but not identical to, the diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD in the DSM-IV and ICD-10, and the IES-R is more compatible with the DSM-IV 
criteria for PTSD, than the IES. However, as the IES-R does not measure the degree of 
exposure to a trauma event (which is a criterion for PTSD for both the DSM-IV and the
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ICD-10), the IES-R can indicate degree of symptom severity against common PTSD- 
type symptoms; but cannot, on its own, diagnose PTSD. For this reason, the IES-R 
should be said to only indicate, rather than diagnose, PTSD.
Weiss and Marmar (1997) recommend modifying the scoring from the original 4 
point-scale (0, 1, 3, 5), to an equal interval, 5 point-scale (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 for endorsing 
responses o f ‘not at all’, ‘a little bit’, ‘moderately’, ‘quite a bit’, and ‘ extremely’ 
respectively), and using the mean score of non-missing items along with a total item 
score. Using these scoring rules, Creamer, Bell and Failla (2003) recommend a cutoff 
mean score o f 1.5. Asukai, Kato, Kawamura, Kim, Yamamoto, Kishimoto, Miyake, Y., 
& Nishizono-Maher (2002) recommend a total cutoff score of 24/25 (equivalent to a 
mean item score of 1.14) to screen for PTSD at either an early or late state of trauma, 
although they report that a cutoff of 29/30 (equivalent to a mean item score of 1.36) 
provided an equal level o f sensitivity and specificity.
The mean item cutoff score of 1.5 (equivalent to a total score of 33) 
recommended by Creamer et al. (2003) is used in this study, in preference to the lower 
1.36 (equivalent to a total score of 25) recommended by Asukai et al. (2002). This 
decision was based on the participants in Creamer et al.’s (2003) study (Australian 
Vietnam veterans) being considered to more closely approximate the sample in this 
study than Asukai et al.’s (2002) Japanese civilian participants.
The IES-R is not as frequently used as its predecessor, the IES. However, it is 
reported to have good internal consistency, good re-test reliability at up to five months, 
good predictive power, correlates well with a similar screening questionnaire for PTSD, 
and has been reported at least six times, as being used to measure PTSD symptoms 
following traumatic or high stress events. A copy of the IES-R questionnaire is attached
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as Appendix E, and the psychometric properties of the IES-R are detailed in Table 16 
(Appendix I).
3.3.4.2 Posttraumatic Check List -  Civilian version
The Posttraumatic Check List (PCL) is a 17-item checklist based on the items 
for Criteria B, C, and D of the DSM-IV’s PTSD diagnostic criteria. Participants indicate 
on an equal-interval five-point scale, (rating from a score of one, for ‘not at all’, to five, 
for ‘extremely’) their experiences of symptoms during the past month. The overall 
range of scores is 17-85. There are three versions of the PCL, each with very slight 
wording differences in some questions. These are the civilian version (known as the 
PCL-C); the military version (known as the PCL-M); and the stress version (known as 
the PCL-S). Examples of the types of differences in wording relate to reporting of 
symptoms include: “Repeated disturbing memories, thought, or images of a stressfu l 
experience fro m  the p a s t” (PCL-C); “Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts or 
images of a stressfu l m ilitary  experience” (PCL-M); and “Repeated, disturbing 
memories, thoughts, or images of the stressfu l experience” (PCL-S) (italics added for 
emphasis of differences only). The PCL-C appears to be by far, the most commonly 
used and generic version of the PCL. While the name ‘military version’ may, at face 
value, seem more appropriate for use with a military sample, the differences between it 
an the other versions is minor. The military version of the PCL-C asks about military 
experiences, which may lead respondents who experience PTSD symptoms from non­
military situations, to either not report them, or try to determine which symptoms may 
be a result of military experiences, and which may not. To reduce this type of confusion 
and its resulting false negatives, I have chosen to use the PCL-C for this study.
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As the PCL-C measures symptoms that are based on the DSM-IV diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD, it is more closely aligned to measuring a specific condition (PTSD) 
than the IES-R. However, like the IES-R, the PCL-C does not measure the degree of 
exposure to a trauma event (which is a criterion for PTSD for both the DSM-IV and the 
ICD-10). Therefore, like the IES-R, the PCL (all versions) only indicates, but does not 
diagnose, PTSD.
Forbes, Creamer and Biddle (2001) state that the commonly used total cutoff 
score of 50, and an individual item score of three (to satisfy individual DSM-IV 
criteria), are optimal for indicating PTSD. Newman, Kaloupek and Keane (1996) 
describe the advantages of the PCL-C being its psychometric properties and its brevity, 
with the disadvantage of being validated mostly with a single sample group -  that of 
male combat veterans. Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, and Fomeris (1996) 
address the concerns of Newman et al. (1996) by studying the PCL on female, non­
combat samples. They supported the use of the PCL as a screening tool for possible 
PTSD, although noted that gender differences may need to be considered and proposed 
a different cut-off for female, non-combat samples. Ventureyra, et al. (2002) support the 
use of the PCL as a simple self-report instrument, recommending a cutoff score of 44 in 
screening for PTSD in female populations.
The scoring rule of Forbes, Creamer and Biddle (2001) - requiring a total cutoff 
score of 50 and an individual item score of three (applied to DSM-IV criteria for PTSD) 
to indicate PTSD is used in this study. The cutoff of 50+ is commonly used with 
military veterans, is commonly used in male dominated samples, and has been used 
with Australian military samples.
The PCL-C is a commonly used measure to screen for PTSD symptoms and is 
reported to have good internal consistency, good predictive power, good re-test
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reliability over 1-2 weeks, correlates at a good level with up to five other commonly 
used measures for PTSD, and is well validated for use with people who have 
experienced a large range of potentially traumatic events. A copy of the PCL-C 
questionnaire is attached, as Appendix F, while the psychometric properties of the PCL- 
C are reported in detail in Table 17 (Appendix I).
3.3.4.3 General Health Questionnaire -  28 item version
Goldberg and Williams (1988) describe the General Health Questionnaire 
(GHQ) as: “a self-administered screening test aimed at detecting psychiatric disorder 
among respondents in community settings and non-psychiatric clinical settings” 
(Goldberg & Williams, 1988, p i). They report that the GHQ indicates state, rather than 
longer-standing, trait distress. The GHQ was originally developed as a 60-item 
questionnaire (GHQ-60), but has been shortened into a 30-item questionnaire (GHQ- 
30), a 28-item version (GHQ-28) and a 12-item version (GHQ-12). The GHQ-28 is the 
only version of the GHQ to include sub-scales. These sub-scales measure somatic 
symptoms, anxiety, social dysfunction, and depression. The GHQ-28 sub-scales are 
based on factor analysis and represent dimensions of symptoms rather than diagnostic 
classifications. Further, they are not independent of each other. However, they allow for 
understanding the relative contributions of these dimensions to total GHQ-28 scores.
Respondents are asked to rate on a 4-point scale, their experience of potentially 
distressing condition, over the past two weeks. The scale rates conditions from ‘less 
than usual’, through ‘no more than usual’, ‘rather more than usual, to ‘much more than 
usual’. The usual means of establishing indicators of disorder, or an overall level of 
symptom reporting, is to score items on the four-point scale as 0-0-1-1 depending on 
which of the responses is endorsed by the participant. This approach is generally
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referred to as GHQ scoring. Goldberg & Williams, 1988 report on 16 studies of the 
GHQ-28 with a common threshold score to indicate disorder, as being 5 or greater, with 
a positive predictive value of the GHQ-28 of 0.67.
However, Goodchild and Duncan-Jones (1985) highlight potential problems 
with this scoring method, due to concerns regarding the wording and meanings of some 
items. A number o f items provide a choice of responding ‘same as usual’. In GHQ 
scoring, endorsement of this answer is considered to show a lack of symptoms 
(presumably because ‘usual’ is considered to be symptom-free). Goodchild and 
Duncan-Jones argue that this assumption may be incorrect, especially with people with 
chronic conditions, or where symptoms last longer than two weeks. In such cases, 
endorsing ‘same as usual’ will then refer to the respondent experiencing the symptom as 
being as severe or distressing as usual. Goodchild and Duncan-Jones argue that using 
the usual GHQ scoring with respondent who may have chronic conditions will result in 
lower rates of identified disorders than may be the case.
In response to these concerns, Goodchild and Duncan-Jones (1985) propose an 
alternate scoring system for the GHQ, to correct this perceived bias toward false 
positives. The alternate scoring method is referred to as CGHQ scoring, with the ‘C’ 
indicating recognition of ‘chronic’ conditions. CGHQ scoring involves dividing 
questions into those where an endorsement of ‘same as usual’, indicates positive mental 
health (such as ‘have you recently felt capable of making decision about things?’) from 
those where endorsement would indicate negative health (such as ‘have you recently felt 
that life isn’t worth living?’). For those questions where endorsement of ‘same as usual’ 
indicates negative mental health (questions A2 -  A7, B1-B7, C2, and D1 -  D7), 
responses are scored 0-1-1-1, while those where endorsement of ‘same as usual’ 
indicates positive mental health (questions A l, C l, and C3 -  C7), are scored in the usual
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0-0-1-1 manner. Goodchild and Duncan-Jones argue that using the CGHQ scoring 
results in a more accurate reflection of chronicity and therefore a more accurate index of 
a person’s condition, has greater stability over time, and is a more robust tool for 
research, than GHQ scoring. While the CGHQ scoring was developed on the GHQ-30, 
Goodchild and Duncan-Jones state that it is equally applicable to the GHQ-28 and other 
GHQ versions. With the GHQ-28, Goodchild and Duncan-Jones endorse a revised 
threshold score to indicate disorder, of 12/13.
Applying the CGHQ scoring system to the 12-item version of the GHQ, 
Whaley, Morrison, Payne Fritschi and Wall (2005) reported that the CGHQ scoring 
system was consistently superior to GHQ scoring method, more strongly correlated with 
measures of anxiety and depression than the GHQ scoring system, and displayed 
superior internal consistency. Whaley et al. (2005) also concluded that the CGHQ 
scoring was psychometric ally appropriate for occupational samples. Koeter, van den 
Brink and Ormel (1989) compared the two scoring systems on the GHQ-28 to assess 
psychiatric outpatients. They reported that while the CGHQ scoring system was 
superior to the usual GHQ scoring, the improvement was only marginal.
The GHQ-28 provides subscale scores for somatic complaints, anxiety, social 
dysfunction and depression. However, scoring criteria for these subscales are based on 
factor analysis rather than specifically on DSM-IV or ICD-10 criteria, and there is some 
overlap between subscales. Like the IES-R and the PCL-C, the GHQ-28 indicates, 
rather than diagnoses, specific conditions.
The CGHQ scoring technique, with a cutoff score to indicated disorder of 13+, 
as endorsed by Goodchild and Duncan-Jones (1985), will be used in this study as a 
measure of general psychological distress.
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The GHQ-28 is very well reported on for its good predictive power. Its re-test 
reliability has been established over eight months, and while it has been most frequently 
validated in general mental health setting, has been used to measure psychological 
distress in people who have experienced potentially traumatic events. A copy of the 
GHQ-28 questionnaire is attached, as Appendix G, while the psychometric properties of 
the GHQ-28 are detailed in Table 18 (Appendix I).
3.3.4.4 Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT)
Co-morbidity between PTSD and substance abuse in general, is well- 
established, with alcohol being the substance most commonly reported co-morbidly 
with PTSD in Australian sufferers (Mills, Teeson, Ross & Peters, 2006). Therefore, a 
measure of alcohol-related problems is appropriate in this study.
The World Health Organisation developed the Alcohol Use Disorder 
Identification Test (AUDIT) as a simple screen to “identify persons with hazardous and 
harmful patterns of alcohol consumption” (Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, Maristela 
& Monteiro, 2001, p4). The AUDIT was designed to be used by a range of health 
professions, in a wide range of health settings, and identifies hazardous drinking 
patterns (consumption that leads to an increased risk of harmful consequences), harmful 
use patterns (leading to physical, mental health and social consequences), and alcohol 
dependence (behavioural, cognitive and physiological phenomenon that concern a 
strong desire to use alcohol; impaired ability to control consumption despite harmful 
consequences; prioritizing alcohol consumption above other activities and obligations; 
increasing tolerance; and withdrawal symptoms when discontinued).
The AUDIT comprises 10 questions that can be delivered as an oral interview or 
written questionnaire. Respondents use a five-point, equal-interval, Likert scale to rate
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responses to eight of the ten questions (scored 0-1-2-3-4), with the remaining two 
questions answered on a three-point, equal-interval, scale (scored 0-2-4). This provides 
for a total score ranging from 0 to 40. Babor, et al., (2001) recommend that scores of 8 
or more be used to indicate alcohol problems. Slightly higher or lower scores influence 
either, but not both, sensitivity and specificity. Further, Babor, et al. (2001) note that 
scores of one or more on Questions 2 or 3 indicate consumption at a hazardous level, 
points scored on questions four to six indicate possible alcohol dependence, and points 
scored on questions seven to ten indicate harmful alcohol use. Overall scores of up to 
seven indicates a low level of alcohol problems, while scores of eight to 15 indicate a 
medium level of alcohol problems, scores above 16 indicate a high level of alcohol 
problems, and scores above 20 indicating further diagnostic evaluation for alcohol 
dependence.
The AUDIT is reported to have good internal consistency, is well reported on for 
its predictive power, has good re-test reliability at up to one month, correlates well with 
other measures of alcohol abuse, and has been often used with military veterans to 
screen for alcohol problems. A copy of the AUDIT questionnaire is attached as 
Appendix H, while its psychometric properties are detailed in Table 19 (Appendix I).
3.3.5 Method
The psychology files from all personnel involved in the fire in HMAS Westralia 
were examined for data that could answer the Research Questions. In the Australian 
Defence Force, all personnel have a psychology file, created as a matter of course 
during recruitment, and added to on an ad-hoc basis during their career. It is routine 
procedure for all psychological tests and questionnaires results to be recorded in 
psychology files. The psychology files of all 94 survivors of the fire in HMAS
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Westralia were examined in January 2006, approx seven and a half years after the fire 
(May 1998). Data from mental health screenings conducted since the fire were 
transcribed into a database, which was then analysed to answer the research questions.
3.3.6 Ethical Issues
This study summarises existing data, with no reporting of individual results. As 
such, the only ethical concern involves the release of information. The project was 
approved by the Australian Defence Human Research Ethics Committee (ADHREC), 
and the University of Wollongong/Illawarra Area Health Service Human Ethics 
committees (see Appendices B and C for copies of approval). With the approval of 
these Ethics Review Committees, the Director of the Defence Force Psychology 
Organisation agreed to release the information requested.
3.3.7 Statistical Analysis
Test scores from psychological screening were transferred to a project database 
suitable for analysis with the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) -  version 11. 
Statistical analysis will be limited due to the size of the study group, and the 
requirement for mostly descriptive analysis.
Assumptions o f normality of the distribution of the PCL-C scores were tested. 
The result, K-S (Lilliefors) =0.197, df = 44, a = .000, indicates that normality of the 
PCL-C distribution of scores cannot be assumed. Therefore, non-parametric statistical 
techniques will be used.
For Research Questions 1 and 2 (prevalence of symptoms), descriptive reporting 
of results is provided. This involves reporting the number of participants exceeding 
established cutoffs indicating the conditions of interest, and reporting of the distribution
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of test scores. For Question 3, the results of Research Questions 1 and 2 are further 
analysed to reveal comparisons between sub-groups based on gender and rank grouping. 
To assess for proportionality of gender and rank sub-groups, a series of Chi-Square tests 
will be used. Results for Question 4 (comparison over time) are the result of analysis of 
data obtained at three different times. Finally, Research Question 5 compares the results 
obtained from Research Questions 1 to 4, with samples that compare to Sample 1, to 
provide meaning to these results.
Where correlations are reported, the size of the correlations can be interpreted 
using the descriptions provided by Cohen (1988). Correlations of +.10 to +.29 will be 
described as small associations, while correlations of +.30 to +.49 are described as 
medium associations, and correlations of +.50 to 1.00 are described as large 
associations.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Research Question 1 -  The prevalence of trauma.
Available data for Sample 1 was retrieved from three sources: screening 
conducted approximately four months after the fire (using the IES-R); approximately 11 
months after the fire (again using the IES-R); and four to six year after the fire (using 
the PCL-C).
3.4.1.1 Indicators of PTSD at 4 months.
From the screening undertaken four months after the fire, IES-R scores for 44 
participants (46.81% of those who survived the fire) were located and reviewed. All 
were complete and valid questionnaires. Mean-item IES-R scores for this screening 
range from 0.00 to 3.36 (equivalent to a total score range of 0 to 74). Within Sample 1,
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seventeen participants (38.64%) are indicated for PTSD (exceeding the mean item 
cutoff score of 1.5). The mean, mean item score is 1.10, SD=0.90; equivalent to an IES- 
R total score of 24.29, SD=19.74.
3.4.1.2 Indicators of PTSD trauma at 11 months.
The results of 56 participants who survived the fire (59.57%), and who 
completed the IES-R at 11 months after the fire, were located and reviewed. All were 
complete and valid questionnaires. Total mean-item IES-R scores range from 0.00 to 
3.45 (equivalent to a total score range of 0 to 76). Again, within Sample 1, 17 
participants (30.36%) are indicated for PTSD. The mean, mean item score for the IES-R 
is 1.09, SD=0.89, equivalent of an IES-R total score of 24.09, SD=19.60.
3.4.1.3 Indicators of PTSD at four to six years.
The results of 50 participants who survived the fire (53.19%) and who 
completed the PCL-C during the 4-6 year review were examined. All questionnaires 
were complete and valid. Total raw PCL-C scores for this group range from a minimum 
of 17 to a maximum of 68 (total possible range of the PCL-C -  17 to 85). Nine 
participants (18.00%) exceeded the PCL-C cutoff raw score of 50+. Of these, eight 
participants (16.00% of the sample) also met the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD resulting 
from individual DSM-IV criterion item scores of three or more. Therefore, the 
prevalence rate for indicated PTSD in Sample 1 at 4-6 years after the fire is 16.00%. 
The mean PCL-C score is 33.36, SD=14.25.
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3.4.2 Research Question 2 - Other mental health indicators at 4-6 years.
Along with the PCL-C, both the GHQ-28 and the AUDIT were administered as 
part of mental health screening undertaken 4-6 years after the fire in Sample 1. Both 
measures are therefore useful in assessing co-existing mental health disorders in Sample
1 .
3.4.2.1 Indicators of general psychological distress.
Complete and valid GHQ-28 questionnaires were available for 50 participants. 
Using CGHQ scoring criteria, 26 participants (52.00%) are identified as displaying 
disorders involving general psychological distress (CGHQ scores of >12). Total scores 
(CGHQ scoring) range from 1-27, with a mean of 12.50, SD=7.47.
Figure 6 displays the individual subscale scores, indicating that the Anxiety and 
Somatic Concerns Subscales contribute relatively more to the Total GHQ-28 score 
(29.54% and 34.87% respectively), than either the Social Dysfunction or Depression 
Subscales (19.43% and 16.24% respectively).
Som atic Anxiety Social Depression
Concerns Dysfunction
GHQ-28 Subscales
Figure 6. GHQ-28 mean subscale scores, n=50.
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3.4.2.2 Indicators of alcohol problems.
As with other questionnaires from the 4-6 year screen, complete and valid 
AUDIT questionnaires were available for 50 participants. Of these, 14 participants 
(28.00%) are indicated for alcohol problems (exceeding the cutoff scores of >7). The 
mean AUDIT score is 6.94, SD=5.06.
Table 2 displays the prevalence of alcohol related disorders, identified by 
AUDIT, along with the indicated degree of alcohol problem, and type of problem. This 
suggests that most participants indicated as displaying disorder were drinking at a 
moderate level, with little difference between types of use. Of the nine participants who 
are indicated for PTSD, six (66.7%) are indicated as displaying alcohol-related 
disorders, with two participants (22.2%) indicating a high level of alcohol problems.
Table 2.
Number of Participants Indicated as Displaying Alcohol-related Disorders (scores >7), Degree of 
Elevation of Scores, and Type of Alcohol Problems identified in Sample, 1 using the AUDIT. N=50
Indicated for Moderate High Hazardous use Alcohol Harmful alcohol
disorder
use use
dependence use
14 10 4 14 9 11
28.00% 20.00% 8.00% 28.00% 18.00% 22.00%
3.4.4.3 Overall Mental Health
Table 3 displays the number and percentage of participants considered either 
indicated for any of the three possible disorders, or not, in the four to six year mental 
health screening.
48
Table 3.
Number and Percentage of Sample Indicated and not indicated fo r PTSD at Four to six year Screening, 
based on Scores fo r Three Mental Health Measures. N=50
PCL-C GHQ-28 AUDIT
(score of 50+) (score of 13+) (score of 8+)
Indicated for PTSD 8 (16.00%) 26 (52.00%) 14(28.00%)
Not indicated for PTSD 42 (84.00%) 24 (48.00%) 36 (72.00%)
Using the cutoff scores provided for each measure, the mental health of Sample 
1, at four to six years after the fire (n=50), can be summarized as follows:
• Eight participants (16.00%) are indicated for PTSD;
• 26 participants (52.00%) are indicated for general psychological distress;
• 14 participants (28.00%) are indicated for alcohol problems;
• 29 participants (58.00%) are indicated for disorder on any one measure;
• Five participants (10.00%) are indicated for disorder on all three measures;
• 21 participants (42.00%) are considered not indicated for disorder on all 
measures; and
• Of the 8 participants indicated for PTSD, all are indicated for disorders 
involving general psychological distress and six (75%) are indicated for alcohol- 
related disorders.
3.4.3 Research Question 3 - Intra-group differences.
Analysis of differences within Sample 1 is restricted by size and evenness of 
sizes of subgroups. However, while considering these limitations, reporting and 
describing prevalence can still be made.
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A series of Chi-Square tests of distribution were undertaken to assess possible 
associations between gender, rank, and indications o f disorder, on all measures. Chi- 
Square rests will determine whether the distribution of participants categories as having 
disorder or not, on each measure, is consistent with gender and rank distribution of the 
sample. As Chi-square tests use categorical data (such as disorder or no-disorder) rather 
than continuous data, they are appropriate to use with PCL-C data, which does not have 
a normal distribution.
For the measures o f mental health, two categories (disorder or no disorder) were 
used. For gender, two categories (male or female) were used. While rank in the military 
is usually defined as Junior Sailor, Senior Sailor and Officer, the small numbers in some 
rank categories would have resulted in almost all invalid results if three rank categories 
were used. To increase the number of valid analyses involving rank, the categories of 
Senior Sailor and Officer were combined, to result in two categories of rank (Junior 
Sailor or Senior Sailor / Officer). Table 4 displays the results of the series of Chi-Square 
tests undertaken.
No results are included for the analysis of association between PCL-C as 50% of 
the cells had expected counts of less than 5, invalidating the Chi-Square test. While the 
analyses for IES-R administered at 11 months and gender, and PCL-C and gender each 
had 25% of cells with counts of less than 5 would also strictly be invalidated, the 
number of cells with counts of >5 is close to the 80% required, and are based on only 1 
cell each with a count below 5 (the percentage with cell counts below 5 can only be 0% 
or 25% - therefore, while it is possible that they are invalid, it is also possible that they 
could be valid). They are maintained in table 4 for consistency with other test, to help 
corroborate overall trends in the remaining data.
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Table 4.
Results o f Pearson’s Chi-Square test of association between gender and rank, and dependent variable, 
for Sample 1.
IES-R IES-R PCL-C GHQ-28 AUDIT
(4 months) (11 months) (four to six years) (four to six years) (four to six years)
n=44 n=56
o<nIIe n=50 o•nIIc
Gender X2=.877 X 2= 1.040* X 2= .0 \9 * X2=.254 X 2= 2 .6 6 7
(P=.349) (p=.308) (p=.890) (p=.614) (P=.102)
Rank X2=2.667 X2=1.217 X 2= 3 4 9 X 2=. 125
ii © (P=.270) (p=.555) (p=.723)
* 25% of cells have expected count of <5.
Table 4 displays that none of the Chi-Square tests administered have p 
values below .05, indicating that there are no significant associations between gender, 
rank, and the dependent variables. The tests based on analyses with cell counts below 5, 
contain the same findings, corroborating the other tests indicating that there are no 
significant associations between gender, rank, and the classifications of disorder or no 
disorder on the dependent variables (trauma, general psychological distress and alcohol 
problems).
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Research Question 1 - prevalence of indicated trauma
The prevalence of indicated PTSD in Sample 1 were determined at four months, 
eleven months, and four to six years after the fire in HMAS Westralia, using the PCL-C.
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The prevalence rate for indicated PTSD at four months, eleven months, and four to six 
years, respectively, are 38.64%, 30.36%, and 16.67%. Ninety-four people survived the 
fire, with sample sizes for this study of 44, 56, and 48 at four months, eleven months 
and four to six year after the fire, respectively.
While the prevalence rates are determined from available data, they only include 
people who were in the Navy at the time of screening. As such, the available samples 
may not be representative of the entire ship’s company. Those with PTSD, may, as a 
group, be less likely to remain in the same employment if the trauma occurred in the 
workplace, in order to avoid the distress association with ongoing reminders of the 
event. It could further be expected that separation from employment due to the impact 
of PTSD would be cumulative over time. Therefore, the possible impact of this 
separation due to PTSD may be greater at the four to six year screening, than at earlier 
times. However, while actually knowing the reasons for discharging from the navy 
would help clarify this process, reasons for discharging from the Navy are not easily 
obtainable. Such data is not recorded in the files used to extract other data used in this 
study, and may not actually be recorded at all (especially if personnel did not 
specifically declare reasons). It was considered that the degree of difficulty to obtain 
access to other files that may not reveal any significant information, and was not 
pursued. As part of Study 2, all personnel who had left the Navy at the time of the study 
were approached by letter, to seek contribution to the study. Only two of the more than 
50 people written to, replied, indicating that contacting individual to seek information 
on why they discharged from the Navy, would not have been fruitful. Therefore, while a 
viable theory, the possibility that those who remained in the Navy four to six years after 
the fire, may, as a group, have had less disorder than those who left in the first years 
following the fire, remains only speculative.
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This effect suggests that the prevalence rate of indicated PTSD in the HMAS 
Westralia sample should be considered conservative, and that the actual prevalence may 
be higher. At the four to six years screening, the actual prevalence rate may be higher 
than indicated, as almost half of the survivors were not in the Navy at the time and did 
not take part in this study. It could reasonably be expected that the half that did not take 
part in the study may have a higher rate of indicated PTSD that did those who did. 
Therefore, the established prevalence rate at four to six years, of 16.67%, should be 
considered to be a conservative figure.
It is tempting to attribute the prevalence of indicated PTSD in HMAS Westralia 
solely to the fire. However, the measures used to indicate PTSD do not discriminate 
between distressing psychological reactions associated with the fire in HMAS 
Westralia, and distressing psychological reactions associated with other possible causes. 
In a study of Australian Navy personnel at the commencement of deployments, Rayner 
(2005) established that about 1.2% of personnel (n=460) exceeded a cutoff score of 50+ 
on the PCL-C. While this cutoff doesn’t use the additional criteria for indicating PTSD 
(a cutoff score of 50+ and endorsement of three items for each criteria in the DSM-IV), 
it can be used to provide a correction for baseline, or underlying levels of indicated 
PTSD in a Navy sample. Applying this correction to the established prevalence rate of 
16.00% indicates a corrected prevalence rate of indicated PTSD associated with the fire 
in HMAS Westralia, of 14.80% (excluding a probable pre-existing rate of PTSD).
Two corrections to the prevalence rates of indicated rates of disorder have now 
been described. One indicates that the initial prevalence rate of 16.00% is lower than it 
actually should be, while the one indicates that this prevalence rate is inflated. While it 
is impossible to determine precisely with the data available whether one should cancel 
the other out, some speculation can be provided. I propose that a correction resulting
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from people leaving the Navy due to PTSD (and rendering the determined prevalence 
rate of indicated PTSD as conservative), is likely to have a greater impact than a 
correction due to a pre-existing or baseline rate.
3.5.2 Research Question 2 - other mental health indicators
The prevalence rate of indicated disorder involving general psychological 
distress in Sample 1, using the GHQ-28 (with CGHQ scoring), four to six years after the 
fire, is 54.17%. In addition to establishing a prevalence rate, the scores on individual 
subscales, for those identified as displaying disorder (n=26), is provided, with the 
results displayed in Figure 7.
Somatic Anxiety Social Depression
Concerns Dysfunction
GHQ-28 Subscales
Figure 7. Relative contribution of each GHQ-28 subscale score, to the total GHQ-28 score, for
participants indicated as displaying disorder involving general psychological distress 
(n=26).
Figure 7 indicates that for participants identified as disorders involving general 
psychological distress, the elevation in their scores is more attributable to scores for the
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Anxiety and Somatic Concerns subscales, than to Social Dysfunction or Depression 
subscales.
In addition to the simple reporting of indicators of mental health at three times, 
the predictability o f one measure at one time, on other measures at other times, can also 
be made.
Table 5.
Intercorrelation matrix of associations between study measures.
IES-R 2 
(11 month)
PCL-C 
(4 to 6 year)
GHQ-28 
(4 to 6 year)
AUDIT 
(4 to 6 year)
.IT .53a .11 .23
IES-R 1 Sig (2-tailed) .000 Sig (2-tailed) .008 Sig (2-tailed) .613 Sig (2-tailed) .271
(4 month) n=31 n=24 n=24 N=24
,76a .49 .37
IES-R 2 Sig (2-tailed) .000 Sig (2-tailed) .006 Sig (2-tailed) .043
(11 month)
oCOIIC n=30 N=30
,55a ,34h
PCL-C Sig (2-tailed) .000 Sig (2-tailed) .016
(4 to 6 year) n50 N=50
31h
GHQ-28 Sig (2-tailed) .026
(4 to 6 year) N=50
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 5 displays an intercorrelational matrix of all study variables. The 
significant associations are: a large and positive association between measures of PTSD 
at all three times; and while there are significant associations between measures of 
PTSD and measures of both general psychological distress and alcohol problems (at 
four to six years), measures of PTSD are more strongly associated with general 
psychological distress than alcohol problems.
3.5.3 Research Question 3 - Intra-group differences.
Table 4 indicates that gender and rank are not associated with indicators of 
disorder at any of the three screenings. While Sample 1 is small and limited to the one 
event, these results can be compared to the findings within an Australian Navy sample 
(n=1739), reported by Rayner (2005). Rayner determined that PTSD was about twice as 
prevalent in females, than males, compared with no significant difference in prevalence 
due to gender in Sample 1. However, the finding with Sample 1 that there was no 
significant association between rank and disorder was consistent with the finding of 
Rayner.
3.5.4 Research Question 4 -  Indicators of distressing psychological reactions to 
potentially traumatic events, over time.
Figure 8 graphs the prevalence rates for indicated PTSD for Sample 1, at 
approximately four months, eleven months, and 4-6 years post-fire. While different 
measures are used (the IES-R at four, and eleven months, and the PCL-C at four to six 
years), it is disorder rates that are reported, rather than specific scores.
The trend in disorder, reported in Figure 8, is for decreasing rates of disorder 
with increasing time, with the rate of decrease seemingly slowing with time. With
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regard  to changes in indicated PTSD over all three screening occasions, 17 individuals
were tracked across the three screenings (four months, 11 months and 4-6 years). Of
these, two (11.7%) were identified as displaying disorder at all three screenings and
eleven participants (64.7%) did not display disorder at any of the three screenings
(76.47% of the sample did not change status as either displaying disorder or not
displaying disorder). Three participants (17.6%) were considered to display disorder at
the first screening (four months) and were considered no longer to display disorder at
the four to six year screening, and one person (5.97%) was indicated as not displaying
disorder at the four month screening, but displayed disorder at the four to six year
screening. This indicates that most participants maintained the same status (either
indicated for disorder or not indicated for disorder) over time. Of those who changed
status, most were in the direction expected (changing from displaying disorder to no
longer displaying disorder over time). Only one of the 17 participants for whom
measures were taken on three occasions changed status from being not identified for
disorder, to displaying disorder, over time.
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Figure 8. Percentage of Sample 1 indicated for PTSD on PCL-C at three times since the fire.
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Sample 1 data therefore provide two trends. One is for PTSD prevalence to reduce over 
time, with the rate of reduction lessening with time. The second trend is for individuals 
to remain fairly stable with regard to their status as either reporting disorder or not, over 
time. The change in the overall prevalence in the sample is due to the change in status of 
disorder or not, in only a small number of individuals, rather than changes in prevalence 
of disorder across the sample.
The formal diagnosis of PTSD (DSM-IV and ICD-10) includes a delayed onset 
variant, whereby onset of symptoms does not occur until at least six months after the 
traumatic event. The results above indicate one possible case of delayed onset PTSD 
(the participant not indicated for PTSD at four months, but who was indicated at four to 
six years). One possible case from a pool of eight participants indicated for disorder 
suggests that the delayed onset variant of PTSD presents in the minority (12.5% of 
Sample 1).
The predictiveness of scores on trauma questionnaires at one time, on scores at 
other times, was established using correlations. As assumptions of normality for the 
PCL-C cannot be made, non-parametric correlations (Spearman correlations) are used. 
While different measures are used at different time, the correlation between the IES and 
PCL-C is considered to be large, at .84, pc.OOl (Creamer, Bell & Failla, 2003) and .77, 
pc.OOl (Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti, & Rabalais, 2003).
Table 6 displays the Spearman correlations between scores on the IES-R and 
PCL-C for the three screenings. All correlations are significant (p<.05, 2-tailed).
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Table 6.
Spearman Correlation Coefficients between Measures indicating PTSD, in Sample 1 at Four Months, 
Eleven Months and Four to six Years.
T1 (4 months)3 T2 11 months)3
T2 (11 months) r=.76, p<.000 (n=30)
T3 (4-6 years) r=.51, p<.015 (n=22) r=.74, p<.000 (n=29)
_____
b PCL-C
Table 6 indicates that the association between each of the screenings is large and 
positive. IES-R scores at four months predict IES-R scores at eleven months, and PCL- 
C scores at four to six years; and IES-R scores at eleven months predict PCL-C scores at 
four to six years. While the correlation is large between all three screenings, the 
correlation coefficient is at its least, over the greatest time interval (as would be 
reasonably expected, due to the greater likelihood of recovery with time, of the greater 
potential for influence by intervening variables with time).
3.5.5 Research Question 5 - Comparison with survivors of similar events.
Sample 1 comprises military personnel with a majority of males. The rate of 
long term indicated PTSD is 16.00%, psychological distress, 54.17% alcohol problems, 
29.17%. I will now describe the results of research with similar populations to provide 
meaning to the results from Study 1. This data is presented in tabular form in Tables 20­
22 (Appendix J).
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3.5.5.1 Comparing distressing psychological reactions.
The American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV (APA, 1994) provides 
prevalence rates for PTSD for community-based studies at 1% to 14%, and for high risk 
groups at 3% to 58%. Sample l ’s prevalence rate of 16.00% exceeds the upper range for 
the general community sample, and is in the lower third of a wide range for high-risk 
groups, at all three screenings.
Berg, Grieger and Spira (2005) examined the rates of PSTD, using the IES-R, in 
US Navy submariners, who had to abandon their submarine after flooding and fires 
threatened the crew with toxic smoke. This was a similar incident to that experienced by 
Sample 1; namely a single and unexpected incident, although one that both samples 
were trained to manage. Further, the mental health response to the incident appears 
similar to that for Sample 1 (see Appendix A for details). Using modified scoring 
procedures for the IES-R, Berg, et al., established a rate of indicated PTSD at seven 
months post-incident, of 9%. This is about one-third, to one-quarter the rate indicated in 
Sample 1 (37% and 31% at four and 11 months post-incident respectively). Berg, et al., 
describes the rate of indicated PTSD as unusually low, and attributed this to the 
specialist selection and training of the sample.
Grieger, Fullerton and Ursano (2003) assessed levels of psychological trauma, 
using the IES-R, in a mostly male sample of survivors of the 2001 terrorist attack on the 
Pentagon. They established a rate of disorder of 14%. The rate of indicated rate of 
disorder in Sample 1 was more than twice this rate at both four months and 11 months.
Rayner (2005) provides a baseline rate of psychological trauma, using the PCL- 
C, with Australian Navy personnel (n=1739) deployed on operations in the middle-east 
between 2001 and 2005. Using a cutoff score of 50+ to indicate disorder, Rayner (2005) 
established a prevalence rate of 1.4%, and a mean PCL-C score for a Navy sample of
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23.4, SD=7.4. In comparison, Sample 1 indicated PTSD at nearly 12 times the rate of 
the general Navy sample reported by Rayner (2005). Using a single-sample t-test, the 
distribution of Sample 1 mean PCL-C scores is significantly different (t=5.13, df=47, 
p<.005) to the distribution reported by Rayner (2005).
McKenzie, Ikin, McFarlane, Creamer, Forbes, Kelsall, Glass, Ittak, and Sim 
(2004) used the PCL-S with Australian veterans (n=1424) of the 1991 Gulf War and a 
control group (n=1548). Their sample was male, predominantly Navy participants 
(86.5%), and was assessed 10 years after the war. Using the PCL cutoff of 50+ to 
determine disorder, McKenzie et al. (2004) established a prevalence rate of trauma of 
7.9% for the study sample, and 4.6% for controls. Sample 1, assessed four to six years 
after the fire, had a prevalence rate of more than twice that of McKenzie et al.’s study 
group and nearly four times that of controls. While Sample 1 shows a reduction of 
disorder over time, and was conducted sooner after the fire than McKenzie et al.’s 
study, the reduction also appears to be slowing over time, and the difference in 
prevalence rate between the two samples may still indicate a higher prevalence rate 
among Sample 1, compared to the Navy veterans of the 1991 Gulf War.
Similar to McKenzie et al. (2004), Barrett, Doebbeling, Schwartz, Voelker, 
Falter, Woolson and Doebbeling (2002), and Kang, Natelson, Mahan, Lee and Murphy 
(2003) used the PCL (cutoff of 50+) to assess rates of disorder (PTSD) with US 
veterans of the 1991 Gulf War. Barrett et al. established a prevalence rate among a 
primarily Army sample (n=3682) of 3.4% for combat veterans, and 1.4% for non­
combat veterans. Kang et al. established a prevalence rate of 12.1% for Gulf war 
veterans, 4.3% for non-Gulf war veterans, and 7.7% for a Navy subset (n=1499). The 
prevalence rate for indicated PTSD in Sample 1 if the PCL-C cutoff of 50+ only were 
used would be revised to 18.00%, more than five times the rate for combat veterans
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(Barrett et al.), more than 13 times the rate for controls (Barrett et al.), more than four 
times the rate for US military (Kang et al.), and more than twice the rate of US Navy 
veterans of the 1991 Gulf War (Kang et al.).
O ’Brien and Hughes (1991) determined the prevalence of PTSD in British Army 
veterans, five years after they fought in the Falkland’s conflict (n=64), to be 22%. A 
further 28% of their sample reporting elevated PTSD symptoms (but presumable 
insufficient to be identified as displaying disorder). The rate of indicated PTSD in 
Sample 1 is lower than for the Falkland veterans’ sample.
Comparisons can also be made with non-combat military activity, such as 
peacekeeping activities. In their study of Australian peacekeepers deployed to Rwanda, 
Hodson, Ward and Rapee (2003) reported a long-term rate of PTSD of 15%. In a wide 
ranging analysis of peacekeeping, Litz, Gray and Bolton (2003) report a prevalence 
range of 3% to 15%, with a level of 8% being considered the norm. This prevalence rate 
is consistent with the rate established by Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich and Batres 
(1997), for US Army peacekeepers in Somalia. Sample 1 provides a prevalence rate of 
indicated PTSD at about twice the average rate expected as an average for peacekeeping 
operations, at the high end of the expected range, and at a similar rate to Australian 
peacekeepers who served in Rwanda.
Hull, Alexander and Klein (2002) studied the long-term effects of a large-scale 
fire at sea, with a large loss of life. Ten years after the 1988 Piper-Alpha Oil rig fire, in 
which 167 of the 226 participants aboard the oil rig were killed, Hull et al. (2002) 
established a prevalence rate of PTSD in survivors of 21% (with an estimate that 73% 
would have been indicated in the first three months after the disaster). The initial 
estimate of prevalence is about twice that of Sample 1 (which was 38.63% at four 
months, and 30.36% at 11 months). However, the longer term prevalence rate is similar
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to the rate determined for Sample 1, despite the much larger loss o f life in the Piper­
Alpha oil rig fire.
3.5.5.2 Comparing general psychological distress.
The prevalence rates for general psychological distress and alcohol problems for 
Sample 1 can also be compared with findings for similar samples. For Sample 1, the 
prevalence rate for indicated disorder for general psychological distress is 54.17%, and 
29.17%, for indicated alcohol problems.
In addition to using the PCL-S to study psychological trauma with a 
predominantly Australian navy sample who were veterans of the 1991 Gulf War, 
McKenzie, Ikin, McFarlane, Creamer, Forbes, Kelsall, Glass, Ittak, and Sim (2004) also 
administered the GHQ-12, a shortened version of the GHQ-28 based on GHQ-28 
questions (with GHQ scoring). They assessed a rate of disorder of 39.6%, with 32.5% 
for controls. Sample l ’s prevalence rate of 54.17% is higher than the study sample, and 
about one-and-a-half time the prevalence rate of the control group. However, Sample 1 
used CGHQ scoring, which more accurately assesses chronic conditions that GHQ 
scoring.
In their study of British Army participants involved in combat during the 1982 
Falkland’s war (n=64), O’Brien and Hughes (1991) used the GHQ-60, a 60-item 
version of the GHQ-28 from which the GHQ-28 is derived (using GHQ scoring). They 
established that 23.44% of their sample were indicated for disorders involving general 
psychological distress. The rate for Sample 1 is about twice the rate established by 
O’Brien and Hughes.
Chung, Easthope, Chung and Clark-Carter (1999) used the GHQ to study 
residents of a British housing estate who were narrowly missed by a crashing transport
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jet airliner. Chung et al.’s study was conducted six months after the incident and 
involved 82 residents of the estate. While the exact versions o f the GHQ used is not 
stated, it can be assumed that it was the 28 item version as sub-scale scores are 
discussed and only the GHQ-28 includes subscales (Goldberg & Williams, 1988). 
Chung et al. (1999) reported that 52% of residents sampled scored above the GHQ-28 
score for disorders involving general psychological distress. This is about the same 
prevalence rate as Sample 1. However, Chung et al.’s study was conducted much sooner 
after the incident than Sample 1 was, and it could be speculated that the rate may reduce 
over time, as did the prevalence rate for indicated PTSD.
In their study of the survivors of the Piper-Alpha oil rig fire, Hull, Alexander 
and Klein (2002) also used the GHQ-28 (although they may have used GHQ scoring, 
which may underestimate chronic disorder). Ten years after the fire, 44% of survivors 
were indicated for general psychological distress. While lower than Sample 1, Hull et 
al.’s sample may actually be similar given the tendency of GHQ scoring to 
underestimate rates of disorder.
3.5.5.3 Comparing alcohol problems.
With regard to alcohol use, McKenzie, McFarlane, Creamer, Ikin, Forbes, 
Kelsall, Clarke, Glass, Ittak and Sim (2006) reported that for a sample of Australian 
Navy male veterans of the 1991 Gulf War (n-1232), the prevalence of alcohol problems 
measured 10 years after the war (using the AUDIT) is 25.7%. However, McKenzie et al. 
(2006) use a cutoff score of 10+ to indicate disorder. While Sample 1 indicates alcohol 
problems at 29.17%, and is higher than McKenzie et al.’s findings, the standard cutoff 
score of eight or more is used with Sample 1. If the cutoff of 10+ (used by McKenzie et
64
al., 2006) is applied to Sample 1, the revised prevalence rate would be 20.83% (lower 
than that established by McKenzie, et al.).
Erbes, Westermayer, Engdahl and Johnsen (2007) assessed alcohol use in a 
sample of mostly male, Army veterans, who had returned from military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. They indicated a rate of disorder of 27% in their sample, using 
the AUDIT. This is also about the same prevalence rate for indicated disorders 
involving alcohol problems as Sample 1.
The prevalence of indicated alcohol problems co-morbid to indicated PTSD in 
Sample 1 (22.2%), is similar to the co morbid rate of 24.1% reported by Mills, et al. 
(2006) in a large Australian study sample.
3.5.6 Summary of findings of Study 1.
The findings of Study 1 are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7.
Summary of the Major Findings of Study 1.
38.64% of Sample 1 are indicated for PTSD 4 months after the fire, 28.57% at 11 months after the fire, and 16.00% 
at four to six years after the fire. At each screenings, a majority of participants are not indicated for PTSD.
At 4-6 years after the fire in HMAS Westralia, 54.17%, or just over half the sample, are indicated with disorders 
involving general psychological distress.
General psychological distress appears to be associated more with anxiety and somatic concerns, than social 
dysfunction and depression.
At four to six years after the fire in HMAS Westralia, 29.17%, or between one-quarter and one-third of participants, 
were indicated for alcohol-related disorders, with 8.33% of the sample indicating a high level of alcohol problems. 
Alcohol problems are predominantly hazardous use, with a relatively smaller proportion with either alcohol 
dependence or harmful alcohol use.
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___________ _____________________________ Table 7 continued__________________
The size and makeup of the sample limits the confidence with which intra-group comparisons such as gender and 
rank can be made. However, there is no significant association between gender and rank, and rates of disorder for 
PTSD, general psychological distress and alcohol problems, at any screenings. The finding of increased numbers of 
males with PTSD in consistent with the distribution of gender within the sample
While these is variation in the overall sample prevalence of PTSD over time, there is general stability in status of 
individuals as either reporting PTSD or not. Therefore, the variation in the sample is due to changes in status of a 
small number of individuals, rather than across-the-board changes in status.
One possible case of delayed-onset PTSD is indicated (12.5% of the total number of PTSD cases and 2% of the 
sample). This suggests that delayed onset PTSD occurs in only a minority of the cases of PTSD.
There is a strong association between measures of PTSD at all screenings. Prevalence of PTSD, and individual 
scores on measures of PTSD, assessed in the months after the fire (as early as four months) has a strong association 
with PTSD prevalence of PTSD and scores on measures of PTSD up to four to six years.
The prevalence of indicated PTSD in Sample 1, four months and eleven months after the fire, is about twice the rate 
of a sample of survivors of the 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon.
The prevalence of indicated PTSD in Sample 1, four to six years after the fire, is: higher than for general community 
samples and within the range of at-risk samples; more than thirteen times that of a large, Australian Navy, normative 
sample; three to four times higher than a similar accident in a US Navy submarine; more than twice that of 
Australian and United States Navy samples, and higher than Australia and United States Army samples, taken 10 
years after the 1991 Gulf War; and about three-quarters that of either a British Army unit five years after combat in 
the Falklands War, or a sample of British civilian oil-rig workers, taken ten years after a major fire at sea.
The prevalence of disorders involving general psychological distress four to six years after the fire is: higher than 
for Australian Navy veterans of the 1991 Gulf War, and about twice that of controls; about twice that of British 
Army combat veterans five years after the Falklands War; about the same as survivors of a large disaster (plane 
crash), measured six months after the crash (although it is assumed that the difference at four to six years would be 
considerably less); and about the same as British survivors of a large oil-rig fire, measured 10 years after the fire.
The prevalence of disorders involving alcohol problems in Sample 1 four to six years after the fire is: about the 
same as an Australian Navy sample taken 10 years after the 1991 Gulf War; and about the same as a sample of US 
Army, male veterans recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan.
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3.5.7 Limitations of the study
The measures used in this study are primarily screening instruments, and used 
on their own, as they have been in this study, indicate, rather than diagnose disorders. 
Comprehensive diagnostic processes may result in different diagnostic rates. However, 
given the psychometrics of the measures used, the rates of indicated disorder, are in-line 
with comparable research.
The sample is an Australian Navy sample, and may not generalize to non­
military populations, or to other non-Navy military samples. However, it provides an 
example of a non-combat, potentially traumatic event, in a military environment.
The overall size of the sample (<50) and the size of gender and rank sub-groups, 
limits the extent to which the results can be generalised. However, similar sized groups 
are not uncommon in research in psychological trauma.
This study has only focused on the level of indicated mental health disorders in 
the sample, and has not been able to distinguish between pre-existing mental health 
conditions, or to possible disorder(s) that may develop in participants independent the 
fire. However, it can be assumed that this would be the same for comparative studies. 
Further, this study is limited to describing associations between the fire in HMAS 
Westralia, and indicated PTSD, general psychological distress, and alcohol problems. 
While it may be tempting to attribute a causal relationship between the fire and mental 
health outcomes, it is beyond the scope of this study to do so.
A significant limitation is that the data gathered was done so for clinical reasons, 
rather than research reasons. The data gathered was intended to compliment clinical 
interviews, so does not contain a significant amount of demographic data, or data that 
could lead to conclusion or inferences about pre-incident personality factors, significant 
factors during or after the event, and about lives since the fire. While this may be
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appropriate for clinical reviews, where this data may have been gathered on an 
individual basis, it none-the-less limits the data available for this study.
3.5.8 Strengths of the study
All participants in this study had exposure to the same traumatic event. While 
there may have been differences in proximity to the fire, roles played in firefighting, and 
exposure to those killed in the fire, all personnel were involved in the same life- 
threatening event and no-one was further away that the length of the ship (171 metres) 
from a major, out-of-control fire at sea, that killed four people, and threatened the lives 
of another 94.
The use of standardized measures allows for meaningful comparisons of scores, 
between the results of Sample 1, and other military and non-military samples.
3.5.9 Future research
While the prevalence of indicated disorder is useful in research, further 
directions should include diagnosis of PTSD, general psychological distress and alcohol 
problems, along with appropriate treatment option to be made available for those 
involved in this type of research.
Further studies with larger samples sizes that include populations from a range 
of traumatic events, and include both military and non-military backgrounds, would 
further knowledge of the potential impact of psychological trauma. It is recommended 
that studies use multiple instruments such as those used in this study.
Future studies that examine the outcomes from specific events, should control as 
much as possible, for pre-existing mental health conditions, or for conditions arising 
from other events. While it is tempting to associate all pathology with the target event, a
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proportion of pathology may come from extraneous and uncontrolled for, sources. 
Large sample sizes, or strategies to identify such extraneous sources, are strongly 
recommended.
I have not speculated on any possible explanation for the results presented. 
Factors that could describe maintaining mental health in the aftermath of a potentially 
traumatic event will be taken up with Study 2 in this project.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented research into mental health related to the 
survivors of a potentially traumatic event. The fire, which serves as an example of a 
significant non-combat event, is one that could potentially be repeated in the future. 
Further, fighting a major fire at sea under worse conditions could be an expected task in 
naval combat. Therefore, it should serve as an indicator of potential mental health 
outcomes in future traumatic events involving navy personnel. The culture and 
experience of navy personnel could be construed to have similarities, but also 
differences from, the Army personnel who are far more often researched in order to 
understand conditions such as PTSD. It is hoped that this chapter serves to increase the 
understanding of the mental health threats in the military, and in large scale accidents, in 
general, as well as specifically in the naval environment.
In the next chapter, I will move back to the theoretical, to begin the process of 
understanding why, and how, some people who experience certain types of events, 
either develop adverse outcomes, or disorder. I will move on to describe theories of 
psychological trauma, a new model will be presented, and a study undertaken with the 
survivors of the fire in HMAS Westralia, to test aspects of this model. While the first
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part o f this report has focused on what happens in the aftermath of trauma, my report 
now moves on to explore why this happens.
Chapter 4. Theoretical models of psychological trauma
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In this chapter I describe and critique the major models of psychological trauma 
and PTSD. They serve to explain the process of traumatisation and the phenomenon 
assessed in Study 1. In order to understand the usefulness of models of trauma, it is 
necessary to have standards against which such models, along with any alternates, can 
be judged. Three sets of existing standards for models of psychological trauma are 
introduced, and combined to form a generic set of standards against which models of 
PTSD can be assessed. These standards are applied to the four major models of PTSD 
described in this chapter.
4.1 Standards for models of psychological trauma
Horowitz (1997) argued that any theory of traumatic stress needed to account for 
a series of basic experimental, field and clinical findings regarding response syndromes. 
He proposed that there were five generally observable experiences regarding traumatic 
stress that should be covered. Firstly, theories must accept that there are general 
response tendencies toward stressful events. Secondly, different types of events produce 
different qualities and quantities of responses. Thirdly, that many stress responses 
persist long after the event is over and some may only begin after an interval of time 
without response. Fourthly, symptoms of severe stress will include intrusive repetitions 
in thought, emotion and/or behaviour, and may include denial, emotional numbness and 
behavioural avoidance. Fifthly, and finally, responses to severe stressors may occur in 
temporal and sequential phases (initial realization and impact, denial and numbness, 
denial and intrusive repetition in thought, emotion and behaviour, and further working 
through and acceptance with a loss of either denial or peremptory recollection of the
stress event).
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Similarly, Jones and Barlow (1990) argue that all models of PTSD should 
account for: the constellation of symptoms (especially re-experiencing); the absence of 
symptoms in some individuals; the importance of pre-trauma characteristics (such as 
sense of control, and social support); event severity; emotional numbing; and delayed 
onset.
Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph (1996) also proposed standards for models of 
PTSD. They argue that models should account for: the clinical characteristics of the 
disorder (including range of symptoms and temporal aspects of PTSD); both normal and 
abnormal responses to traumatic events; different severity of disorder and outcomes; the 
ability to discriminate PTSD from other disorders; how information is processed in 
PTSD; and empirical evidence to test the model.
These three lists of standards address the key psychological events to be 
explained by any models of psychological trauma. A composite list of these standards 
for models of psychological trauma include:
(1) There are characteristic symptoms of PTSD;
(2) Responses can be range from normal to abnormal, with different 
severity;
(3) Symptoms can be enduring;
(4) Disorder may have a delayed onset;
(5) Symptoms present in phases that maybe overlapping or discrete;
(6) Pre- and post-event characteristics influence responses; and
(7) Models should be testable.
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4.2 Biological models of PTSD
Jones and Barlow (1990) describe biological models of PTSD as paralleling the 
behavioural and biochemical changes that take place in animals when faced with 
inescapable or unavoidable shock. Calhoun and Resnick (1993) describe biological 
models o f PTSD as those which explain damage or change to the neuronal pathways 
and neuro-chemical systems, caused by the effects of extreme stressors placed on the 
central nervous system at the time of the trauma. While describing a complex interplay 
of neural interactions, Nemeroff, Bremner, Foa, Mayberg, North and Stein (2006) 
describe the changes brought on by trauma, as primarily resulting in reduced 
hippocampal volume and changes in blood flow in specific parts of the brain. These 
changes are enduring, and primarily impact on neurotransmitter activity in response to 
stimuli initially considered dangerous. Once the changes occur, cues that are associated 
with the original stimuli, lead to feeling that the original event is about to reoccur. This 
produces an exaggerated neuro-chemical response related to the initial event, including 
physical and behavioural effects such as startle response and aggressive behaviour.
Wastell (2005) indicates that after an initial neurotransmitter burst that depletes 
neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine and dopamine, organisms release endogenous 
opioids to restore control, or homeostasis. These opioids have an analgesic response, 
manifested as a lack of memory for some aspects of the event. Further, they cause an 
addiction, which sees people seek out stimuli that remind them of the original event, in 
order to have the neurotransmitter effects, and in turn, the release of the opioids. 
Between the release of opioids and the next neurotransmitter release, come withdrawal 
symptoms, such as anxiety, hyperalertness and sleep disturbance.
McFarlane and Yehuda (1996) describe a ‘kindling’ effect, whereby people 
retain a biological memory of succeeding stressful events with increased potential for
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reaction over time and repetition of response. This: “progressive sensitivity to affective 
destabilization” (pl70), allows an increased triggering of responses and greater 
vulnerability to future events that have some similarity with the original triggering 
event.
Wastell (2005) indicates that while complex, the biological model is based on 
the assumption that trauma initiates a biological process that is out of the control of the 
individual. As the biological response is a generalized response and explains the 
characteristic symptoms of PTSD, it satisfies the first standard for models of trauma. 
The process of ‘kindling’ can account for some individual variations in responses, along 
with the observation that some responses can take time to develop into disorder.
The biological model provides a good account of the characteristic symptoms of 
PTSD and the enduring nature of the disorder. However, it does not adequately account 
for normal (non-pathological) responses to disorder, and the process of resolving 
disorder or recovering (how the biological changes described in disorder are reversed 
when recovery takes place). There is no accounting for delayed onset disorder, and the 
biological model of PTSD does not account for pre- and post-event characteristics such 
as social support or perceptions of control and coping.
Wastell (2005) notes that the biological model doesn’t adequately explain the 
complex range and intensity of psychological experiences that occur with PTSD, 
especially emotional reactions and memories. Nemeroff et al. (2006) and Neumeister, 
Henry and Krystal (2007) describe puzzling inconsistencies in findings among patients 
with PTSD, and highlights that neural processes involved in recovery are poorly 
understood. Further, Neumeister, Henry and Krystal add that biological differences in 
those with and without PTSD may be more markers of vulnerability to disorder than the
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effects o f exposure to traumatic events. This leaves the biological model currently more 
theoretical, than testable.
4.3 Psychodynamic models of PTSD
Calhoun and Resnick (1993) report that repetition and denial in stress reactions 
were described by Freud, and that these features were essentially the forerunners of the 
hallmark symptoms of PTSD; now recognized as re-experiencing and avoidance. 
Kudler (2007) adds that Freud was the first clinician to view traumatic disorders 
differently to the concept of the ‘broken brain’ approach that was the basis for ‘shell­
shock’. He adds that a conflict between conceptualizing PTSD as a physical disorder or 
a physic disorder is an ongoing and unresolved issue.
Repetition and denial of re-experiencing aspects of traumatic event were 
incorporated into a broader model of PTSD by Horowitz (1997). Jones and Barlow 
(1990) describe the broader psychodynamic model of PTSD as a consequence of 
peoples’ inability to integrate traumatic events into their cognitive schemas. Joseph, 
Williams and Yule (1997) indicate that new information is interpreted, and meaning 
ascribed to it, through the use of mental models or schemas that individuals have 
developed over time, and that people have an: “inherent drive to make our mental health 
coherent with new information” (p. 73). The unusual nature of information related to 
traumatic events is usually so incoherent with existing schemas that the new information 
cannot easily be made sense of by the old schemas. However, the new information is 
not completely incomprehensible; trauma related information usually results in fear 
responses, with high arousal and a potential for action. Active memory continually 
repeats representations of the new information in an attempt to facilitate opportunities 
for integration. The repeating of new information is usually helpful for integration of
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non-traumatic memories (as discussed in length, by Naugle, Bell, & Polosney, 2003, in 
their account of clinical considerations of integration). As the degree of incoherence 
between existing schemas and the new information increases (as happens with 
information related to traumatic events), repetitions of representations of new 
information required to achieve coherence will also increase over time. With this comes 
a greater repetition of accompanying fear, arousal and potential for action responses. 
Ongoing repetitions of this process can be easily overwhelming to those experiencing it. 
An inhibitory mechanism, takes over to control the amount of information presented 
and to slow down cognitive processing to avoid distress. When this inhibitory process is 
too strong, avoidance of the event and cues to it result. However, when the inhibitory 
process is not strong enough, too much information is represented, in an attempt to 
process it. This process results in the flooding and distressing effects of re-experiencing. 
This model suggests that people alternate or oscillate between re-experiencing and 
avoidance, as the balance between the need to process information and the need to 
control the flow of information, alternates, until equilibrium is reached, when the new 
information and existing schemas are integrated. Social support is viewed as important 
in mediating tolerance of the information processing.
Horowitz (1979/1997) describes the psychoanalytic model of trauma as being 
based on modulating excessive stimuli that overexcites the mind. The entry of 
information and energy is regulated by a ‘stimulus barrier’. This is a psychic barrier, 
rather than an organic one. The amount of information allowed to reach awareness is 
altered, according to the perception of signals of danger, with increasing signals of 
danger and anxiety resulting in a higher threshold for entry of that information. This 
barrier is comprised of the defensive or inhibiting mechanisms used to protect the ego. 
This conceptualization of processing information related to stressful events includes a
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feedback loop. As stimuli became more anxiety provoking, the greater the defensive 
inhibitions, resulting in decreased information processing. With decreased information 
processing, threat is also decreased, allowing for the defensive inhibitions to decrease. 
However, this decreased defence allowed greater processing and a potentially increase 
in threat and so on. This produces an unstable system and phases of anxiety and reduced 
anxiety, and phases of perception and information processing alternating with phases of 
inhibited stimulation and information processing.
Van der Kolk (2007) describes post traumatic disorder as the stimulus barrier 
being unprepared for trauma and ineffective in screening information, resulting in a 
flooding of stimulus related to the trauma. This flood of information resulted in the 
mental paralysis and intense emotions experienced by people who are said to have been 
traumatized.
Horowitz (1997) and Van der Kolk (2007) indicate that as the ego protects itself 
from the information of traumatic events (in order to ensure the safety of the person), 
the result is impaired information intake about what has happened. People thus have 
difficulty making sense of what they know they have experienced. When they try to 
remember what has happened, they have either uncontrolled or blocked recollections 
depending on the effectiveness of their defensive inhibitions, and if they try to not 
remember, their ego defences will be down, and they may have intrusive and 
uninhibited breakthrough recollections. Van der Kolk (2007) describes these 
recollections as contemporary experiences, rather than memories of a past event. 
Horowitz (1997) describes five phases people go through as they process the 
information of a traumatic event. These are outcry, denial, intrusion, working through 
and completion. For each, there is also a pathological response leading to disorder, that 
begins when people are overwhelmed by an event. The pathological stages include
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panic or exhaustion, extreme avoidance, flooded states, psychosomatic responses, and 
character distortions.
Krupnick (2002) and Kudler (2007) focus on the interpersonal nature of 
psychodynamic therapy, in helping people cope with the adjustment to trauma. 
Krupnick indicates that trauma stems from some people being unable to make revisions 
to their views of the world in order to incorporate what has happened. The symptoms of 
avoidance and arousal are the result of the need for revision to incorporate what has 
happened, and a defence again the pain of this process. The role of therapist is help 
people bring to awareness, the balance between psychological, social and biological 
factors in play during disorder, and help them develop a sense of coherence and 
meaning in their lives.
Schnyder (2005) adds that the process of re-engaging normal coping 
mechanisms involves addressing the unconscious aspects of the trauma, and bringing 
them into consciousness in tolerable doses. People will need to become aware of the 
meanings they made of the event, along with the wishes, fantasies, fears and defenses 
stirred up by the event.
The issue of diagnosis or classification of disorder is taken up from a 
psychodynamic view by Kudler (2007). He argues that it is too limiting to consider only 
specific disorders (such as PTSD) that either exist or not, that there are normal and 
abnormal reactions to trauma, or even that people should be considered either well or ill 
after trauma. Rather, a broader view by therapists, that people experience a range of 
experience following trauma, and that disorder is represented by how well they cope 
and adjust is advocated from the psychodynamic perspective.
This model explains the major symptoms of PTSD, and with the assumption of a 
stimulus barrier, explains individual variations such as no disorder or disorder in people
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exposed to the same stressor. The delayed onset of disorder is explained through 
constant repetitions increasing in frequency and impact, over time, until the person 
finally becomes overwhelmed by an increasing threshold for entry of information (some 
time after the event). Phases o f alternating symptoms are explained well, although it is 
more a model of disorder than normality or recovery, with little to describe how mental 
health is maintained or how recovery occurs. Social support is acknowledged as a 
mediator, but the process of mediation is not well explained. Further, other pre-event 
characteristics such as perceived control and coping are also not well incorporated in 
psychodynamic models. With a psychic barrier to information, rather than an organic 
one, the model is also more theoretical, than testable. Wastell (2005) also criticizes 
Horowitz’s model for focusing exclusively on the cognition, while much of the 
experience of PTSD involves emotional responses.
Cahill and Foa (2007) note that the concept of existing schemas that are 
shattered by the experience of trauma, may explain people developing disorders at the 
very first exposure to trauma. However, it doesn’t explain how people may experience 
disorder following multiple traumas. They argue that if people experience potentially 
traumatic event without developing disorder, it would be because they have developed 
schemas that integrate such events. Therefore, repeated exposure to potentially 
traumatic events should actually reaffirm such schemas, rather than shatter them. Cahill 
and Foa note two further discrepancies with people who experience multiple traumatic 
events. Firstly, they note that individuals with history of trauma are more likely to 
develop chronic PTSD in the face repeated exposures to traumatic events, and secondly, 
that some people who integrate traumatic events well, experience personal growth, 
effectively protecting them from developing disorder. There appears to be no way to 
determine or explain why these differences occur.
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4.4 Cognitive/Information processing models of PTSD
Jones and Barlow (1990) describe cognitive/information processing models as 
being based on the structure of fear responses. Fear is viewed as a program designed to 
avoid or escape danger, and information about the stimulus and the response evoked, is 
stored in a neural network. The fear network is different to other memory networks. It 
contains information about threat and safety, which is of higher priority and significance 
than less survival-focused information, and is more readily accessible. This prioritizing 
and sensitivity to threat-based information, and the provision of a ready response 
established to manage danger, can result in over-activation of the network. Joseph, 
Williams and Yule (1997) describe people developing: “a number of information­
processing biases such as in attentional hypervigilence toward trauma-related stimuli” 
(p75). They tend to increase their estimation of the risk of a repeat episode of a 
traumatic event, leading them to respond to stimuli that resemble the fear-network 
producing stimuli, even if they are of less significance. This results in false-positive 
responses to danger. The responses may be appropriate to survival, perhaps as it may 
have been during the original event, but may occur even in non-life-threatening 
situations. Responding to cues that remind people of the original event is no-doubt 
intended to ensure survival, and includes intense awareness and focus on the cue, fear, 
and avoidance. The network and the resulting response will be reinforced if a response 
is enacted, yet there is no adverse outcome (with people believing that their responses, 
designed to protect them, was the cause of there being no harm done). The strength of 
the fear network, the response, and the neuro-chemical activity produced, is considered 
to inhibit the development o f any alternate or more adaptive network, with fear the 
enduring legacy of development and activation of the fear network.
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Calhoun and Resnick (1993) describe information processing models of PTSD 
as focusing on problems in processing or integrating trauma-related information as the 
cause of disorder. More recently, this line o f research has developed into an integration 
of human evolutionary theory (Cantor, 2005) in which PTSD is presented as a defensive 
strategy whereby information-processing becomes focused, to the exclusion of all else, 
on defensiveness and preparing for danger. Recovery is a staged process that includes 
feedback about processes that produce fear responses that are appropriate and 
proportional to current situations, rather than only to the original situation.
Foa and Kozak (1986) and Foa, Rothman and Hembree (2006) describe the 
basic fear response in people as a program to escape danger, that involves information 
stored in memory, of stimuli that are considered dangerous (involving meaning-making 
about dangerousness, and recognizing a stimulus as representing this meaning-making 
process), along with physiological information about how to escape. This process is not 
necessarily a conscious process, and can occur with stimuli that only resemble the 
feared response, evoking the same response as if the resembled stimuli were, in fact, the 
feared stimuli. Further, Joseph, Williams and Yule (1979) indicate that fear network 
responses enter consciousness, resulting in the symptoms of re-experiencing. The 
process of triggering fear memories by stimuli that resemble the original stimuli will be 
ongoing, while ever there is no new emotional-processing (revised meaning-making, 
through the presentation of new information that is incongruent with the fear response, 
presented at the time the fear is evoked). Resolution involves correcting the association 
of fear responses with stimuli. However, this involves evoking the fear response and 
modifying the association, which is potentially painful to people who have a bias to 
overestimate risk. Further, escape or avoidance, which is a response to fear, will reduce 
the likelihood of acceptance of the process of integration, correction of risk, and
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meaning-making. The process of pathological fear is viewed as similar to normal fear, 
with excessive response elements, and resistance to modification.
Similarly, Walser and Hayes (2006) describe PTSD in an Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy conceptualization, as a process o f experiential avoidance. Firstly, 
individuals with PTSD are actively unwilling to experience, in the present moment, 
negative emotions (such as traumatic memories, negative thoughts and unpleasant 
physiological states) and second, that these individuals attempt to: “change the form or 
frequency o f those events, even when there is a negative cost of doing so” (Walser & 
Hayes, 2006, p.10). This experiential avoidance can have secondary complications, as 
current research argues for avoidance being a significant risk factor not only for PTSD 
but for depression (Tull, Gratz, Salters & Roemer, 2004) and substance abuse (Ouimette 
& Brown, 2003) as well. Recent research argues that these shared vulnerabilities are: 
“characterized by a fundamental non-acceptance of one’s private experience” (Walser & 
Westrub, 2007, p .l l) . It is in this way that disorders: “are marked by dysfunctional, 
avoidant behaviors (sic.) that powerfully and negatively affect one’s life” (ibid.) The 
active attempt to change or in some way escape internal experiences o f emotion, is the 
central premise of the experiential avoidance notion of PTSD.
Nemeroff et al. (2006) describe the common feature after trauma of people 
developing negative cognitions about their safety, their self-competence during the 
event, and the impact of symptoms they may develop. However, they add that for most 
people, everyday experiences following the traumatic event, tend to correct or mellow 
extreme cognitions, allowing the person to regain a sense of safety and competence. 
This assertion is supported empirically by the findings of Cao, McFarlane and Klimidis 
(2003) in their follow-up study of psychiatric disorder following an earthquake. Their 
findings showed conclusively that avoidance created disorder, whereas ‘life as normal’
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facilitated acceptance and a reconciling of the event. Nemeroff et al, (2006) indicate that 
people, who use avoidance and emotional numbing in the aftermath of trauma, deny 
themselves the experiences necessary to correct overly negative cognitions, leaving 
them with only distorted cognitions related to safety, competence, and the consequences 
of any symptoms they develop. With specific regards to clinical implications, high 
levels of avoidance are directly correlated with poor treatment outcomes (Walser & 
Westrub, 2007).
This model explains the most characteristic symptom of PTSD; that of re­
experiencing and reacting to cues that resembles a trauma, and also explains the 
enduring nature of PTSD. Further, it can be testable, to the extent that trauma and fear 
can be adequately distinguished. The model assumes individual responses in recognition 
of cues and of individual neural pathways. However, this model does not explain 
delayed-onset PTSD, or how people recovery from initial trauma. Finally, the model 
does not address pre- and post-trauma features that could mitigate responses.
4.5 Behavioural models of PTSD
Calhoun and Resnick (1993) and Jones and Barlow (1990) view behavioural 
models of PTSD as being based on classical conditioning theory. Over time, and with 
repetition and reinforcement, responses to one specific stimulus can become associated 
with other events or situations that usually would not evoke the same response. 
Previously neural stimuli (non-traumatic events) can evoke responses similar to those 
evoked by specific (traumatic) stimuli. The principal of generalisation broadens the 
range of previously neutral responses that can be associated with the original and 
specific stimuli or event. With regard to trauma, people exposed to traumatic events, 
and who respond with fear and anxiety, very quickly condition the fear and anxiety
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response with other, previously neutral stimuli (Foa, Rothman, & Hembree, 2006). Cues 
that resemble those of the original event, then produce the conditioned response of fear 
and anxiety, while avoidance of such cues occurs as negative reinforcement (avoidance 
of cues results in avoidance of the painful experience of fear and anxiety). Stimulus 
generalization over time results in an increasing number of cues that become associated 
with the original event and therefore trigger fear and anxiety, along with the number 
which become avoided. Cahill and Foa (2007) add that the anger and irritability often 
seen in male combat veterans with PTSD can be the result of a conditioned response to 
fear, to evoke the aggression learned in their military training, with these responses 
reinforced through both positive reinforcement (such as attaining goals) and negative 
reinforcement (reducing anxiety as a result of aggressive behaviour).
Extinction of conditioned responses, which is well understood in learning 
theory, is impeded in people with PTSD. Extinction usually requires complete exposure 
to all components of memory. Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart & Roy (2006) and 
Naugle, Bell, & Polosney (2003) argue that the strength of avoidance of trauma- 
associated cues (due to the strength of the fear and anxiety produced) prevent people 
from gaining complete exposure to their memories, and extinction is impeded. They 
may experience some exposure, but avoid complete exposure or the level necessary for 
extinction to occur. Social support mitigates the fear and anxiety response, and is seen 
as an important mitigating effect in the development of PTSD. Cahill and Foa (2007) 
also describe people as having varying degrees of biological predispositions to the 
learning theory in the aftermath of traumatic events.
This model accounts for most of the characteristic symptoms of PTSD, although 
Cahill and Foa (2007) contend that learning models cannot adequately explain the 
presence of generalized exaggerated startle responses in sufferers of PTSD. Variations
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in individual responses to traumatic events are the result of different initial responses to 
trauma. The enduring nature of symptoms can be explained through reinforcement, and 
recovery from disorder, explained through extinction. However, the extinction of fear 
should always result in the extinction of avoidance; however, this is not always the case 
with PTSD. While delayed onset PTSD can be accounted for by increasing 
generalization over time, until a threshold is exceeded, it still requires an initial response 
of fear and anxiety and therefore doesn’t really account for true delayed onset PTSD 
(where there are no initial symptoms). While the impact of pre and post event factors 
such as predictability and control, personality factors, and social support are 
acknowledged, the process by which they reinforce and influence the stimulus-response 
in fear, are not well explained.
4.6 Conclusions
Four brief summaries of the major models of PTSD are presented. All explain 
the development of the characteristic symptoms of PTSD. However, none fully explains 
all outcomes with post-trauma reactions, and none fully satisfy the standards for models 
of PTSD derived from Horowitz (1997), Jones and Barlow (1990), and Brewin, 
Dalgleish and Joseph (1996). With this in mind, new approaches to potentially explain 
all facets of PTSD need to be developed or explored. The next chapter will provide 
background to a personal construct theory, and will then move onto to apply this theory 
to post-traumatic stress. While personal construct theory has been used very 
successfully to describe some facets of post-traumatic stress, the development of a 
comprehensive personal construct psychology model of trauma that could be assessed 
against the standards developed in this chapter, has not yet been fully developed. In
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further chapters, such a model will be proposed, and then tested, to validate the 
approach. The model will then be reviewed in the light of this validation.
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Chapter 5. Personal construct theory of mental health and disorder
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In this chapter I will introduce the theory of personal construct psychology 
originally published by George Kelly in 1955. The fundamental postulate, basic 
assumptions, corollaries and formal structure of the theory will be described, along with 
the principles governing everyday life, cycles of adaptation to experience, optimal 
health, disorder, and emotions. This chapter provides the conceptual base upon which a 
personal construct model of mental health and psychological trauma will be developed.
Kelly (1955/1991) describes his theory of personality with clinical examples in a 
two-volume work, the Psychology of Personal Constructs. Kelly’s personal construct 
theory focuses on how individuals form meanings and make predicts about themselves 
and their worlds, including interpersonal interactions. Central to the theory are the 
premises that people develop their own unique sets of constructs of the world based on 
their experiences, and that construing is neither fixed nor absolute. They are individual 
and can change or be revised over times as a result of experience.
It should be noted that George Kelly will be quoted often, and that in his two- 
volume work on the Psychology of Personal Constructs, Kelly (1955/1991) uses 
language that, by the standards of the American Psychological Association (2001), 
would be considered to have a gender bias. This bias generally appears as use of 
masculine pronouns such as ‘he’, to represent both genders. Kelly was primarily writing 
in the 1950’s; even though further articles such as Kelly (1970) and Kelly (1980) were 
published after his death in 1967. The time of his writing could be generally considered 
to pre-date the current conventions of the American Psychological Association (2001). 
It is argued that the bias in his writing is stylistic, and that Kelly’s (1955/1991) 
Psychology of Personal Constructs can be equally applicable to both genders. An 
example of Kelly’s intention to not be gender restrictive in his use of language is him 
noting that: “when we speak of man-the scientist we are speaking of all mankind and
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not merely a particular class of men who have publicly attained the stature of 
‘scientists’” (1955/1991: p.4). This passage appears to use ‘man’ or ‘men’ to refer to ‘all 
mankind’, rather than a sub-set based on gender.
5.1 Fundamental Postulate
Kelly’s (1955/1991) theory of personal constructs is based on a fundamental 
postulate and 11 corollaries). The fundamental postulate states that that “a person’s 
processes are psychologically channelised by the ways in which he anticipates events” 
(Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, 32). How people present to others is determined by the way 
they anticipate events and themselves and their worlds interacting. Kelly notes that 
“everything man does follow lines laid down in his effort to anticipate what will 
happen” (1980: p.26). Therefore, the meanings people ascribe to their pasts, helps them 
anticipate their futures.
5.2 Constructive Alternativism
Kelly used the term ‘constructive-altemativism’ (1955/1991, Vol 1, p.3) to focus 
on the ability to review, recreate, and revise, individual construing of the world and 
events. As there are no absolute meanings ascribed to events, there are a range of 
possible alternate constructs that people can hold at the same time, or that different 
people can develop, at different times and with different experiences.
Kelly (1955/1991) describes people testing their expectations of their worlds and 
events based on their experiences as acting as-if they were scientists. Kelly holds that 
people can anticipate events through their experiences; test these predictions, revise and 
reflect on the accuracy or usefulness of their predictions based on experience, test them 
again, and so on. With each cycle, the construct system develops in much the same
90
manner as scientific knowledge develops -  through repeated speculation, testing and 
revising, as if undertaken in scientific endeavours.
5.3 The formal structure of construct systems.
Kelly’s theory has 11 corollaries that provide the structure of constructs and 
construct systems. The first of the corollaries, the Construction Corollary, holds that: “a 
person anticipates events by construing their replications” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol 1, 
p.35). In other words, people anticipate replications of their experience of past events, 
through learning from experience.
The second corollary, the Individuality Corollary, holds that: “persons differ 
from each other in their construction of events” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol 1, p.38). People 
ascribe their own meanings to the events they have experienced and have unique 
anticipations or replications of events.
The third corollary, the Organisational Corollary, holds that: “each person 
characteristically evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, a construction 
system embracing ordinal relationships between constructs” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, 
p.3). Constructs are organized in hierarchies, with some dominating or subsuming 
others. A hierarchy of constructs means that priorities of importance exist between 
constructs. Where one construct in a system appears incompatible with others, the one 
higher in the hierarchy usually dominates. Kelly also describes constructs as being 
either core or peripheral. Core constructs govern people’s sense of themselves and are 
described by Epting and Amerikaner (1980) as being of central importance in 
maintaining and developing entire construct systems. Peripheral constructs can be 
altered without serious modification of the core structure, and are described by Epting 
and Amerikaner (1980) as those that are usually adapted and revised on a frequent basis.
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The fourth corollary, the Dichotomy Corollary, holds that: “a person’s 
construction system is composed of a finite number o f dichotomous constructs” (Kelly, 
1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.41). Dichotomous constructs have two poles -  usually identified as 
clearly different to each other by construers. This provides a system in which constructs 
can be compared to others, based on the similarity or difference between the 
dichotomous poles of each. The greater the number of pairs of poles available, the 
greater the number of ways elements can be compared.
The fifth corollary, the Choice Corollary holds that: “a person chooses for 
himself that alternative in a dichotomized construct through which he anticipates the 
greater possibility for extension and definition of his system” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, 
p.45). People choose between the two poles of any construct, the pole that they believe 
will allow them to extend or reinforce their construct systems. People can exercise free 
choice in determining which pole of a construct is helpful to them. This concept implies 
that an event can usually be described as what it is like, as well as what it is different to. 
In terms of describing how one event relates to another, people tend to use one or other 
(either describing how one is event is similar to another, or how it contrasts with 
another). The type of description they prefer (whether a relationship is based on 
similarity or contrast) is described as the emergent pole of their construing, while the 
type of description that is not used is described as the implicit or contrast pole. 
Individuality o f construing is based on the choice of pairs of poles (how people describe 
events as similar to, or contrasting with others) that people make.
The sixth corollary, the Range Corollary, holds that: “a construct is convenient 
for the anticipation of a finite range of events only” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.48). 
This implies that the constructs people hold to anticipate outcomes in one situation, may 
apply to some other similar situations, but not to all other situations. There is a range of
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events for which constructs can be applied with maximum effect. Outside their range of 
convenience, constructs lose their usefulness to make sense of events or to anticipate 
events.
The seventh corollary, the Experience Corollary, states that: “a person’s 
construct system varies as he successively construes the replications of events” (Kelly, 
1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.50). As people construe the replications of events there may be 
variations in the outcome of what they anticipated. The change in outcomes can lead 
people to revise their constructs in order to have greater accuracy of predictions in the 
future. Experience, if it involves re-construing, can lead to variations in peoples’ 
construct systems and the way they develop expectations. Kelly (1980) argues that 
experience does change people, and that change can come about a result of revision of 
the way meanings are made of experiences.
The eighth corollary, the Modulation Corollary, states that: “the variation in a 
person’s construction system is limited by the permeability of the constructs within 
whose range of convenience the variants lie” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.54). The 
usefulness to accommodate or make sense of events for which they were not 
specifically developed is described as the permeability of a construct. Permeable 
constructs can be applied to a wide range of new experiences, while impermeable 
constructs can only apply or adapt to a much smaller number of situations for which 
they were not specifically created.
The ninth corollary, the Fragmentation Corollary, holds that: “a person may 
successively employ a variety of construction subsystems which are inferentially 
incompatible with each other” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.58). In other words, there 
does not have to be total agreement between different constructs within people’s 
construct systems. While the hierarchical ordering of constructs usually sees one
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subsume another, this superordinacy o f one over another may not be perfect and some 
conflict between constructs may arise. However, provided any conflict is minor or 
inferential in nature, it can be tolerated. This process makes construct systems workable 
as a large number o f constructs are bound to include inconsistencies. It also explains 
seeming inconsistencies (usually minor) in peoples’ behaviours.
The tenth corollary, the Commonality Corollary, holds that: “to the extent that 
one person employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by 
another, his psychological processes are similar to those of the other person” (Kelly, 
1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.63). While all construct systems are unique to individuals, there 
will be some similarities between the construing of different people. Where there is 
similarity in the ways people construe, there will be similarity of psychological 
processes. The greater the similarity in construct systems between people, the greater 
the similarity in their psychological processes, and therefore in the ways they anticipate 
events.
The eleventh and final o f Kelly’s corollaries, the Sociality Corollary, holds that: 
“to the extent that one person construes the construction processes of another, he may 
play a role in a social process involving the other person” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, 
p.66). This corollary holds that people’s ability to construe other people’s construing 
determines to what extent they can play a role in social interactions with each other. 
Kelly (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.67) notes that: “if we can predict accurately what others 
will do, we can adjust ourselves to their behaviour. If others know how to tell what we 
will do, they can adjust themselves to our behaviour”. Duck (1982) surmises 
interpersonal relating as trying to understand how other people construe events, that will 
in turn, lead to anticipate how other will behave.
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This summarises the basic postulate and corollaries of Kelly’s theory of personal 
constructs. They describe a set of broad structures that develop and change slowly, 
provides people with their construct o f self, which can be construed by other people, 
allowing for people to compare construct systems and to anticipate how others will 
think and behave, and therefore interact.
5.4 Person as Scientist
As construing is determined by people’s meaning making rather than definite or 
absolute meaning, and individual interpretation is based on how they experience events, 
it makes sense to expect that interpretations could change as people add to their history 
and diversity o f experience. Landfield and Leitner (1980) note that all interpretations 
are not fixed, but rather, subject to revision. Therefore, constructs systems are not rigid, 
but rather can be adaptable and reactive to the experiences people have. People can 
revise their interpretations of old and new events, based on comparing them to a 
constantly developing set of meanings.
5.5 Construing
Construing involves placing an interpretation, making meaning of events (Kelly, 
1955/1991). Interpretation usually compares interpretations of one event with others 
that have been experienced to determine to what extent the new event is similar to or 
different from interpretations of events experienced in the past. Landfield and Leitner 
(1980) described these processes as differentiation and integration, and indicate that 
construing is a uniquely bipolar process; something is either similar to something else, 
or different from it. These processes allow people to build up interpretations of new 
events based on how it is similar to and different from, interpretations of events in their
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past. From these comparisons, people make anticipations of future events. The essential 
reason for construing is to be able to anticipate or provide a better understanding of 
future events (Landfield & Leitner, 1980).
5.6 Constructs and construct systems
Constructs are the “reference axes, upon which people project events in an effort 
to make some sense out of what is going on” (Kelly, 1970, p. 13), and are ways to 
distinguish, group, and compare, aspects of events. As people experience life, they will 
develop complex systems of constructs, based on comparing and contrasting elements 
of multiple events, making anticipations and having them validated. From this vast array 
of knowledge, people develop construct systems -  structured collections of 
interpretations drawn from a wide range of experiences, from which to assess and 
anticipate future events. Construct systems are based on structured collections of 
constructs.
A construct system is not simply a collection of independent thoughts or ideas. 
As Kelly (1955/1991) maintains in his fundamental postulate: “each person 
characteristically evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, a construction 
system embracing ordinal relationship between constructs” (1955/199la, p.32). A 
construct system has a rationale (convenience in anticipating events) and a structure 
(ordinal relationships between constructs) that guide people’s conduct (Mancuso & 
Adams-Webber, 1982: p.25). A construct system is ordered, with some constructs being 
more comprehensive than others, and some more important to people than others. 
People have hierarchies o f importance and centrality. To change a higher level construct 
is to cause change in how people anticipate a broad range of events, and therefore how 
people behave, think and feel. Other constructs may be less important or more specific
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than others. These are more peripheral constructs and changes to them do not cause 
alteration in the core structures of people.
The use of the term ‘construct’ and ‘construct system’ tend to imply a deliberate 
and conscious process. However, Kelly (1955/1991) described constructs as being either 
verbal or pre-verbal. Verbal constructs are those that we are aware of, can readily 
articulate, and are readily a part of the prediction and meaning-making process. Pre­
verbal constructs are those that people use as part of meaning-making and anticipation 
yet may not be conscious of, or not have a language with which to easily articulate them 
(Kelly, 1995/1991). Instead of words, people may use symbols such as postures, 
objects, people or situations to represent their constructs. Such construing may be less 
definite and more cumbersome, requiring more interpretation, but they are symbols of 
construing all the same. In some occasions, there may be no symbol at all available, 
leaving people feeling, but not having the ability to describe the feelings and construing 
with the convenience of words. Without conscious awareness or the ability to articulate 
or understand them clearly, pre-verbal constructs may be more difficult to validate; 
however, they influence psychological processes in the same way as more verbal 
constructs and construct systems.
Kelly (1955/1991) described the process of comparing constructs as resulting in 
either validation or invalidation of the anticipations they have generated. Expectations 
people develop based on applying their understanding of their worlds are like 
hypotheses that can be either confirmed or disconfirmed.
While all constructs can provide validation or invalidation, Kelly (1955/1991) 
describes constructs in ways that indicate that some features of constructs may make 
validation or invalidation more likely. The first of these features is tightness of 
construing. Tightness refers to how precise a construct is, and how unvarying
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constructs’ predictions. Tight constructs have very specific and unwavering meanings, 
while loose constructs can be applied with wide variation. Kelly (1955/1991) indicates 
that tighter constructs can be more easily tested, and therefore may more easily be either 
validated or invalidated than looser constructs. Conversely, looser constructs are more 
difficult to either validate or invalidate, as their definitions and applicability are much 
less clearly defined.
The range of convenience of constructs determines the range of events that can 
be provided meaning by one construct. Constructs with a wide range of convenience can 
incorporate and integrate a wider range of things or events than constructs with a narrow 
range of convenience, reducing how easily they may be invalidated. Therefore, the 
wider the range the range of convenience constructs have, the less likely invalidation is, 
and vice versa.
The permeability o f constructs refers to constructs that can accept new elements 
or be applied to new situations for which they were not specifically designed. The 
greater the permeability of constructs, the more adaptable they are to new experiences, 
and the less likely invalidation.
Therefore, constructs that are tightly construed have a narrow range of 
convenience and low permeability, are more likely to be invalidated than constructs that 
are more loosely construed, have a greater range of convenience, and have less 
permeability.
Validation and invalidation involves testing the anticipations that people develop 
as a result of their existing construct systems. These are the experiments that people 
engage in when they act ‘as-scientists’. They develop hypotheses or predictions about 
their worlds, based on the meanings they make of the elements of their experiences, and 
then test these hypotheses through experience and engagement in their worlds. The
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outcomes of their experiments are usually either validation or invalidation of their 
hypotheses. Where there is validation, the hypothesis is confirmed and can be applied 
with greater confidence in the future in predicting the outcome of events. Where there is 
invalidation, people need to revise either the process o f testing their predictions or the 
predictions themselves. Revised constructs can again be tested, leading to new 
outcomes that can either validate or invalidate the new predictions. This process can be 
repeated over and over throughout life.
Over time, construct systems develop complexity as the number of events that 
people provide meaning to, also develop in number. As the complexity and number of 
constructs within a system increases, the likelihood of constructs becoming 
incompatible or clashing with each other will also increase. These clashes usually 
involve two or more constructs, developed in relative isolation to each other due to 
isolated experiences, seemingly resulting in inconsistent or incompatible predictions. 
These seemingly incompatible constructs are described by Kelly (1955/1991) as 
fragmented constructs. Kelly’s (1955/1991) Fragmentation Corollary holds that 
incompatible constructs can be held at the same time, provided that they only differ 
inferentially. However, where incompatibility between constructs occurs at more than 
an inferential level, the Fragmentation Corollary is exceeded, and the person will 
experience a disorder if they cannot resolve the incompatibility. Kelly (1955/1991) 
indicates that typically, fragmentation is resolved through the use of hierarchies of 
constructs (where the fragmentation is resolved by one construct assuming more 
importance than the other), or the use or development of superordinal constructs, that 
allows seemingly incompatible constructs to co-exist through their relationship of 
compatibility with a higher order construct.
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5.7 Cycles of construing
Kelly described three cycles of construing by which people develop and test new 
constructs and incorporate events into their construct systems. These are the Creativity 
Cycle (Kelly, 1955/1991 & Kelly, 1980), the Circumspection- Pre-emption-Control (C- 
P-C) cycle (Kelly, 1955/1991 & Kelly, 1980), and the Experience Cycle (Kelly, 1980). 
The first of these cycles, the Creativity Cycle, describes a progression of tightening and 
loosening of constructs in order to try new ways of predicting and construing events in 
order to validate the constructs and expand their understandings. Tightening constructs 
refers to making predictions more exacting and unvarying -  they become more specific 
in order to enable them to be more testable and predictable. The benefit of tightening 
constructs is that they can more readily be validated or invalidated. However, there is 
not much leeway to apply tight constructs to new situations -  they can be brittle, either 
standing firm (being validated) or being shattered (being invalidated) easily by the 
outcome of experience. Loosening constructs refers to making predictions more varied 
and applicable to a wider range of applications while retaining their identity. The benefit 
of loosening constructs is that they can be applied to a wider range of circumstances 
with varying degrees o f validation. They may require more effort to test and may have 
more questionable validation than tight constructs, but can be more adaptable. The 
Creativity Cycle allows for flexibility in trying new constructs -  especially those that at 
first glance may seem to invalidate or clash with other constructs. Creativity involves 
suspending immediate decision-making about the construct. Engaging in the Creativity 
Cycle takes courage; but Leitner and Pfenninger (1994) note that it is necessary for 
people to allow their construing to become vague, elastic and wavering to provide what 
they describe as: “the fertile chaos necessary for reinventing” (p.124). Loosening of
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construing is necessary for change, but to remain too loose is to create difficulty in 
being understood by others.
The second cycle, the C-P-C cycle, involves the three steps of Circumspection, 
Pre-emption, and Control. However, the aim is one of arriving at a decision. 
Circumspection involves being open to all possibilities that a situation may offer, being 
able to make and maintain a range of possible predictions from which to choose, rather 
than having exacting and tightly defined predictions. Pre-emption involves logically 
narrowing down this range of possible predictions based on what predictions about an 
event can be drawn from the existing construct systems, choosing one that seems to fit 
best. Control involves choice and commitment to one of the range of the possibilities. It 
involves control, decision making, and testing the pre-empted construct, resulting in 
either validation or invalidation of the chosen and tested construct.
The third cycle is the Experience Cycle. The five steps involve people pro­
actively and deliberately experimenting to test constructs. The steps are: anticipation, 
investment, encounter, confirmation, and revision. Anticipation involves making 
predictions about the future based on existing constructs. Investment refers to how 
much people want to test their predictions. Sometimes people are keen to test their 
predictions and to do to is of great importance or urgency. However, at others there will 
be less interest, or the possibilities of the prediction will be relatively unimportant. 
Further, they may just not want to know through fear of the possibilities. Encounter, is 
mostly the scientific endeavour of assessing the adequacy of predictions by comparing 
them with the reality of experience of the world. Confirmation refers to the outcome of 
the experience of encounter — whether anticipations were validated or invalidated. 
Finally, during the revision stage, the original prediction is revised in the light of 
confirmation, with the prediction either being retained and incorporated into a revised
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construct system to help future anticipations and predictions with perhaps even greater 
confidence; or rejected as invalid and continuing to require review. This process can be 
repeated, with invalidated predictions being replaced and revised again and again. Kelly 
(1970) describes peoples’ experiences as not being assessed by the number of events 
they experience, but rather, the investments they make in anticipating, and the revisions 
following the outcome of their experiences.
5.8 Psychological disorders -  not adapting to invalidation
Kelly defined a disorder as “any personal construction which is used repeatedly 
in spite of consistent invalidation” (1955/1991, Vol. 2, p.193). Psychological disorders 
occur when people’s anticipations of their worlds are not validated by their experiments 
and experience, yet they keep using them without varying or developing them in line 
with their experiences. There are several ways in which these disorders can develop.
Warren (1992) describes people who fail to complete the Creativity Cycle, the 
C-P-C cycle, or the Experience Cycle, in the face of invalidation of construct systems, 
as displaying disorder, as they fail to change their construing to avoid invalidation. 
Disorders of the Creativity Cycle are due to an inability or unwillingness to tighten and 
loosen construing, in order to try new ways of seeing things in ways that can be 
validated or invalidated. People may be stuck with constructs that are either too loose or 
too tight to incorporate new elements of constructs resulting from experience. Kelly 
(1955/1991) described constriction as a form of tightening of construing, whereby 
people reduce the boundaries of their perceptual fields, limiting themselves to only one 
issue at a time and avoiding any potential relationship between constructs and issues. 
Constriction is a process designed to avoid the anxiety of invalidation and 
fragmentation, by effectively seeing only one issue or construct at a time, and in
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isolation of other constructs that may invalidate the first. This allows invalidating 
constructs to exist seemingly without anxiety and disorder. However, isolating 
construing, or limiting awareness of invalidation or fragmentation limits awareness of 
invalidation, and therefore also reduces the likelihood of people seeing any need to 
undertake the construct revision necessary to resolve the initial invalidation or 
fragmentation. Constriction is only a temporary fix to anxiety, and results in people’s 
world effectively shrinking and being firmly delineated, to avoid awareness of the 
invalidated or fragmented constructs.
Disorders related to the C-P-C Cycle involve not being open to all possibilities 
in a situation during circumspection, not closing on likely alternatives during pre­
emption, and not being prepared to change constructs in the face of invalidation during 
the control phase. Disorders of the C-P-C cycle would be disorders of decision making 
-  with people person unable to make decisions based on circumspection and pre­
emption, or not being able to control the testing process.
With the Experience Cycle, disorders can result from failure to complete any of 
the five phases, with this inhibiting the completion of the whole cycle of learning from 
experiences. During the anticipation phase, people may not have, or may not develop, 
curiosity about predictions of events -  they just let things happen without understanding 
or anticipation. During the investment phase, people might not get involved in wanting 
to validate a prediction -  they may be unable or unwilling to engage in validation 
processes, and opt out. During the encounter phase, people may not get actively 
involved in anticipation or may not make predictions that are consistent with their 
construct systems or experience. During the confirmation phase, people may not accept 
disconfirmation obtained during an encounter, attempting instead to try to force the 
outcome to fit the prediction rather than accept the fallibility of their predictions.
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Finally, during the revision phase, people may continue with, and justify, their old 
expectations despite invalidation arising from encounters.
As each of the cycles involves the development of new constructs, disorders 
involve the inability to develop new constructs - continuing to use old constructs despite 
invalidation. However, failure to develop new constructs may not necessarily be a 
problem. Disorders may only develop if people, who cannot develop new constructs, 
encounter events that invalidate their existing construct systems; and even then, the 
resulting invalidation or fragmentation would have to exceed the inferential level of 
incompatibility described as being tolerable in the Fragmentation Corollary.
Personal construct theory infers that the ongoing testing and development of 
constructs is the norm for people. Further, to not engage in these testing and validational 
processes leads to psychological disorders. Kelly (1955/1991) used the concepts of 
validation and invalidation to describe the two outcomes of anticipation and 
experimentation with the anticipation either validated or invalidated. However, Walker 
(2002) describes a third possible outcome; that of non-validation. Non-validation is 
viewed as non-engagement in the process of validation and may result in disorder if 
constructs are used despite them not being validated. Validation is most commonly 
avoided when people fear the possible outcome of engaging in testing their hypotheses. 
If people withdraw from, or refuse to engage in the Creativity Cycle, the C-P-C Cycle, 
or the Experience Cycle, they will be left only with their anticipations without any 
confirmation of the usefulness of their anticipations -  the anticipations will not be 
validated or invalidated. However, people may prefer to maintain this uncomfortable 
state to the potentially more uncomfortable state of having their anticipations 
disconfirmed, and need to engage in cycles of transition. Specifically, Walker (2002) 
described nonvalidation in the experimentation process, when people circumspect
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endlessly, rather than developing firm constructs, making only loose predictions rather 
than formulating testable hypotheses. They also act with hostility, trying to force the 
world to fit their loose predictions rather than making tighter constructs, misreading or 
ignoring other people’s reactions rather than evaluating the outcome of their 
experiments, and being dogmatic rather than acting according to the outcomes they 
observe. The process of non-validation, like that of disorder described by Warren 
(2006), impedes the process of experimentation and adventure, avoiding the possible 
outcome of invalidation.
5.9 Emotions related to invalidation and transition
Kelly (1955/1991) argued that the outcome of constructs being invalidated by 
experiences results in the experience of emotions of transition. These emotions are 
indicators of the need to manage invalidation and will continue to exist for as long as 
invalidation remains unresolved. Further, the type of constructs that are invalidated will 
indicate the type of emotion that will result. Kelly (1955/1991) described the following 
as ‘emotions of transition’ (in this order), threat, fear, anxiety, guilt, aggressiveness, and 
hostility.
Kelly (1955/1991) described threat as: “the awareness of an imminent 
comprehensive change in core structures” (Kelly, 1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.391). Core 
structures are those that govern people’s self-maintenance processes -  they provide 
construing that is consistent with self and provide the degree of personal significance of 
events (Kelly 1955/1991). Therefore, a threat to core constructs is an imminent threat to 
change completely how a person views and makes sense of the world -  leaving people 
without the ability to anticipate future events as meaningful to them, or in ways that are 
consistent with their construing of their own identities. Landfield and Leitner (1980)
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note, that while changes to core-construing will have far-reaching implications, they are 
not always negative. However, it will result in dislodgement from a person’s central 
system of meaning, leaving the person vulnerable.
Fear, a lesser emotion, is: “the awareness of an imminent incidental change in 
core structures” (Kelly, 1995/1991, Vol. 1, p.391). This emotion is similar to threat in 
that it has a sense of immediacy and impacts on core construing. However, the change it 
may bring is less comprehensive, and may leave some aspects of construing and 
personal significance unchanged. Therefore, while the change is just as imminent and 
involves the same core construing as threat, the degree of change expected with fear is 
incidental, leaving much of the core constructs unchanged.
Kelly (1955/1991) described anxiety as: “the awareness that the events with 
which people are confronted he outside the range of convenience of their construct 
systems” (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.391). It is the awareness that existing constructs do not 
adequately apply to the world around (Landfield & Leitner, 1980). Anxiety requires 
awareness by people, of constructs in their construct systems, and of their applicability 
to making sense of the world. If construct systems are insufficient to fully make 
meaning out o f an event, anxiety will result. McCoy (1977) adds that it is not just 
invalidation or awareness of invalidation that causes anxiety. Constructs must also be 
abandoned as inadequate, in the light of invalidation if there are no new constructs to 
replace them. While unpleasant, McCoy (1977 & 1981) argues that anxiety is a 
necessary precondition for making revisions in the construct system, as it is an indicator 
of peoples’ need for change. Anxiety is similar to threat, although constructs resulting in 
anxiety are lower in their hierarchies of constructs than threat; and whereas threat 
involves invalidation of core-construing, anxiety usually involves invalidation of non­
core construing.
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Kelly (1955/1991), described guilt, as: “the awareness o f dislodgement of the 
self from one’s core role structure” (Vol. 1, p.391). This emotion results from people’s 
awareness that their sense o f themselves is not what they believed it to be, they have not 
acted in accordance with their core role, or have done something that is perceived as 
being in direct contradiction to their central roles (Landfield & Leitner, 1980). 
Bannister (1977/2003) adds that guilt is not simply the result of people behaving in 
ways that defy social norms, but comes from having misread themselves. People may 
not readily recognize dislodgement. However, if they behave in ways that reflect these 
changes, they will come face to face with contradictions from their usual self, leaving 
themselves unsure of how to predict their future behaviour.
Hostility is defined by Kelly as: “the continued effort to extort validational 
evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which has already been recognized as a 
failure” (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.391). People try to force their worlds to fit their 
predictions when those predictions have been invalidated by experience, often through 
anger or manipulation, rather than revising their invalidated hypotheses to suit the 
evidence that they have received by experience. Bannister (1977/2003) describes 
hostility as resulting from people being unwilling to face up to the need to change and 
develop new constructs in the face of invalidation. People may have not have palatable 
alternate theories, may have invested too much in existing constructs to abandon them 
easily, or be unable to tolerate the temporary chaos that abandoning existing construing 
would bring. In these cases, people may prefer to bully people, ‘cook the books’ and 
torment others in order to gain apparent validation for their construct systems threatened 
with invalidation. Cummins (2003) described hostility and anger as expressions of 
invalidation, indicating the need for change.
107
Kelly described aggressiveness as: “the active elaboration of one’s perceptual 
field” (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.391). He also described people who: “set up choice points 
in their lives” (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.375), where they need to elaborate, decide and act. 
In personal construct theory aggressiveness is not viewed as negative, as it might be in 
general usage. Rather, aggressiveness is active and deliberate engagement in the 
processes of construing and reconstruing when needed to develop new constructs. 
Bannister (2003) describes aggression as risking commitment to the unknown, in order 
to undertake elaboration. In this regard, aggression is a sign of people’s commitment to 
resolve disorder through reconstruing.
While Kelly (1955/1991) described these six emotions of transition, McCoy 
(1977) argues that only four (anxiety, threat, fear and guilt) are emotional states, with 
aggression and hostility described as behaviours that result from emotional states. 
McCoy (1977 & 1981) also describes a broader range of emotions o f transition than 
Kelly, that include threat, fear, bewilderment, doubt, guilt, shame, contempt or disgust, 
anxiety, sadness, and anger. McCoy describes positive emotions as those arising from 
validation of construing and negative emotions as those arising from invalidation. While 
positive emotions can lead to mental health, and negative emotions can lead to disorder, 
they do not describe pleasure or distress respectively; but rather validation-seeking or 
invalidation, respectively. While the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ often imply 
happiness and distress, they are not used in this way by McCoy. Further, it is not only 
validation that provides positive emotions; but the process of moving to resolve 
invalidation and integrate constructs, through reconstruing through the cycles of 
transition. This compliments Kelly’s (1955/1991) definition of disorder as the continued 
use of constructs that have been invalidated by experience. Hence, mental health and
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disorder, while linked to emotions of transition, are not intrinsically linked to pleasure 
or distress.
The full list of emotions described by McCoy (1977) include emotions related to 
core structures, non-core structures, fit o f self and core structures, fit between own core 
structure and others, recognition of construct system functionality, and behaviours 
associated with emotions. Her list of emotions increases Kelly’s (1955/1991) original 
list of emotions of transition, to seventeen.
In describing behaviours associated with invalidation, McCoy (1977) follows 
Kelly’s (1955/1991) view that hostility is a process of trying to force validation without 
making changes in construing, while aggressiveness is the seeking out of elaboration to 
resolve invalidation. Mascolo and Mancuso (1992) describe emotions of transition as 
functioning to preserve functional equilibrium between events and construct systems. 
However, this equilibrium does not need to be perfect. The fragmentation corollary 
indicates that ‘inferential’ fragmentation can be tolerated (Kelly, 1955/1991), and 
Mascolo and Mancuso describe an ‘adaptive’ equilibrium between events and construct 
systems, where discrepancies between events and construct systems are reduced to a 
subjectively optimal level. Emotions of transition, therefore, lead to actions to reduce 
fragmentation and invalidation, which in turn, reduce the experience of emotions of 
transition.
In addition to the specific and discrete emotions of transition described, the 
disorder of depression could also be included as it involves emotional experiences in 
response to invalidation. Neimeyer (1985) describes constriction as one of three 
responses to invalidation, aiming at reducing the anxiety of invalidation through 
reducing the perception of boundaries of perception to such an extent as to have 
awareness of only specific elements, but not the relationships between them. The
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process o f constriction results in people developing highly polarized, construct systems. 
Constriction leads to them priming themselves to only extract negative information 
from experiences (including construing of the self), forming global and 
undiscriminating emotional judgments, and construing themselves as different to other 
people. Further, Neimeyer indicates that constriction can develop into depression. While 
using highly polarized construct systems, depressed people don’t only stick to one 
construct pole; rather they change poles frequently, as a result of ambivalence, or in 
order to order to constrict their system further (to avoid reconstruing). Neimeyer then 
indicates that negative self-construing correlates with the vegetative and emotional 
responses associated with depression (sleep disturbance and feeling sad). Therefore, 
while more complex than a single emotion, depression involves a significant experience 
resulting from invalidation, and indicating the need for reconstruing. As such, it appears 
the serve the same function as emotions of transition, and will be included along with 
them.
This provides a range of emotions related to invalidation which indicate a need 
for construct revision. If  invalidation relates to core structures, threat and fear will 
result. Emotions related to invalidation of non-core structures include anxiety, 
bewilderment or doubt.
McCoy (1977 & 1981) indicates that emotions can relate just as much to 
validation of construing, with love and happiness the result of validation of core 
structures, and satisfaction and complacency the result of validation of non-core 
structures, with contentment the result of the awareness of this validation. So while 
emotions of transition are indicators of invalidation, positive emotions are indicators of
validation.
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Kelly’s (1955/1991) descriptions of specific emotions may differ from more 
generally accepted meaning of the same terms, and it may be that Kelly’s descriptions 
of emotions are focused on the processes that lead to emotions, rather than to the 
experiences of emotions. For example, Kelly describes guilt as: “the awareness of 
dislodgement of the self from one’s core role structure” (Vol. 1, p.391). It seems 
unlikely that people may actually experience or to describe experiencing dislodgement 
of their self for their core roles. Rather, they are more likely to experience a sense of 
responsibility and regret for committing a wrongdoing. However, the process leading to 
sensing a responsibility and regret for committing a wrongdoing may stem from 
awareness of a pre-verbal construct of dislodgement from their core roles. In this sense, 
Kelly’s description of emotions may be less focused on the experience of emotions, than 
on the processes leading up to the experience of the emotion.
Kelly’s (1955/1991) description of aggressiveness is also seemingly at odds with 
the more commonly usage of the term. Kelly describes aggression as: “the active 
elaboration of one’s perceptual field” (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.391) and implies that 
aggressiveness is an essential process and indicator of for positive mental health. 
However, aggression is commonly recognized as: “the act or practice o f attacking 
without provocation”, “beginning a quarrel or war”, “an unprovoked attack , or as a 
psychological state including a “hostile or destructive tendency or behaviour . These 
descriptions are clearly negatively constructs that appear manipulative and more 
indicative of disorder than positive mental health. However, this same reference also 
describes aggression as being: “self-assertive and forceful . These last two definitions 
are more consistent with Kelly’s view.
These differences go beyond mere semantic differences and suggest that Kelly’s 
(1955/1991) usage of language regarding emotions may be tapping into different
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constructs those in common usage, rather than simply being a different explanation for 
the experiences of people. In the case of guilt, Kelly appears to construing the process 
that leads to the experiences of an emotion, rather than describing the actual experience. 
With aggression, while Kelly appears to be describing an intent that is consistent with 
common usage, this consistency is very limited, and in general, the use by Kelly and 
general usage are at odds.
5.10 Optimal mental health in personal construct theory
Epting and Amerikaner (1980) describe optimal health as resulting from 
completion of the Experience Cycle. Optimal health does not sit as a mid-point between 
good and bad functioning and is not the norm. Rather, it is a lofty goal to achieve, akin 
to achieving a transcendence of self. Epting and Amerikaner consider that, in addition 
to the completion of Experience Cycles, a construct system that has developed 
hierarchically and has relatively stable core constructs (those that provide people with 
their sense of identity) and with little stress placed on them (with change only being 
necessitated in peripheral constructs) has optimal functioning.
Similarly, Walker and Winter (2005) reflect on the complexity of describing 
optimal functioning or good mental health. From this perspective, they summarise 
optimal health as the ability for people to engage in cycles as if they were scientists, 
testing and revising their construing based on whether or not their construing leads to 
validation when it is tested. Further, they note that the process of validation is 
interpersonal in nature, it is more complex than appears on the surface, and that 
validation varies in importance depending where people are developmental^. Kelly 
(1980) adds that people change themselves through experience. This indicates that it is 
the ability to change as a result of experience that is considered an indicator of mental
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health. Further, change and mental health are viewed as unique ways of linking the past 
and present, with valid anticipations of the future.
As noted earlier, Kelly (1955/1991) viewed people as acting as if they were 
scientists, making predictions, testing the utility o f these predictions, adjusting their 
knowledge base according to what they learned, and then making new predictions to 
test, based on this developed knowledge and anticipations. Important to this process, is 
whether or not people’s anticipations are validated or invalidated as a result of their 
experiments in life. If  predictions and anticipations are validated, meaning-making is 
confirmed, reinforcing the original construct. If predictions and anticipations are 
invalidated, people need for revision of their construing. This process requires them to 
be actively involved in the experimentation process -  testing the anticipations they 
make. These processes may not be as overt and deliberate as scientists in their 
laboratories, but their outcomes help to revise and develop knowledge and predictions 
in the same way.
Leitner and Pfenninger (1994) consider that optimal functioning involves the 
ability to interact in intimate interpersonal relationships. They note that: “constructs are 
formed out of a dynamic interaction between the person and the world (Leitner & 
Pfenninger, 1994, p.125), and cannot occur in a social vacuum. Therefore, the ability to 
interact with other people is essential for construing. Leitner and Pfenninger argue that 
there are nine aspects of interpersonal functioning that are essential for optimal 
functioning. These are discrimination, creativity, responsibility, openness, commitment, 
courage, forgiveness, and reverence. Leitner and Pfenninger contend that these aspects 
are an elaboration o f empathy, or understanding of the construing of others, which could 
also be seen as the embodiment o f the Sociality Corollary.
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Mascolo and Mancuso (1992) describe mental health as an ‘adaptive’ 
equilibrium between events and construct systems, where discrepancies between events 
and construct systems are reduced to a subjectively optimal level. This means that 
people recognize invalidation when it occurs, and move toward resolving this and 
maintaining relative (but not necessarily complete) integration of constructs. They stress 
that mental health is a process of managing invalidation and moving toward integration, 
rather than only a state of achieving complete integration. This view of mental health is 
compatible with Kelly’s (1955/1991) view of disorder, (which can be assumed to be at 
the opposite pole of a mental health -  disorder continuum), where invalidated constructs 
are not addressed and replaced (and may not even be recognized), but maintained and 
repeatedly used, perpetuating the emotions of transition.
5.11 Conditions for the formation of new constructs
The three cycles of transition describe what happens when people revise or 
develop new constructs, with emphases on creativity, experience and decision making. 
Kelly (1955/1991) also describes the conditions that are favourable for the formation of 
new constructs along with conditions that are unfavourable; in other words those 
conditions facilitating or hindering engaging in the cycles of construing.
Favourable conditions include the use of fresh elements, experimentation, and 
the availability o f validating data. New elements involve people having access to new 
experiences from which to derive new constructs, and might take the form of input from 
other people, or focusing on some aspect of a different construct that could be applied to 
the current situation. They involve being able to access different ideas from different 
sources. Experimentation is the ability to engage in the cycles of construing described 
above (Creativity, C-P-C, and Experience Cycles). People need to have knowledge of,
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be willing to, and feel capable of, going through these cycles and what they require. 
Further, they need the tools and environment in which to undertake the experiments 
they need. People need data with which to validate their predictions. There is little 
benefit to undertaking the process of experimentation if the outcomes of the 
experiments are not known or cannot be known. Whether or not validating evidence is 
available is essential to determine whether people’s anticipations can become constructs 
rather than just predictions.
Unfavourable conditions include threat, preoccupation with old material, and no 
‘laboratory’ in which to change the cycles o f revision. Threat is considered to be the 
most important of these processes, and involves incompatibility between new constructs 
and constructs high in the hierarchy, with consequences for an imminent and 
comprehensive change in people’s core structures (Kelly, 1955/1991). Incompatibility 
with constructs high in the hierarchy will be comprehensive, and therefore, threatening. 
Threat may result in construct revision being deferred or denied, if the threat of 
comprehensive change is greater than the desire to review or develop new constructs. 
The threat of comprehensive change can limit people’s willingness to engage in the 
process. Preoccupation with old material refers to not being open to new information or 
not having access to new information from which a new prediction could be developed 
and tested through experimentation. It could include being stuck with constructs that 
have been made redundant through experience, rather than being open to new ideas that 
might accompany new experiences. Being preoccupied with the old impedes acceptance 
or development of the new, or of engaging in the process of construct review and 
revision. As the laboratory is essential to scientists, so it is to people-as-scientists. A 
laboratory is a controlled place for people to test hypotheses. It must have the elements 
required to test out the predictions. As many of the hypotheses people make are social
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hypotheses, based on what they predict people will do, the laboratory required to 
experiment, is a social laboratory.
In addition to these conditions, Epting and Amerikaner (1980) add that 
interpersonal relationships can facilitate or inhibit movement from loose to tight 
construing, and are therefore a condition related to completing the Creativity Cycle. 
They describe as important, the striving of people to see the world from the point of 
view of other, and of the gaining of new understanding from this process. Leitner and 
Pfenninger (1994) add that construing does not happen in a social vacuum, but relies on 
a dynamic interaction between people and their worlds to take place.
Tschudi and Rommetveir (1982) describe disorders as being problems of 
interpersonal relating. They maintain that: “disregard of others’ constructions may be 
associated with untold terror” (p.261), and that psychologically: “failure to arrive at 
inter-subjectivity and shared social reality is at the heart of clinical problems” (p.249). 
These opinions indicate that the ability o f people to access and use interpersonal relating 
to help their experimentation, validation, and reconstruing, are important conditions 
impacting on disorder or mental health in the face of experience.
5.12 Conclusion
This chapter provides a description of George Kelly’s theory of personal 
constructs. The fundamental postulate, the underpinning stance, and the formal structure 
of the theory in its general usage, along with disorder, mental health and the process of 
recovery from disorder have been described. Having described personal construct 
psychology in general terms, I now move on to apply the theory to understand mental 
health and disorder in the aftermath of exposure to extremely stressful or traumatic
events.
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Chapter 6. A personal construct psychology model of maintaining mental health
following potentially traumatic events.
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In this chapter I apply Kelly’s theory of personal constructs to the understanding 
of mental health and psychological trauma. A personal construct model of maintaining 
mental health following psychological trauma, based on the work of Sewell, is 
presented and reviewed.
6.1 Propositions derived from personal construct theory and mental health following 
exposure to potentially traumatic events.
From the general theory of personal constructs and the specific applications of 
the theory to the fields of mental health and psychological trauma come several 
propositions that can be developed into hypotheses, operationalised, and tested.
I. People form construct systems that they use to establish stable predictions about 
future events and to understand new events. These processes develop with a 
variety of levels o f awareness.
II. Construct systems have hierarchies, with constructs higher in the ordinancy 
having more importance than those lower in the hierarchy. The most important 
constructs (superordinate constructs) are those related to processes that govern 
self-maintenance.
III. Events usually considered to be potentially traumatic usually involve construing 
an imminent risk or confrontation with threatened death or personal safety, with a 
high level o f awareness. Construing imminent death or safety involves construing 
processes that govern personal maintenance. Therefore, traumatic events are those 
that impact on ‘core-constructs’.
IV. The two main outcomes from initial comparisons between existing construct 
systems and constructs of traumatic events are: validation of construing or
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fragmentation at no more that an inferential level; and invalidation of construing or 
fragmentation at more than an inferential level.
V. Validation will result in positive emotions, while invalidation or fragmentation will 
result in emotions of transition.
VI. Invalidation results in a range o f emotions of transition, each reflecting different 
types and levels of constructs invalidated.
VII. Severe invalidation or fragmentation prevents comparison between trauma- 
specific construing, and construing of other events in existing construct systems. 
This prevents trauma specific constructs from becoming construed as a historical 
event. Rather, traumatic events are construed as ongoing and current events, with 
ongoing emotions of transitions. They are in effect, frozen in time, and continue to 
be construed as threatening events.
VIII. Comparisons between construing of events and existing construing systems may 
be an ongoing or repeated process, especially if there are new constructs of the 
event developed over time, or ongoing invalidation or fragmentation beyond an 
inferential level.
IX. Construct review and revision through successful engagement in cycles of 
transition (until invalidation or fragmentation is resolved) is the usual and mental 
healthy response to potentially traumatic events.
X. Disorder is the repeated use of constructs that have been invalidated or fragmented 
beyond the inferential level, or inability to successful complete cycles of transition 
when needed, and will be associated with the ongoing presence of emotions of 
transitions and the absence of positive emotions.
XI. The main cause of inability to complete cycles of transition following trauma, is 
constriction of construing. Constriction refers to narrowing of fields of awareness to
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only focus on one at a time, of two or more invalidating or highly fragmented 
construct systems, in order to avoid the anxiety o f awareness o f the invalidation.
XII. Dilation of construing is necessary in order to resolve disorder by engaging in, 
and completing cycles of transition.
XIII. Interpersonal relating mediates successful completion of cycles of transition as a 
major condition for the formation o f new constructs, and is therefore associated with 
mental health and disorder.
XIV. As core-construing (construing governing self-maintenance processes) is 
involved in potentially traumatic events, and core-construing is superordinal, it 
could be expected that ongoing invalidation or fragmentation of superordinal 
construing will result in disturbance in most subordinate areas of construing.
6.2 Personal construct theory and psychological trauma
Throughout this chapter I consider the definitions of traumatic events provided 
in Chapter 2 (from the DSM-IV and ICD-10). This includes people having experienced, 
witnessed or having been confronted by actual or threatened death, serious injury or 
threats to the physical integrity of self or other, combined with reactions including 
intense fear, helplessness and horror. Traumatic events threaten people’s existence, 
safety, and identity, either directly though experience, or through witnessing or being 
confronted by, or through identifying with other people’s experiences.
Butt (2006) indicates that the person-as-scientist metaphor means acting ‘a s - if . 
Therefore, good persons-as-scientists could act ‘as-if it were them that were 
experiencing what the victim they see or are confronted with is experiencing. Further, 
Kelly’s Commonality Corollary holds that: “to the extent that one person employs a 
construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another, his
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psychological processes are similar to those of the other person” (1955/1991, Vol 1 : 
p.63). This corollary indicates that if people construe experiences of a traumatic event 
in similar ways to one another, they will have similar psychological processes and 
therefore, similar reactions to the event. When people identify with, and therefore 
employ similar construing of events, they can identify with the imminent 
comprehensive change of others, and therefore share the imminent nature of 
comprehensive change to core structures required for Kelly’s (1955/1991) description of 
threat.
In his two-volume work on the psychology of personal constructs, Kelly 
(1955/1991) did not provide a comprehensive account of psychological trauma, but 
described what appear to be accepted negative aspects of trauma such as people freezing 
in their tracks and reverting to, and applying, constructs that have been invalidated by 
previous experiences. Kelly (1955/1991) held that, as there are no intrinsic or absolute 
meanings to any event, traumatic events may be similar to other events in life, as 
opportunities for people to test their existing construct systems. Events considered by 
some people to be traumatic, can be validating to others, if they provide subjective 
documentation or proof o f the validity o f their existing construct systems.
A personal construct theory account specifically concerning psychological 
trauma was first proposed by Sewell (1996). Disorders following trauma were described 
as resulting from people being unable to develop or use overarching or superordinal 
constructs to integrate trauma-specific constructs and existing construct systems. 
Without superordinal constructs to overcome the fragmentation of seemingly 
incompatible and invalidating constructs, people can use two or more construct systems 
incompatible and mutually invalidating construct systems; one based on experience up 
until the event, and the other, based on the event itself. Whenever two or more mutually
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incompatible and invalidating construct systems exist and are used, people will have 
difficulty making meaning of experiences in their lives (and understand is what ways 
they are similar to, and different from, other events in their lives) and making stable or 
consistent anticipations of future events. They may alternate between construct systems 
without continuity or consistency. Presumably, the higher in people’s hierarchy of 
constructs that fragmentation or invalidation occurs, the greater the impact on people 
will be.
Sewell, Cromwell, Farrell-Higgins, Palmer and Patterson (1996) developed this 
concept, adding that recovery from PTSD is contingent on people developing and 
integrating the trauma-related isolated construct subsystems into an entire construct 
system. They tested this theory with Vietnam veterans, indicating that there were 
differences with regard to the impairment of integration of construing between Vietnam 
veterans with PTSD and controls. Veterans with PTSD were also unable to establish 
hierarchies of construing that could resolve the fragmentation between trauma-related 
construing and existing construct systems.
Cromwell, Sewell and Langelle (1996) noted that impairment of integration of 
trauma-related constructs with existing construct systems was due to a lack of 
associative or transitive propositions. Traumatic events produce constructs that are so 
different to existing experience that people may not be able to develop the associative 
constructs necessary to link trauma-specific constructs with their existing construct 
systems; nor the superordinal or hierarchical constructs necessary to overcome 
fragmentation. Without consistent construct systems that include trauma specific 
constructs and existing construct systems, people cannot make meaningful, valid and 
consistent stories of what happened to them. Further, they cannot compare or 
distinguish traumatic events from other events that they have construed as past or
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historic events. Without being linked to the constructs of time or past, traumatic events 
cannot be construed as past events and remain “frozen in time” (Cromwell, Sewell & 
Langelle, 1996: p.193) as ongoing current events. Finally, the lack of constructs 
necessary for people to make a valid and meaningful narrative o f what happened to 
them during the traumatic event leads to intense anxiety.
Sewell and Williams (2001) view trauma as the inability o f people to understand 
both the emergent and implicit poles of their constructs related to trauma and then- 
existing constructs. Without understanding both poles, they cannot fully compare 
trauma related constructs with their existing construct systems and develop alternate 
narratives. Sewell and Williams argue that if their emergent poles of existing constructs 
system are invalidated by trauma, it is the understanding of the implicit poles of then- 
existing construct systems, and the flexibility and complexity of these systems that will 
determine whether or not they can develop new constructs that integrate trauma-specific 
and existing construct systems. Unfortunately, people are often less aware of the 
implicit poles of their construing than they are of emergent poles, and less able to bring 
them to awareness and application. Without awareness of the flexibility or complexity 
of the implicit poles of their construing, people will be unable to fully develop 
narratives that make sense to them, of events and experiences or distinguish trauma 
experiences from everyday non-traumatic experiences. They will be left with the 
invalidated emergent poles of their construing - and the validated emergent poles of 
trauma related constructs - leaving them to react ‘as-if there were trauma all around. 
With only invalidated emergent construct systems, people are unable to establish the 
associative or transitive propositions; described by Cromwell, Sewell and Langelle 
(1996) as necessary to link constructs related to traumatic events and their existing 
construct system. They are left with invalidation that they cannot overcome.
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To recover from trauma requires people to elaborate their construing, bringing to 
awareness and understanding the implicit poles of their construing, applying both poles 
to develop alternate stories of the event and the senses of themselves, and incorporate 
the existing construct systems and trauma specific construing.
Sewell and Williams (2001) developed this further, noting that traumatic 
experiences disrupt the way people construe all events, along with how they construe 
themselves and interpersonal relationships. They argue that while people need to be 
aware of, and understand, both emergent and implicit poles of their construing in order 
to make meaningful stories o f their experiences, verbal behaviour (talking) is more 
associated with emergent poles rather than implicit poles. Therefore, people may favour 
the emergent pole of their construing and not be able to easily articulate implicit poles 
through verbal communication. Again, they note that it is people’s ability to fully 
understand how trauma is similar to, and different from, other experiences in their lives 
that determine whether constructs can be integrated. Full understanding requires 
awareness and application of both emergent and implicit poles of their construing. 
Sewell and Williams are consistent with Kelly’s (1955/1991) view that traumatic events 
do not have to always have negative effects, and that growth is a possible outcome from 
trauma; however, it requires elaboration of constructs systems through extending and 
reintegrating constructs related to the trauma and existing construct systems.
Sewell describes trauma as: “an extreme experience that cannot be construed in 
relation to other life experiences (that) often creates a fragmented trauma-related 
construct subsystem” (2003, pp.223-224). Without associative constructs, trauma- 
specific constructs are left isolated and stand-alone. This means that trauma-specific 
constructs and existing construct systems remain mutually exclusive with no means to 
link them to other experiences in people’s lives. If this exclusivity leads to invalidation
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of core construing (constructs that govern self-maintenance processes) or fragmentation 
of construing beyond an inferential level, the negative impact of trauma will be 
experienced.
Sewell (2003) describes people suffering PTSD as being stuck in the construal 
of experience around one or two core constructs (such as good versus bad or in-control 
versus out-of-control). Further, those with PTSD construe themselves and the world in 
ways that may be validated only by the experience of a specific event (a traumatic 
event), but not by the rest of the world or their experiences. What they learn about 
themselves and the world through traumatic experience differs from what they believed 
about themselves and the world prior to the event. This learning leads to alternating 
between conflicting construct systems, resulting in difficulty making confident and 
consistent predictions about themselves, their social interactions, and their future 
experiences. Sewell (2003), like Sewell, Cromwell, Farrell-Higgins, Palmer and 
Patterson (1996), contends that recovery relies on the ability of people to create new and 
varied hierarchically abstract relationships between trauma constructs and the rest of 
their construct systems.
Sewell (2005) adds to this account by defining trauma as a disruption in peoples’ 
construing of events and of themselves in two ways. Firstly, trauma impairs people’s 
ability to establish cause-and-effect relationships, leading to losses of predictiveness of 
causation in the future, and resulting in the experience of chaos and loss of control. 
Secondly, trauma disrupts peoples’ understandings and experiences of their social 
relationships and how they relate to other people. Sewell argues that when both as 
disrupted, people can be said to be traumatized. This model of trauma is based on 
outcomes to individuals and their social world, rather than on the being based on the 
types of events that could trigger these responses.
126
The essential features of the personal construct approach to psychological 
trauma presented is that people are unable to resolve significant fragmentation between 
existing construct systems and constructs developed from a specific traumatic event. 
The result is that people are invalidated as construers -  they are unable to make 
meaningful and believable stories of themselves, their experiences and their social 
relating. Further, people may alternate between the extremes of their incompatible 
emergent poles, creating instability or inconsistency in anticipating and validating 
constructs. One outcome of the fragmentation between trauma-specific construing and 
existing construct systems results in trauma specific constructs is the inability to utilize 
the constructs o f time, history or past that are used with existing construct systems. 
Without utilizing constructs of time, past and history with which to compare traumatic 
constructs, the event is left as an ongoing current event that continue to influences 
peoples’ prediction of their futures. People’s abilities to elaborate their constructs may 
be compromised by the relative dominance of the emergent poles of constructs related 
to the trauma constructs over the implicit poles of trauma constructs and inability to 
clearly bring into awareness the implicit poles or their constructs. To recover, or to 
integrate trauma specific construing, requires people to bring to awareness the implicit 
poles of their construing. This increases the likelihood of integration through the 
development of associative constructs and hierarchical connections between constructs.
6.3 Models in Personal Construct Psychology
Prior to developing a model of mental health and psychological trauma, 
standards by which such models can be judged should be clearly stated. In Chapter 4, I 
introduced standards for models of psychological trauma, derived from Horowitz 
(1997), Jones and Barlow (1990), and Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph (1996). Standards
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also exist for personal construct models, and should equally apply to a personal 
construct psychology model of psychological trauma. These two sets of standards 
interact with one another and provide the structural standards along with the experience- 
specific standards against which a personal construct model of extreme psychological 
stress can be judged.
6.3.1 Standards for personal construct models
Viney (2006) describes models as a set of conceptual propositions that enable 
clinicians to make generalizations from one client to another, and from one community 
to another. They prevent people from being overwhelmed by the complexity of theories, 
make theories accountable for real life situations and events, provide new ideas for 
practitioners, provide more appropriate and specific definitions of the concepts 
contained in a theory, check that information gathered is relevant to the theory, and help 
make predictions based on the theory.
In establishing these principles, Viney (2006) establishes six standards for 
personal construct models. Firstly, models must be firmly based in this theory. 
Secondly, models should be easy to comprehend and expressed using as few concepts as 
possible. Thirdly, models should be internally consistent without any propositions in 
conflict with others in the model. Fourthly, models should be parsimonious or frugal; 
(they should contain maximum information with the minimum of propositions). Fifthly, 
models should deal adequately with the psychological events of focus and whatever 
physical, psychological, historical and contextual events are relevant in applying the 
model. Finally, models should be comprehensive and specific; they should be broadly- 
based enough to include all relevant events, yet still be precise enough to use to make
128
valid predictions. These standards will be later applied to a personal construct theory 
model o f mental health associated with psychological trauma.
Having posed a personal construct psychology model of mental health in the 
aftermath of potentially traumatic events, in this chapter, the model can now be 
validated against both sets of standards for models (one for models of psychological 
trauma, and the other for personal construct psychology models). This approach only 
treats the model as a theoretical model. I now move on to provide experimental data 
from people exposed to potential trauma, to validate the model as a practical and 
workable model, rather than as only a theoretical model.
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Chapter 7. Study 2 - Testing the personal construct model of mental health and
psychological trauma
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Study 1 of this report provided a description of the experiences of people in the 
Navy who experienced a potentially traumatic event, highlighting both mental health 
and disorder, as short- and long-term responses. This study goes some way to develop 
understanding of what happens when disaster strikes. However, it does little to explain 
the processes behind these outcomes, or how these processes occur. To fully understand 
mental health and disorder in the aftermath of trauma requires understanding not only 
what happens, but also why. The models of mental health described in Chapter 4 
provide some knowledge and understanding of the processes involved, but fall short of a 
full account o f the range of experiences of people involved in potential trauma. The 
personal construct psychology model posed in Chapter 6 provides insight into a broad 
range of possible responses to potentially traumatic events. However, while the work of 
Sewell, upon which it is based, has been validated through experiment, the revised 
model has not. It is still a theoretical model. For this model to be validated, it must 
account for the actual experiences of people who have experienced potentially traumatic 
events.
I will now provide the opportunity for the model to move from a theoretical 
model, to a practical and validated model, through applying it to the experiences of 
some of the subjects in Sample 1. Sample 1 were described in Study 1 (Chapter 3 of this 
report), as Australian Navy personnel who were involved in fighting a fire at sea that 
resulted in the deaths of four of the crew. The event was considered to be of sufficient 
intensity and threat to be considered potentially traumatic, and a prevalence of indicated 
PTSD similar to that experienced by military personnel in war and peacekeeping 
operation, and by civilian disasters, was revealed. With this sample, I have established 
what happened to them. Now I move to try to understand why. To do this, I will apply 
the personal construct model posed in Chapter 6.
131
7.1 Aims and Research Questions.
This project will test the value of hypotheses derived from the propositions of 
the model posed in the previous chapter. These propositions are based on the theory of 
personal constructs provided in Chapter 5, along with the specific application of 
personal construct theory to mental health in the aftermath of potentially traumatising 
events. I examine participants’ experiences o f exposure to psychological trauma and 
will further develop models o f mental health and disorder in the face of exposure to 
trauma. I will address the following questions:
1. Are validation and invalidation of core construing (threat) associated with 
mental health following exposure to potentially traumatic events?
2. Is the presence o f positive and negative emotions associated with mental 
health following exposure to potentially traumatic events?
3. Are disorders such as PTSD associated with constriction of construing?
3. Is social support associated with mental health following exposure to potentially 
traumatic events?
and;
4. How are people who maintain mental health after being exposed to potential 
trauma distinguished from those who develop disorder?
7.1.1 Hypotheses to be tested
Using the personal construct model of psychological trauma, the following 
hypotheses address the research questions:
1. Measures of threat will be negatively associated with measures of mental health;
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2. Measures of positive emotions will be positively associated with measures of 
mental health, while measures of emotions of transition will be negatively associated 
with measures of mental health;
3. Measures o f constriction of construing will be negatively associated with 
measures of mental health;
4. Measures of positive social support will be positively associated with measures 
of mental health.
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Design.
The first of the hypotheses will be operationalised through establishing 
associations between measures of threat and mental health. Construing related to threat 
will be measured using content analysis scales focusing on fears of death, mutilation, or 
separation, applied to narratives supplied by participants. Mental health will be 
measured using questionnaires assessing symptoms associated with post-traumatic 
mental health problems, with mental health indicated by lower scores on mental health 
questionnaires and disorder indicated by higher scores. It is hypothesized that measures 
of threat will be negatively associated with measures of mental health. Therefore, the 
operationalised Hypothesis 1 reads: the degree of threat, as measured by the analysis of 
narratives provided by participants by content analysis scales, will be negatively 
associated with the degree of mental health.
The second hypothesis will be operationalised through the establishment of 
associations between measures o f positive emotions and emotions of transitions and 
measures o f mental health. Positive emotions and emotions of transitions will be
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measured using content analysis scales focusing on positive emotions and a range of 
emotions o f transitions (namely: threat, anxiety, guilt, shame, hostility, and depression) 
applied to narratives provided by participants. Mental health will be measured using 
questionnaires assessing symptoms associated with post-traumatic mental health 
problems; mental health will be indicated by lower scores on mental health 
questionnaires and disorder indicated by higher scores. It is hypothesized that measures 
of positive emotions will be positively associated with measurements of mental health 
(as indicated by lower scores on mental health questionnaires), and emotions of 
transition will be negatively associated with measures of mental health. Therefore, the 
operationalised Hypothesis 2 reads: the degree of positive emotions derived from the 
analysis o f narratives provided by participants by content analysis scales, will be 
positively associated with measures of mental health, while the degree of emotions of 
transitions, derived from the analysis o f narratives provided by participants by content 
analysis scales, will be negatively associated with measures of mental health.
The third hypothesis will be operationalised by establishing an association 
between measures of constriction in construing, and measures of mental health. 
Constriction in construing will be measured using content analysis scales assessing 
depression (which is an indication of constricted construing). Mental health will be 
measured using questionnaires assessing symptoms associated with post-traumatic 
mental health problems. Mental health will be indicated by lower scores on mental 
health questionnaires and disorder indicated by higher scores. It is anticipated that 
measures of depression will be negatively associated with measures of mental health. 
Therefore, the operationalised Hypothesis 3 reads: the degree of constriction of 
construing, as measured by the analysis of narratives provided by participants by
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content analysis scales assessing depression, will be negatively associated with 
measures o f mental health.
The fourth hypothesis will be operationalised by establishing associations 
between measures o f satisfying social relationships, and measures of mental health. 
Satisfying social relationships will be measured using content analysis scales assessing 
qualities of positively perceived social relationship, applied to narratives supplied by 
participants, focusing on social relationships. Mental health will be measured using 
questionnaires assessing symptoms associated with post-traumatic mental health 
problems. Mental health will be indicated by lower scores on mental health 
questionnaires and disorder indicated by higher scores. It is hypothesized that measures 
of positive social relationships will be positively associated with measures of mental 
health. Therefore, the operationalised Hypothesis 4 reads: the degree of social support, 
as derived from the analysis o f narratives provided by participants by content analysis 
scales, will be negatively associated with measures of mental health.
7.2.2 Sampling
The ideal sample to study mental health in the face of trauma would comprise 
people who have been exposed to a potentially traumatic event that could be reasonably 
expected to produce disorder in those exposed (i.e.: there is a likelihood of producing 
PTSD) and have resulted in the full range of possible outcomes (mental health and 
disorder). Ideally, a sample should have approximately equal numbers of those with 
mental health and disorder. However, a sample containing all participants with either 
mental health or disorder would go a considerable way to testing some of the model. 
There should ideally be a time lag between event and assessment to allow for whatever 
cycles of transition have been necessary for the people involved or for disorder to be
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apparent (repeated use of invalidated constructs implies some time). For research 
purposes, the ideal sample would have experienced the same or a similar event to 
reduce or limit possible variation due to different types of events or exposure.
An example of a suitable population that would have been exposed to a 
potentially traumatic event is the sample described in Study 1 (people who survived a 
multiple fatality, and raging fire that threatened a large Navy ship and resulted in PTSD 
for a considered proportion). All participants in this sample were all exposed to the 
same event; a fire in a Navy tanker at sea, that raged out of control for several hours, 
threatening the ship and all onboard at the time. With a threat to all and at least 
confrontation with actual and threatened death (the death of four of their shipmates), 
this incident (described in detail in Appendix A) would satisfy the definition of a trauma 
that could produce PTSD as described by the American Psychiatric Associations (1994) 
in the DSM-IV (people having experienced, witnessed or been confronted by an event 
that involved actual or threatened death, serious injury or a threat to the physical 
integrity o f others. However, while the prevalence of indicated PTSD in Sample 1 was 
significant, it still only accounted for a minority of the Sample, and there is nothing like 
equal numbers of those with disorder and those displaying mental health (the majority 
of Sample 1 were not indicated for PTSD). Therefore, to utilise Sample 1 in Study 2, 
requires only examining those without disorder. To include unequal numbers of those 
with disorder and mental health would be to introduce an extraneous variable.
Participants in Study 2 are drawn from Sample 1 (Navy personnel who were in 
HMAS Westralia at the time of the fire on the 5 May 1998). Inclusion criteria are 
having participated in the Study 1, and not being indicated for PTSD at the four to six 
year screening. Those meeting these criteria, to be included in Study 2, will be defined 
as Sample 2.
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All 48 people who participated in Study 1 were invited to participate in Study 2, 
by a letter inviting voluntary participation sent by the Director of the Australian 
Defence Force Psychology Organisation (a copy of the letter is contained in this report 
as Appendix D). Invitations were sent to the recorded address of current Navy 
personnel, and to the last known address, or address of next-of-kin, for those people 
who had left the Navy. People who had not responded to the initial mail-out within two 
months were sent a repeat copy of the letter inviting participation.
Sample 2 consists of twenty-eight people (29.8% of those involved in the fire 
and 58.3% of those involved in the review), who agreed to participate in Study 2. Of 
these, 22 yielded data suitable for analysis. Five potential participants provided 
incomplete data for analysis and were excluded. One participant was excluded as their 
score was considered to be an outlier (see Results, 7.3 for details). The final sample for 
Study 2 comprised 22 participants, made up of 17 males (77.27%) and five females 
(22.73%). The group’s average age at the time of the fire was 27.59 years (SD=6.06), 
with an age range of 18-44 years. By military rank, the group comprises 10 junior 
sailors (45.45%), three senior sailors (13.64%), and nine officers (40.91%).
7.2.2.1 Representativeness of the sample
Table 8 compares the distribution by gender and rank of Sample 2 with the crew 
list of HMAS Westralia at the time of the fire, and with a wider Navy sample (from 
Rayner, 2005, n-1739). The trend in all three groups is that there are predominantly 
more males than females, and more junior sailors than either senior sailors or officers.
Table 8 indicates that the participants in Study 2 have a very similar gender 
distribution (i.e.: predominantly more males that females) to the population of HMAS 
Westralia at the time of the fire, and to that of the Navy in general. With regard to the
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distribution o f rank of participants in Study 2, both the crew of HMAS Westralia at the 
time of the fire, and the wider Navy sample displayed predominantly more junior sailors 
than either senior sailors or officers. Table 8 also displays a comparison of the average 
ages of the Study 2 sample and the crew of HMAS Westralia, at the time of the fire. 
This comparison shows that these mean ages are also virtually identical.
Table 8.
Comparison o f the Gender Distributions o f Sample 2, the Crew of HMAS Westralia at the Time o f the 
Fire, and a Representative Navy Sample.
Study 2 participants Westralia population RAN (n=1739)a
(n=22) (n=98)
Male 17(77.3%) 73 (74.5%) 83.9%
Female 5 (22.7%) 25 (25.5%) 16.1%
Junior sailor 10(45.5%) 60(61.2%) 68.4%
Senior sailor 3 (13.6%) 18(18.4%) 18.2%
Officer 9 (40.9%) 20 (20.4%) 13.5%
Age 27.6 years 27.4 years
aRayner (2005)
Sample 2 can be seen to be generally representative of the crew of HMAS 
Westralia on the day of the fire, and of a large Australian Navy sample, with respect to 
age, gender, and rank distribution. Where Sample 2 and the wider Navy sample differ, is 
with regards to the dependent variable of this study -  i.e.: reporting of mental health 
problems. The eligibility criteria for Study 2 (see section 7.2.2) is for participants to 
have experienced an event that would be regarded as sufficiently distressing to result in
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disturbances such as PTSD, yet has not resulted in PTSD. Study 1 (Chapter 3) reports 
that the fire in HMAS Westralia resulted in a level o f PTSD that is higher than 
community rates of PTSD and similar to high-risk groups, considerably higher than the 
base-rate o f PTSD in a large Australian Navy sample, and similar to some military 
samples after exposure to war. The sample in Study 2 is a sub-set o f this group, yet this 
sub-set satisfies the inclusion criteria for Study 2.
7.2.3 Measures
Two types of data will be gathered for this project. The first is measures o f the 
independent variables (positive emotions, emotions of transition, and measures of 
interpersonal relating), while the second is measures dependent variable (mental health).
7.2.3.1 Measuring emotions
Content Analysis Scales applied to narratives supplied by participants were used 
to assess emotions. Content analysis scales are used because they provide an appropriate 
research methodology that is derived from the theory of personal constructs, and is 
therefore consistent with the theoretic approach described in Chapters 5 and 6.
Content analysis scales are a method of measuring people’s psychological 
experiences or transient emotional states, through an analysis of the content of then- 
speech (Gottschalk & Gleser, 1969, & Viney, 1983). The methodology is based on the 
assumption that the language in which people choose to express themselves contains 
information about the nature of their psychological states (Viney, 1993). Analysis yields 
quantifiable data and provides a rigorous scaled measurement of the meanings people 
form of the events they describe (Viney & Caputi, 2005/in press). While sharing some 
of the characteristics o f content or thematic analysis, content analysis scales are
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continuous scales that produce normally distributed scores amenable to statistical 
analysis (Viney & Caputi, 2005/in press).
Gottschalk and Hoigaard-Martin (1986) describe content analysis scales as: 
“combining the personal and subjective strengths of self-report measures with the 
objective and impartial strengths of the rating of the magnitude of psychological 
dimensions by independent observers” (p. 213).
The process of using content analysis scales begins with obtaining, recording 
and then transcribing into text, narratives from participants. While there are no exact 
instructions specified for individual content analysis scales, typical directions to 
participants provide limited guidance, emphasizing relatively free speech. An example 
of instructions for eliciting narratives appropriate to analysis by Content Analysis Scales 
is:
“I ’d like you to talk to me for a few minutes about your life at the moment -  the 
good things and the bad -  what it is like for you. Once you have started I shall 
be here listening to you: but I ’d rather not reply to any questions you may have 
until a five minute period is over. Do you have any questions you would like to 
ask now, before we start” (Viney, Rudd, Grenyer & Tych, 1995, p.7).
Narratives are recorded and transcribed into text which is prepared for analysis. 
The number of words used in the narratives is recorded and the text is broken into 
clauses. A clause is defined by Delbridge, Bernard, Blair, Butler, Peters & Yallop, 
(1997), as a group of words containing a subject and predicate that makes complete 
sense. Typical guidelines for the preparation of text are provided in Viney, Rudd, 
Grenyer and Tych (1995). Individual clauses are coded according to whether or not 
they match criteria clearly established for each scale (each scale having unique scoring
140
criteria). The number, and type of each coded clauses are recorded and converted into 
standard scores for subscales, and for the total scale. A formula for conversion differs 
for each scale used, although all take into consideration the number of words used in 
each narrative. The resulting quantitative score can be subjected to statistical analysis.
Viney (1983) and Viney and Caputi (2005/in press) describe content analysis 
scales as being developed through nine stages; namely (1) describing the state to be 
assessed precisely, and in all its dimensions; (2) defining the unit of content to be 
analysed; (3) specifying the content o f communication from which the psychological 
state is to be inferred; (4) specifying cues that indicate the intensity of the state; (5) 
applying weightings to these cues; (6) including a Correction Factor to account for the 
length of the verbal communication; (7) deriving a score from applying the scale to 
samples of communication; (8) normalizing distributions; (9) collecting normative data.
In evaluating the use o f content analysis scales, Viney (1983) notes that content 
analysis scales have applicability to a wide range of personality, developmental and 
social psychological issues, are useful for a range of verbal communication, including 
pre-existing recordings of data. Further, content analysis scales have been developed to 
measure a wide range of psychological states, including anxiety, hostility, social 
alienation -  personal disorganisation (Gottschalk, Winget & Gleser, 1969), hope 
(Gottschalk, 1974), positive affect (Westbrook 1976), sociality (Viney & Westbrook, 
1979), perceptions o f self-determination of behaviour (described as origin and pawn by 
Westbrook and Viney 1980), psychosocial maturity (Viney, Rudd, Grenyer & Tych, 
1995, and Viney & Tych, 1985), cognitive anxiety (Viney & Westbrook, 1976), and 
depression (Gottschalk & Hoigaard-Martin, 1986). In this study the following content 
analysis scales are used; Positive Affect Scale (Westbrook, 1976), Total Anxiety Scale 
(Gottschalk, Winget & Gleser, 1969), Gottschalk-Gleser Hostility Scale (Gottschalk,
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Winget & Gleser, 1969), Cognitive Anxiety Scale (Viney & Westbrook, 1976), 
Depression Scale (Gottschalk & Hoigaard-Martin, 1986), and Sociality Scale (Viney & 
Westbrook, 1979).
There are ethical considerations for using content analysis scales with 
participants who have been exposed to potential trauma. Most importantly, because 
content analysis scales rate psychological states based on representations of constructs 
used in general language, they do not require direct discussion of an event. Without a 
need for participants to directly describe their experiences of an event, the process of 
data collection should minimize any possible re-traumatisation of participants through 
exposure to traumatic cues. Content analysis scales can yield effective measures, while 
participants are free to disclose as much or as little as they wish, and are only asked to 
describe their lives. This helps them maintain control over what information they 
provide and is in contrast to structured questionnaires that seek specific information and 
give less control over disclosure to participants. Content analysis scales are considered a 
method of data collection that avoids the potential harmful impact of re-traumatisation 
in research into psychological trauma.
Viney and Westbrook (1979) note that an advantage of content analysis scales is 
that they may be applicable in situations in which people are less fluent, less intelligent, 
or less persistent, than is ideal with other methods of research, and are applicable to 
verbalisations of varying lengths, obtained with a wider variety of instructions. They 
offer greater flexibility than measurement tools requiring adherence to strict rules of 
administration. This strategy is important in the field of psychological trauma, as it is 
reported that sufferers o f PTSD may have difficulty with normal verbal expression of 
their condition and experiences. Van der Kolk and McFarlane (1996), van der Kolk 
(1996), and Kudler, Blank and Krupnick (2000), report that PTSD interferes with
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sufferers’ capacity to articulate how they are feeling and to utilize words and symbols to 
identify feelings - a condition described as alexithymia. Schnurr and Vielhauer (1999) 
add that experiencing alexithymia is associated with the avoidance and hyperarousal 
symptoms of PTSD. The use of content analysis scales may have specific application to 
psychological trauma. As noted, McFarlane and van der Kolk (1996) argue that methods 
that transform the subjective experience, in a rigorous manner, are required to fully 
understand trauma. This goal closely echoes the description of content analysis scales 
provided by Gottschalk and Hoigaard-Martin (1986).
Viney (1983) argues that the theoretical advantages of using content analysis 
scales in research include: that they can be applied particularly within a personal 
construct perspective; that they force a clarity of conceptualization; that they are based 
on internally consistent assumptions; and that they tap into less directly observable 
experiences. Viney (1983) further considers the practical advantages of content analysis 
scales in research to include no requirement for cumbersome equipment, the data- 
collection process is not time consuming, they are suitable for a wide range of 
applications, they can produce rich data with little intrusion or influence by the 
researcher, they are not significantly affected by socially-desirable responding or 
researcher bias, and that they are able to deal with ambivalence on the part of the 
participant.
Lebovits and Holland (1983) indicate that content analysis scale overcome some 
of the problems of self-report tests with patients who may distort their reporting of 
symptoms. Lebovits and Holland argue that content analysis of narratives is a useful and 
sensitive alternative to self-report tests of emotional states. They cite the use of content 
analysis scales with cancer patients, coronary care patients, and other medical patients. 
They conclude that content analysis scales demonstrate sensitivity to immediate mood
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states, and that they avoid many of the pitfalls o f self-report and observer rated 
measures. Further, Viney and Caputi (2005/in press) state that content analysis scales 
are generally less intrusive and have fewer demand characteristics than standardized 
questionnaires, as they assess the intended meanings of the participant, rather than 
endorsement or non-endorsement o f items posed by the authors o f questionnaires.
Viney (1983) notes that content analysis scales are limited to verbal 
communications, and ignore non-verbal communications. Therefore, they can only be as 
useful as the quality o f the verbal samples provided and the ability o f participants to 
express themselves verbally. Further, interpretations may be limited by a relatively 
narrow range of normative data. However, Gottschalk-Gleser (1969) and Viney and 
Caputi (2005/in press) describe content analysis scales as being applicable to written, as 
well as verbal communication.
The Gottschalk-Gleser Scales have been developed into a computer-scored and 
analysed version (Gottschalk, Bechtel, Buchman & Ray 2003, & Gottschalk and 
Bechtel 2002). This program (Psychiatric Content Analysis and Diagnosis or PCAD 
2000) arranges narratives provided in written form into clauses, and then rates each 
using a customised dictionary. Weightings are applied to various classifications of 
clauses, and raw scores are automatically converted into standard scores that can be 
compared to normative data available in the scoring manual (Gottschalk and Bechtel, 
2002). Gottschalk, at al (2003) note that the computer-scored version reduces the time 
required for training o f raters, along with the time required to score the scales. Further, 
the computer scored version has consistent reliability, reducing the need for multiple 
raters to establish inter-rater reliability. Gottschalk, et al 2003 notes that the advantages 
of computerised administrations o f content analysis scales are speed, objectivity, the
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automatic scoring, and that the programs can be easily updated to included to new 
words, expression or jargon to be included in coding criteria.
I will now describe the specific content analysis scales to be used in Study 2.
7.2.3.1.1 Positive Emotion
Positive emotion will be measured using the Positive Affect Content Analysis 
Scale (Westbrook, 1976). This scale scores references to emotions including admiration, 
affection, amusement, joy, elation, love, happiness and hope. Westbrook indicates that 
positive emotions are those: “usually considered pleasurable, agreeable or desirable as 
opposed to negative affects that are considered unpleasant” (1976: p. 716). While this is 
not strictly consistent with Kelly’s (1955/1991) or McCoy’s (1981) descriptions of 
emotions - as being based on validation rather than pleasure - the positive emotions 
described by Westbrook (1976) are similar to McCoy’s (1981) positive emotions related 
to core construing (love, happiness, self-confidence and contentment). Therefore, the 
Positive Affect Scale is considered to be an appropriate measure of positive emotions 
related to transition and validation.
The Positive Affect Scale developed by Westbrook (1976) does not attempt to 
identify individual positive emotions, providing only a single composite scale for 
positive emotions. However, given McCoy’s (1981) definition of positive emotions as 
indicators of validation or successful reconstruing, any positive emotion identified 
should be consistent with validation, and therefore, optimal positive mental health.
The Positive Affect Scale has good inter-rater reliability, measures state, rather 
than trait, variables, and has been used to assess positive affect as part of general mental 
health, in people experiencing a range of mental health challenges. The coding rules 
used with the Positive Affect Scale, along with examples of clauses to be coded, are
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displayed in Appendix M, and the psychometric properties o f the scale are detailed in 
Table 23 (Appendix K).
7.2.3.1.2 Threat
As described by Kelly (1955/1991), threat involves an attack on superordinal 
constructs necessary to govern self-maintenance processes o f existence and identity. 
Threat will be measured using three subscales o f the Gottschalk-Gleser Anxiety Scale, 
namely the Death Anxiety, Mutilation Anxiety and Separation Anxiety Subscales. The 
Gottschalk-Gleser Anxiety Scales have been used to measure threat in people 
undertaking psychotherapy (Viney, 1993), women recovering from breast cancer (Lane 
& Viney, 2005), people disclosing sexual assault (Carter 2004), and patients in 
palliative care (Viney, Walker, Robertson, Lilley & Ewan, 1994). The use o f the Death 
Anxiety, Mutilation Anxiety and Separation Anxiety Sub-scales of the Anxiety Scale to 
measure threat to the construing of the physical self has been reported on by Viney 
(1993).
To measure threat, scores on the Death Anxiety, Mutilation Anxiety and 
Separation Anxiety subscales will be combined to form a single measure. Gottschalk 
and Gleser (1969) describe these subscales as measuring references in narratives to 
death, dying, threat of death, or anxiety about death, injury, tissue of physical damage, 
or anxiety about injury of threat of such, desertion, abandonment, ostracism, loss of 
support, falling, and loss of love object or threat of such loss. A combination of 
measures of references to death, injury and separation or isolation from others, is 
consistent with annihilation, which in turn, is consistent with Kelly s construing threat 
as: “the awareness o f an imminent comprehensive change in core structures” (Kelly,
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1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.391), where core structures are those that govern people’s self­
maintenance processes.
The Total Anxiety Scale has acceptable to good inter-rater reliability. It 
correlates well with other measures of anxiety, and has been used to screen for anxiety 
and mental health in people from a range o f mental health challenges. The coding rules 
and weightings for the Total Anxiety Scale are displayed in Appendix N (from which 
the specific rules for the Death Anxiety, Mutilation Anxiety and Separation Anxiety can 
be derived), and the psychometric properties o f the Total Anxiety Scale are detailed in 
Table 24 (Appendix K).
7.2.3.1.3 Anxiety
Anxiety, the emotion resulting from an awareness of invalidation, will be 
measured using the Cognitive Anxiety Scale (Viney & Westbrook, 1976). This scale 
codes references in narratives that indicate an awareness by people of insufficient 
information to make meaning of events due to novel stimuli; extra constructs needed but 
not available; incongruous stimuli; responses needed but unavailable; and a high rate of 
stimulus presentation. Further, the Cognitive Anxiety Scale codes narratives according 
to whether the anxiety is experienced by the narrator, is experienced by others, or is 
expressed, but denied. While there are other content analysis scales that contain scales 
that purport to measure anxiety, the Viney and Westbrook (ibid) scale is much closer to 
Kelly’s (1955/1991) conceptualization of anxiety as the awareness by people of their 
construct systems being insufficient to make meaning of events.
While the Total Anxiety Scale (Gottschalk-Gleser, 1969) also measures anxiety, 
the description o f the state in the Viney and Westbrook (1976) Cognitive Anxiety Scale
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more closely approximates the definition of anxiety provided by Kelly (1955/1991), and 
will therefore be used in Study 2.
The Cognitive Anxiety has very good inter-rater reliability, and has been 
validated as a measure o f transition and adapting to new experiences, with people from 
a range of mental health challenges. The coding rules for the Cognitive Anxiety Scale 
are presented in Appendix O, and the psychometric properties of the scale are detailed 
in Table 25 (Appendix K).
7.2.3.1.4 Guilt
Guilt will be measured using the Guilt Anxiety sub-scale o f the Gottschalk- 
Gleser Total Anxiety Scale. The Guilt subscale measures references in narratives, to 
experiences of adverse criticism, abuse, condemnation, moral disapproval, guilt, or 
threat of any o f these experiences. The coding rules and weightings for the Guilt 
Anxiety subscale o f the Total Anxiety Scale are displayed in Appendix N (from which 
the specific rules for the Guilt Anxiety subscales can be derived), and the psychometric 
properties of the Total Anxiety Scale are detailed in Table 26 (Appendix K).
7.2.3.1.5 Shame
Shame will be measured using the Shame Anxiety subscale o f the Gottschalk- 
Gleser Anxiety Scale. The Shame Anxiety subscale measures references in narratives to 
ridicule, inadequacy, shame, embarrassment, humiliation, overexposure of deficiencies 
or private details, or threat o f such. The coding rules and weightings for the Anxiety 
Scale are displayed in Appendix M (from which the specific rules for the Guilt and 
Shame Anxiety subscales can be derived), and the psychometric properties of the Total 
Anxiety Scale are detailed in Table 22 (Appendix J).
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7.2.3.1.6 Hostility
Hostility will be measured using the Gottschalk-Gleser Hostility Outwards 
Scale. This scale provides two subscales (Hostility Outward -  Overt, and Hostility 
Outward -  Covert), along with a Total Hostility Outward score. The Hostility Outward - 
Overt subscale measures themes in narratives related to the subject killing, fighting, 
injuring others or threatening to do so, robbing, abandoning others, causing suffering or 
anguish to people, animals, flora or inanimate objects, or threatening to do so, adversely 
criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger or dislike, self-depriving or 
disappointing others, or using hostile or cursing words or mentioning anger or rage. The 
Hostility Outward -  Covert subscale measures references to the same themes, although 
the references are to someone other than the subject, acting in this way. The total score 
is a composite of these subscales.
The Hostility-Outward scale has good inter-rater reliability, has been correlated 
with some measures of mental health, and has been used to assess hostility and 
adjustment to change in people experiencing a range of mental health challenges, 
including hospital patients in crisis. The coding rules for the Hostility Scale -  outward, 
are presented in Appendix P, and the psychometric properties of the scale are detailed in 
Table 26 (Appendix K).
7.2.3.1.7 Depression
Depression, a constriction in construing in response to invalidation or 
fragmentation, will be measured using the Gottschalk and Hoigaard-Martin Depression 
scale (Gottschalk & Hoigaard-Martin, 1986). This content analysis scale was developed 
specifically to assess depression; although another of the Gottschalk-Gleser content 
analysis scales (the Hostility Inward Scale), has also been used to measure depression
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by Viney, Clarke, Bunn and Benjamin (1985), and Viney, Walker, Robertson, Lilley 
and Ewan (1994). The Gottschalk and Hoigaard-Martin Depression Scale comprises 
subscales measuring references in narratives to hopelessness, self-accusation 
(comprising guilt depression, shame depression and hostility directed inward), 
psychomotor retardation, somatic concerns, death and mutilation depression, separation 
depression, hostility directed outward, and produces a composite Total Depression 
score. The subscales are derived from other content analysis scales authored by 
Gottschalk, including the Hope Scale, the Anxiety Scale, and the Hostility Scale.
The Gottschalk and Hoigaard-Martin Depression scale has been used to assess 
depression in survivors o f breast cancer (Lane & Viney, 2005), psychiatric outpatients 
(Gottschalk, Stein, & Shapiro, 1997), alcoholics, depressed adults and children, boys 
with attention deficit disorder, and psychiatric inpatients (Gottschalk & Hoigaard- 
Martin, 1986).
The Depression Scale has good inter-rater reliability, correlates well with other 
measures o f depression, and has been used to assess people experiencing depression and 
adjustment to significantly stressful events. The coding rules and weightings for the 
Depression Scale are presented in Appendix Q and the psychometric properties o f the 
scale are detailed in Table 27 (Appendix K).
Table 9 summarises the emotions to be measured and the content analysis scale
used for each scale.
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Table 9.
Emotions and their Respective Measure for Study 2.
Emotion Measure
Positive
Affect
Threat
Anxiety
Guilt
Shame
Hostility
Depression
Positive Affect Scale (Westbrook 1976)
Death, Mutilation and Separation subscales of the Anxiety Scale (Gottschalk, Winget 
and Gleser 1969)
Cognitive Anxiety Scale (Viney and Westbrook 1976)
Guilt Anxiety subscale of the Anxiety Scale (Gottschalk, Winget and Gleser 1969) 
Shame Anxiety subscale of the Anxiety Scale (Gottschalk, Winget and Gleser 1969) 
Hostility Out subscale of the Hostility Scale (Gottschalk, Winget and Gleser 1969) 
Depression Scale (Gottschalk and Hoigaard-Martin 1986)
7.2.3.2 Measuring interpersonal relating
Interpersonal relating will be measured using the Sociality Scale (Viney & 
Westbrook, 1979). This content analysis scale measures references to four types of 
positive or rewarding interpersonal relating, namely; solidarity (people as resources), 
intimacy (people as source of social satisfaction), influence (people as power), and 
shared experience. In addition to the four subscales, the Sociality Scale provides a total 
Sociality Scale score. Further, the Sociality Scale assesses the role as reactor or initiator 
played by the speaker in their narratives, (Malins, Couchman, Viney & Grenyer, 2004). 
The Sociality Scale, with its focus on the quality of interpersonal relating, measures 
what Guay, Billette and Marchand (2006) describe as functional support, rather than 
structural support. Functional support refers to the quality and perception of how people 
perceive other people acting toward them, while structural support refers only to the 
existence and abundance of social relationships.
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The Sociality Scale has good inter-rater reliability and has been validated as a 
measure of quality of interpersonal relationships with people experiencing significant 
adjustment issues. The coding rules for the Sociality Scale are presented in Appendix R 
and the psychometric properties of the scale are detailed in Table 30 (Appendix K).
7.2.3.3 Measuring post-traumatic mental health.
The measure used to assess post-traumatic mental health is the Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder Check List -  Civilian version (PCL-C). Detailed information on the 
PCL-C (a brief, self-report questionnaire to screen for post-traumatic stress disorder) is 
provided in Chapter 3. Optimal mental health is indicated by low scores on these 
indicators of symptoms, while poorer mental health and disorder is indicated by higher 
scores on this questionnaire. Scores above 50 generally indicate disorder (PTSD), 
although additional criteria are required to make a diagnosis of PTSD.
7.2.3.4 Psychometrics of the measures
Viney (1983) and Viney and Caputi (2005/in press) describe inter-rater 
reliability to be the most important reliability measure of content analysis scales. 
Having at least two independent assessors apply the coding rules of content analysis 
scales to narratives, and then comparing the results, should indicate the consistency of 
agreement in applying the scales, and whether errors have been made in the application 
of the scales. Where there is high agreement between two or more independent raters 
applying the same scales to the same narratives, reliability of the resulting analysis can 
be assumed. Viney and Caputi (2005/in press) and Gottschalk and Bechtel (2002) argue 
that an inter-rater reliability of at least .85 and .80 respectively should be the minimum 
acceptable level o f inter-rater reliability for content analysis scales.
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Validity o f the content analysis scales used in Study 2 is primarily content 
validity, based on whether they actually measure what they purport to measure. A 
number of studies report on the use o f the content analysis scales chosen for Study 2. A 
summary o f the reported validity is displayed in is reported in Appendix J. The 
psychometric qualities o f the PCL-C are reported on in Appendix I.
7.2.4 Procedure
As part of a larger study, participants were invited to complete a series of 
questionnaires regarding their experiences related to the fire in HMAS Westralia (a 
complete copy of the questionnaire is presented as Appendix I). The PCL-C and two 
questions designed to elicit narratives that would be suitable for analysis with content 
analysis scales were included in this series. The PCL-C was administered with standard 
instructions. The instructions to elicit narratives were a variation of the instructions 
typically used in eliciting narratives for use with content analysis scales, with 
participants asked to provide direct written responses, rather than eliciting verbal 
responses (that are usually recorded and transcribed into text prior to analysis).
Gottschalk and Bechtel (2002) indicate that while content analysis has usually 
been applied to verbal communication, some content analysis scales can equally readily 
be applied to written text as to spoken and then transcribed text. While noting a need for 
caution, they add that content analysis scales have been successfully applied to a wide 
range of written materials, including suicide notes, the written notes of a terrorist, and 
historical documents. Reports on the application of content analysis scales to written 
text such as the writings such as o f Napoleon and Mahatma Gandhi were made by 
Gottschalk, Deffancisco, and Bechtel (2002) and Gottschalk and Bechtel (2005) 
respectively. The intent of the usual type of instructions for content analysis described
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earlier is to elicit speech samples with only limited directions with an emphasis on 
relatively free speech. This same intent was carried into the instructions used to elicit 
written samples of narratives in this study. The exact instructions provided are 
contained in Appendix K. Two lined pages were provided for participants to write their 
responses. To encourage a further opportunity to provide a narrative, a second loosely 
structured question was provided and another lined page provided. There was no time 
limit imposed on participants. As can be seen by comparing these revised instructions to 
the typical instructions used to elicit narratives for use with content analysis scales 
described earlier, there is relatively little variation, and the intention of eliciting free 
speech with few specific directions is retained.
The PCL-C was scored in accordance with standard instructions. The narratives 
provided by participants were transcribed from handwritten form into text by a typist 
who was blind to the results of the PCL-C. The typist was paid to provide this specific 
service and had no other part in the study.
For the Gottschalk-Gleser scales, transcribed narratives were entered into the 
Gottschalk-Gleser Content Analysis Computerised Scoring System, known as 
Psychiatric Content Analysis and Diagnosis -  2000 program (PCAD 2000 program). 
This program automatically formats written narratives into clauses and scores them 
providing standardized scores for a range of available Gottschalk-Gleser Content 
Analysis Scales. Using a computerized scoring system eliminated the requirement for a 
measure of inter-judge reliability. These scores were also entered into an SPSS database 
for analysis.
For the Positive Affect, Cognitive Anxiety and Sociality Scales, the transcribed 
narratives were prepared manually, by breaking text into clauses, using the rules for 
outlined in Viney, Rudd, Grenyer and Tych (1995). Clauses were entered into prepared
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scoring sheets with all identifying information removed and a code number assigned 
(known only to me, the principal researcher).
Research assistants who had no knowledge o f the participants were employed to 
undertake the coding of narratives according to the instructions provided for the Positive 
Affect Scale (Westbrook 1976), the Cognitive Anxiety Scale (Viney & Westbrook, 
1976) and the Sociality Scale (Viney & Westbrook, 1979). The use of blind raters is 
considered essential to ensure unbiased coding of narratives as I had been involved in 
the gathering of mental health measures. Three research assistants were employed to 
code the narratives. One rater was a male clinical psychologist, who had experience in 
content analysis, coding narratives, and working with Navy personnel. The two other 
raters were female PhD (Psychology) candidates, who also had experience in the use of 
content analysis and rating. I provided training in the use of the specific content analysis 
scales chosen for this project (Positive Affect Scale, Cognitive Anxiety Scale, and 
Sociality Scale).
The three raters applied the rules of each scale to code the narratives in separate 
sessions without other raters present. In advance, one rater (the male) was designated as 
a primary rater against which the raters would be compared to establish measures of 
inter-judge reliability. During the coding process, I provided generic coaching to the 
research assistance, in the application of the coding rules for each of the scales, but did 
not provide any specific advice or direction as to how any individual clauses or 
participants should be coded.
The raw scores obtained for each scale were converted into standard scores 
following the instructions and formulas provided in Westbrook (1976) (for the Positive 
Affect Scale), Viney and Westbrook (1976) (for the Cognitive Anxiety Scale), and 
Viney and Westbrook (1979) (for the Sociality Scale). The standard scores for the
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Gottschalk-Gleser Scales and three other scales were entered into an SPSS database for 
analysis.
7.2.4.1 Ethical considerations
Ethics approval was sought and obtained from the University of Wollongong / 
Illawarra Area Health Service Human Research Ethics Committee and the Australian 
Defence Human Research Ethics Committee. Copies of letters of approval to conduct 
Study 2 are contained as Appendices B and C.
In considering ethical issues in undertaking research with people who have 
experienced psychological trauma, Newman and Kaloupek (2004) describe the 
importance of considering both the potential costs and potential benefits to the research 
and then comparing these to see if potential benefits outweigh costs.
With regard to possible benefits of conducting research into psychological 
trauma, Kilpatrick (2004) states that the information obtained from trauma research may 
be so important that to not undertake important research when it is needed, is equally an 
ethical problem as the potential costs.
With regard to the potential costs of conducting trauma research, Newman and 
Kaloupek (2004) indicate that ‘retraumatisation’ of people who have already 
experienced distress through exposure to traumatic events is the main concern. Levine 
(2004) also highlights the need for consideration of issues such as personal vulnerability 
of people who have experienced trauma.
Rosenstein (2004) and Collogan, Tuma, Dolan-Sewell, Borja and Fleischman 
(2004) also consider participant vulnerability, stating that they view the greatest ethical 
consideration in trauma research to be participants, who’s decision-making capacity 
may be impaired in vulnerable groups, being able to provide truly informed consent.
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After having posed the potential harm o f ‘retruamatisation’ in research into 
psychological trauma, Newman and Kaloupek (2004) also state that it is a common 
misconception that simply asking people to recall what happened to them may be as 
traumatic as the original experience. They contend that to confuse the two: “undermines 
efforts to balance the risks and benefits of research participation by exaggerating the 
risk aspect” (p. 390).
Similarly, after discussing potential risks to participants in trauma research, 
Levine (2004) contends that the definition of personal vulnerability has been extended 
too far and has ignored two important points. The first point is that exposure to a trauma 
should not define a group as vulnerable because it ignores individual differences and 
clusters people simply and describes them as vulnerable solely on the basis of having 
experienced the same event. Secondly, this definition ignores the concept of resilience -  
that some people exposed to trauma may not suffer psychological harm and may not be 
vulnerable.
Both Newman and Kaloupek (2004) and Levine (2004) argue for a need for 
cost-benefit analyses of psychological research into trauma, indicating that while risks 
may have been overstated, there is a need for care in undertaking research into 
psychological trauma. Newman and Kaloupek (2004) conclude by recognizing that 
there is no requirement for research to be totally risk-free, as long as researchers take 
reasonable measures to address the risks that research protocols address ethical 
considerations in the measurement procedures chosen, and researchers include a table of 
potential risks and benefits of research to be considered. Levine (2004) stresses the need 
for care in trauma research and proposes a checklist in planning research with people 
who have been exposed to trauma. This checklist includes: (1) whether the population is 
being exploited, (2) other kinds o f interviews or research that the population may be
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exposed to, (3) whether political and social turmoil are likely to affect participants’ 
ability to make informed choice, (4) whether children or adolescents are being selected, 
(5) whether there is specific screening of the population to identify any participants who 
may have impairments and who may be at particular risk, (6) whether consent is clear, 
unambiguous and understood, (7) whether there are assistance plans for participants 
who may experience difficulty, and (8) whether there is a procedure for informing 
participants of the results of the research.
With regard to the possible benefits of Study 2, the aims are to better understand 
the long-term impact of potentially traumatic events on groups of personnel, and to 
understand the process of traumatisation, resilience to trauma and recovery from 
trauma; based on a personal construct theory model of psychological trauma. The 
project will contribute to knowledge of psychological trauma and the applicability of 
personal construct theory and research methodologies in the treatment and management 
of people exposed to psychological trauma. This project will provide greater 
understanding o f the experience of people involved in the fire in HMAS WESTRALIA, 
than Study 1 alone will. This should lead to a greater understanding of the psychological 
impact on survivors, of fatal training accidents. This understanding can be used to 
facilitate better health and personnel planning for accidents and in the circumstances of 
other traumatic events such as war and war-like operations.
This research will also lead to better understanding of the process of trauma 
generally and of the key mediating steps in the trauma process. This will hopefully lead 
to future improvements in strategies to maximise conditions likely to lead to 
maintaining mental health, or to the restoration of mental health, in similar people.
The checklist proposed by Levine (2004) and described in Section 4.3 of this 
report was used in this research project. To the best of my knowledge, this population
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has not undertaken any similar research. Informed choice will be provided by given 
potential participants information on the research project and the method of data 
collection in writing at the time of invitation, with time to consider and discuss with 
others prior to agreeing to participate. As all participants were employed in the Navy at 
the time of invitation, an assumption of adequate intellectual functioning and decision­
making ability is made. The raw data required to be collected, summarized and analysed 
for this research is provided by the owner o f the data (the Australian Department of 
Defence, ADF) rather than the subject of the data. The age of the population to be 
studied at the time of the fire (May 1998) was 18-43, with an average age of 27.3 years, 
and a modal age o f 25 years. In 2005/2006 (the time of the study), the age range of the 
population to be studied was 26-51 years. As noted earlier, the participants are all 
maintaining employment in the Navy, providing a basic screen suggesting no or very 
limited impairment.
The potential harm from Study 2 is considered minimal as the event has been the 
subject of significant popular media coverage in the years since the fire so will be well 
known to many people. This project has been reviewed and approved of by two ethics 
committees. I am a Clinical Psychologist with experience working with people exposed 
to traumatic events. Data collection will be conducted in psychology clinics or medical 
centres, where there are available independent mental health professionals to provide 
support to participants who require or request it. There is no direct means of informing 
individual participants of the results of the research. However, it is intended to seek 
publication of the results in relevant publications. While this approach may not fully 
address all the points in Levine’s (2004) checklist, it addresses most, at least, 
adequately. The project and method of data-collection are designed to be very low-risk 
to the population and consistent with the aims of Kilpatrick (2004).
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Newman and Kaloupek (2004) provide the opinion that ethical considerations of 
working with people exposed to psychological trauma should always be based on a 
cost-benefit basis. Ethical considerations for this project involved both the benefits as 
well as possible risks to participants.
Rayner and Viney (2003) reported that while the military has been a fertile field 
for the study of psychological trauma, much of this research has been undertaken with 
Army personnel, with only very limited research in the field of psychological trauma in 
Navy personnel. A strong bias toward only one of three main subgroups in the military 
(Navy, Army and Air-Force) would lessen the ability to generalize from the results of 
such research. There is also an imperative to study psychological trauma in the Navy 
based on a 2005 Senate Inquiry into Military Justice in the ADF where it was noted that: 
“Navy has acknowledged that it lacked a good understanding o f PTSD, but has 
expressed its willingness, and taken action, to obtain a better insight into the 
condition” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005: p. 305).
This indicates an internal pressure to better understand psychological trauma within this 
population sub-group.
There is the potential benefit of this project in furthering knowledge of 
psychological trauma in a sub-group of the ADF with unique conditions of service, 
cultures and operating environments that can be used to maintain or improve the health 
and management o f such personnel.
With regard to the possible costs of undertaking this project, Rosenstein (2004) 
and Collogan, Tuma, Dolan-Sewell, Borja and Fleischman (2004) view the greatest 
risks in trauma research to be whether truly informed decision-making capacity to 
consent to participate exists, especially when this consent may be impaired in 
vulnerable groups. Newman and Kaloupoek (2004) add that the possibility o f
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‘retraumatisation’ due to participants recounting traumatic events is also a significant 
risk in research into psychological trauma. In Study 2, I minimise the issue of 
retraumatisation by not asking for any direct discussion o f traumatic events focusing 
only on participant’s experiences since the event.
With potential gains with regards to information and understanding of trauma in 
an under-represented population sub-group; and potentials costs being minimized by 
ehminating retraumatising and seeking informed consent, I argue that the potential 
benefits considerably outweigh the very low risk of potential harm or exploitation of 
participants. Further, where there is potential harm, it is appropriately addressed. I argue 
that this project satisfies the ethical requirements of Newman and Kaloupek (2004), 
Levine (2004), and Kilpatrick (2004) for research involving personnel exposed to 
potentially traumatic events.
7.2.4.2 Statistical Analysis
The design of Study 2 measures associations between independent variables 
(measure of emotions and interpersonal relating) and dependent variables (measures of 
mental health). With only a single dependent variable measured used, univariate or 
descriptive statistics is the most appropriate form of statistical analysis to use 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 1989).
The assessed statistic o f skewness for the PCL-C is 1.95. This falls outside the 
determined range of standard error for skewness for which normality of distribution 
could be considered to be indicated (-.62 to +.96). Further, the assessed statistic for 
kurtosis for the PCL-C is 4.87, which also falls outside the determined range of standard 
error for kurtosis which indicates normality o f scores (-1.88 to +1.88). Specifically, the 
distribution of PCL-C scores appears to be positively skewed and leptokurtic. As
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assumptions of normality o f distribution cannot be made, non-parametric statistical 
analysis will be used with these measures.
The distribution o f PCL-C data is presented in Table 10.
Table 10.
Indicators o f normality of distributions fo r PCL-C.
Mean (Std. Deviation) 27.61 (11.95)
Skewness (Std. error of Skewness) 1.95 (.48)
Kurtosis (Std. error of Kurtosis) 4.87 (.94)
The analysis of data to determine results was undertaken using SPSS version 11. 
Data analyses include establishing correlations between measures of mental health and 
measures o f emotions and interpersonal relating; and a profile analysis of comparisons 
between obtained standard scores and normative data.
Both independent and dependent variables used in Study 2 are assessed for 
possible outliers. The guidance provided in Tabachnick and Fidell (1989), that potential 
outliers can be identified if they have z scores in excess of + 3 of their mean, will be 
applied to the sample.
With n=22 and 1-tail (as all hypotheses have an a priori direction of anticipated 
association), significant correlations will be established when ps > .36, a=.05. Further, 
the size of the correlations can be interpreted using the descriptions provided by Cohen 
(1988). Correlations of +.10 to +.29 will be described as small associations, while 
correlations of +.30 to +.49 are described as medium associations, and correlations of 
+.50 to 1.00 are described as large associations.
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7.3 Results
7.3.1 Dependent variable
The range of PCL-C scores was 17 to 68, with a mean score of 27.61, 
SD=11.95. The scores on the dependent variable for all participants were scrutinized for 
outliers. O f the original sample of 23 participants, one participant’s score on the PCL-C 
exceeded the mean for Sample 2 by more than three standard deviations, indicating that 
this case represented an outlier. The distribution of PCL-C scores is presented in a 
histogram at Figure 9, along with a superimposed normal curve.
Figure 9 Frequency histogram of individual PCL-C scores, with normal curve superimposed, for
Study 2 participants
15 19 23 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68
PCL-C sco re
It can be seen in Figure 9 that one case is clearly at an extreme pole of the 
distribution and should be considered to be an outlier. Due to the small size of the 
sample, the inclusion of an outlier could weaken any associations derived from the rest 
of the sample. Further, this participant was also the only case to exceed the cutoff 
indicating PTSD, within the sample. This category of dependent variable scores is of
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potential interest to a study of mental health, and is tempting to include any case 
representing a different category of mental health, there is no way of knowing whether a 
single case is truly representative o f the category of disorder, or whether the case is an 
outlier within that category or even both categories of the dependent variable scores. For 
reasons of not wanting to weaken any associations made by including an outlier, when 
there is no way of knowing whether a single case is representative of another category 
of dependent variable category worthy of study, the case was considered to be an 
interesting artifact, but excluded from further analysis.
The exclusion of the one case of PTSD was necessary to remove the statistical 
noise generated by a clear outlier. Further, any relationship between the study variables 
in a clinical population could not be investigated using only one representative from that 
population. This exclusion did reduce the variability in the data and sample size, thereby 
reducing the power of the statistical analysis. However, this impact was minimal due to 
the use of nonparametric statistical analysis, and the exclusion of only one case which 
was a clear outlier (the reduction in statistical power would be significantly high if 
parametric statistics had been used).
The distribution of PCL-C scores in Study 2, revised by the removal of the 
outlier, has a range of 17 to 43, with a mean of 25.77, SD=8.27.
7.3.2 Independent variables
7.3.2.1 Inter-relater reliability of the measures of emotions and interpersonal relating 
used in Study 2
Miles and Huberman (1994) provide a method and formula for comparing 
independent samples o f coding of the same material that considers both agreements and 
disagreements between judges. This formula (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p.64), is:
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Reliability =
Number o f  agreements
Total number o f agreements + disagreements
This method was applied to the ratings o f all clauses, for all 22 participants, for 
the Positive Affect Scale, the Cognitive Anxiety Scale, and the Sociality Scale. The 
results for the Study 2 sample are presented in full, in Table 11. These data indicate that 
the average inter-rater reliability for the Positive Affect Scale, the Cognitive Anxiety 
Scale, and the Sociality Scale, are 0.91, 0.88, and 0.92, respectively. These levels o f 
inter-rater reliability exceed the acceptable standard described by Viney and Caputi 
(2005/in press) and Gottschalk and Bechtel (2002).
Inter-judge reliability was also determined using correlations to quantify the 
strength o f the linear relationship between the total standardized scores for each content 
analysis scale by independent judges, for each participant by independent raters.
Spearm an’s correlations were used to maintain consistency with the non­
parametric statistics that will be used throughout this study. Spearman’s correlations for 
the Positive Affect Scale was determined at +.74 (p=0.00), indicating a large positive 
association between the standard score for the each judge on the Positive Affect Scale. 
Spearman’s correlation for the Cognitive Anxiety Scale was determined at +.55 
(p=0.00), indicating a medium positive association between the standard scores for each 
judge for the Cognitive Anxiety Scale. Spearman’s correlation for the Sociality Scale 
was determined as +.74 (p=0.00), indicating a large positive association between the 
standard score for each judge on the Sociality Scale.
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Table 11.
Inter-judge reliability data fo r  coding the Positive Affect, Cognitive Anxiety, and Sociality Scales.
Positive Affect Scale 
Agree Disagree Reliability
Cognitive Anxiety Scale 
Agree Disagree Reliability Agree
Sociality Scale 
Disagree Reliability
1 25 2 0.93 24 3 0.89 25 2 0.93
2 28 1 0.97 27 2 0.93 28 1 0.97
3 26 3 0.90 28 1 0.97 29 0 1.00
4 35 3 0.92 36 2 0.95 37 1 0.97
5 50 7 0.88 49 8 0.86 52 5 0.91
6 44 4 0.92 38 10 0.79 46 2 0.96
7 34 8 0.81 38 4 0.90 36 6 0.86
8 30 2 0.94 27 5 0.84 32 0 1.00
9 49 6 0.89 52 3 0.95 47 8 0.85
10 12 1 0.92 13 0 1.00 11 2 0.85
11 45 3 0.94 44 4 0.92 45 3 0.94
12 44 1 0.98 40 5 0.89 42 3 0.93
13 16 0 1.00 11 5 0.69 16 0 1.00
14 27 1 0.96 25 3 0.89 27 1 0.96
15 24 0 1.00 22 2 0.92 23 1 0.96
16 22 2 0.92 21 3 0.88 23 1 0.96
17 49 7 0.88 44 12 0.79 50 6 0.89
18 22 2 0.92 18 6 0.75 20 4 0.83
19 26 2 . 0.93 27 1 0.96 25 3 0.89
20 26 1 0.96 22 5 0.81 24 3 0.89
21 15 3 0.83 14 4 0.78 17 1 0.94
22 22 1 0.96 22 1 0.96 23 0 1.00
23 31 7 0.82 33 5 0.87 33 5 0.87
Total 702 67 0.91 675 94 0.88 711 58 0.92
A third assessment of inter-judge reliability of the scores for the Cognitive 
Anxiety, Positive Affect and Sociality Scales, was performed by comparing the means 
of the standard scores for significant differences, using paired-sample t-tests, between 
two raters. The test statistics for the Positive Affect, Cognitive Anxiety, and Sociality
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Scales were 0.70, -1.63, and 0.20 respectively. W ith df = 21 and p = .01, the critical 
value o f t = 2.52. Therefore the null hypothesis (i.e.: the scores are the same) is not 
rejected and the scores obtained between more than one judge for these three scales, can 
be considered to be not significantly different (p = 0.01).
Three different methods of assessing inter-rater reliability for scores on the 
Positive Affect Scale, the Cognitive Anxiety Scale and the Sociality Scale, have been 
used. These methods indicate good inter-rater reliability, medium to large positive 
correlations between scores, and that the distributions o f scores by independent judges 
are not significantly different. These findings reinforce a view that the scores obtained 
by the primary and secondary raters have acceptable inter-rater reliability and can be 
used with confidence.
1 3 .2 .2  Examples o f narratives coded by content analysis scales for independent 
variables
Before presenting scores derived by content analysis scales, it can useful to get a 
feel for the type of information provided by participants and how clauses taken from 
these narratives are coded and scored via content analysis scales.
Examples o f clauses (there may be more than one presented) from narratives 
provided by the Study 2 sample, that would be scored for the Positive Affect Scale 
include:
“(I) haven’t looked back. I coped with the fire by making it my goal to sail on 
HMAS Westralia once more. Doing this helped me discover it wouldn’t happen
again, and I moved on”.
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“My time in HMAS Manoora totally changed my perspective. I pulled myself 
out of my rut and absolutely loved it” .
“I found great pleasure in my work. I found that even though the work was hard 
at times, I could enjoy m yself’.
“Like most careers, I have had highs and lows with the Navy; and whilst I may 
have done some thing differently over the past 8 years, I am satisfied and happy 
with the way my time in the Navy has eventuated”
Examples of clauses (again, there may be more than one presented) from 
narratives provided by the Study 2 sample that would be scored for subscales o f the 
Total Anxiety Scales:
“The four who died; I believe that their number was up” (Death Anxiety 
regarding others)
“I am more concerned about how my experiences have impacted on those 
around me, particularly my wife, as she has had a harder time dealing with the 
fact that I could have died then, that I have” (Death Anxiety regarding others)
“Being sea-sick regularly didn’t help this” (Mutilation Anxiety regarding self)
“I have lost my father in the last month and this time to recover” (Separation 
Anxiety regarding self)
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I tried to leave the Navy, but got freaked out and posted back to HMAS 
W estraha” (Separation Anxiety regarding self)
“I have since learned that females can not get away with this, as opposed to my 
male classmates in other ships” (Guilt Anxiety regarding self)
I blamed myself heavily for this, thinking I was always concerned with myself 
and not for her and out kids when they were there for me” (Guilt Anxiety 
regarding self)
“I seem to forget the simple chores of life” (Shame Anxiety regarding self)
Examples of clauses (again, there may be more than one presented) from 
narratives provided by the Study 2 sample, that would be scored for the Cognitive 
Anxiety Scale include:
“I reach my threshold before others” (an example of cognitive anxiety 
experienced by the self due to a high rate of presentation)
“My life hasn’t changed much at all since the fire; although it was a traumatic 
experience at the time” (cognitive anxiety expressed, but denied)
“I could never understand how they could ever go to war ... so it makes me 
wonder how many are making it up.” (cognitive anxiety - incongruous
stimuli/extra constructs needed)
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“After the fire I was pretty confused about what was going on with my life” 
(cognitive anxiety - extra constructs needed)
“Its only when I think back that I feel I had a problem that no-one picked up on. 
I guess my command team did, but didn’t know how to fix it for me.” (cognitive 
anxiety experienced by others -  extra construct needed)
Examples of clauses (again, there may be more than one presented) from 
narratives provided by the Study 2 sample, that would be scored for the Hostility Scale 
include:
“W e have to take off the kid-gloves when recruiting and training our people” 
(Hostility outwards, overt)
“I don’t really trust what comes out of Canberra anymore” (Hostility outwards, 
overt)
“If  they don’t like danger in their life, then they can work at the supermarket” 
(Hostility outward, covert)
Examples of clauses (again, there may be more than one presented) from 
narratives provided by the Study 2 sample, that would be scored for the Depression
Scale include:
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“Like everyone else I had problems with relationship, family, friends etc, and 
eventually broke up with my girlfriend at the time”
“After the fire I was pretty confused about what was going on with my life” 
“Only been in the engine room  once since it was rebuilt, and felt numb”
“I am tired of dealing with it”
Finally, examples of clauses (again, there may be more than one presented) from 
narratives provided by the Study 2 sample, that would be scored for the Sociality Scale 
include:
“Thank goodness for a good wife” (intimacy - receptor)
“I used my experiences onboard HMAS Westralia to improve the way I handle 
personnel” (influence -  initiator)
“Personally, Navy support has been good. I believe there is a genuine corporate 
desire to prevent this from happening in the future. I know the Commanding 
Officer has expended significant time and energy since the fire dealing with 
crew and deceased’s family members.” (solidarity -  receptor)
“My family still ask me about it, and I tell people about what I did on the day, 
and I tell what I did, which makes me feel good I think” (solidarity -  receptor).
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These narratives are coded and scored for each of the scales, providing a feel for 
the types of information provided by participants, and how narratives contribute to the 
scores for each o f the content analysis scales. The results of content analysis o f 
narratives provided by the Study 2 sample, using the content analysis scales listed in
7.2.3 are presented in the next section.
7.3.2.3 Emotions and interpersonal relating: normative contrasts.
The independent variables for Study 2 were measures of positive emotions 
(Positive Affect Scale), emotions o f transition (subscales o f the Total Anxiety Scale, 
Hostility Outward Scale, Cognitive Anxiety Scale, and Depression Scale), and 
interpersonal relating (Sociality Scale). The means and standard deviations of the 
independent variable are displayed in Table 12. Using the standard described by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1989), no participant was indicated as an outlier.
Further to the total Sociality Scale score, the subscales that contribute to the total 
scale score, and which identify different types and directions of interpersonal 
relationships are presented in Table 13, and also presented in Figure 10, allowing a 
visual comparison o f the relative contributions to the total Sociality Scale score of 
subscales measuring type of relationship.
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Table 12.
Mean standard scores and standard deviations, fo r  Content Analysis Scale subscale and total scores fo r
the Study 2 sample (n=22).
Scale Mean Standard Deviation
Positive Affect 1.45 0.47
Threat 2.12 0.38
Death Anxiety 0.73 0.24
Mutilation Anxiety 0.66 0.18
Separation Anxiety 0.73 0.23
Guilt Anxiety 0.77 0.37
Shame Anxiety 0.82 0.24
Cognitive Anxiety 2.01 0.86
Hostility Out Total 1.04 0.15
Overt 0.90 0.19
Covert 0.58 0.08
Total Depression 6.28 0.98
Sociality 0.85 0.45
Table 13.
Mean Standard Score and Standard Deviation fo r Sample 2, fo r Subscales and Total Sociality Scale
Scores.
Solidarity Intimacy Influence Shared
Exp
Reactor Initiator Reactor / 
Initiator
Total
SS 0.45 0.48 0.21 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.46 0.79
SD 0.24 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.30
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Figure 10. Sample 2 Sociality Scale standardised subscale scores.
As the total Sociality Scale score is based on a composite of subscale scores, 
Figure 10 indicates the relative contribution of each sub-scale, to the total score. Figure 
10 indicates that positive relationships based on solidarity and intimacy contribute 
relatively more to the total scale score (31.03% and 33.10% respectively), than do 
positive relationships based on Shared Experiences or Influence (14.48% and 21.38% 
respectively).
With regard to the perceived direction of their relationships, the Sociality Scale 
codes clauses as indicating subject as reactor, initiator, or either (no clear preference). 
Figure 11 displays the standardised scores for the Reactor, Initiator, and either Reactor 
or Initiator Subscales of the Sociality Scale. There is a significant difference (t = 1.72, 
p<.05) between the standard score for Initiator, and both Reactor and either Reactor or 
Initiator Subscales. This suggests a preference among the Study 2 sample to view 
positive relationships in terms of how they, as subjects, are related to by others, rather 
than in terms of how they relate to other people.
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7.3.2.4 Post-trauma mental health.
The mean PCL-C score for the Study 2 sample was 25.77, SD = 8.28 and the 
range of scores was 17 - 43. The cutoff score of 50+ to indicate possible PTSD was not 
exceeded by any of the Study 2 participants and the distribution of scores did not 
indicate the presence of possible outliers.
7.4 Discussion
I will now provide interpretation to the normative results obtained from the 
Study 2 sample.
7.4.1 Interpreting content analysis scale scores: Some contrasts.
The distribution of scores for the independent variable reported can be compared 
against available normative data. From these comparisons, a profile of variation and 
significance of variation in scores obtained by the Study 2 sample can be made. The 
resulting Z-scores can be profiled.
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In order to create Z-scores, it is first necessary to chose normative groups where 
more than one normative group for each scale exists, with this choice being based on the 
samples that most closely approximate the Study 2 sample demographics. The Study 2 
sample can be summarized as predominant male, adult, with stable employment, and 
with no pre-existing obvious mental health disorders.
With regard to the Positive Affect Scale, comparative data is available for 
mothers, psychiatric patients, students, relocated women and students in transition 
(Westbrook, 1976), patients in a range of palliative care situations (Viney, Walker, 
Robertson, Lilley & Ewan, 1994), and adolescent offenders prior to group work, at 
completion of group work and at follow-up (Viney, Henry & Campbell, 2001), and 
medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis before and after crisis-intervention 
counselling, and at follow-up (Viney, Clarke, Bunn & Benjamin, 1985). I chose 
students (Westbrook, 1976) as most closely approximating Sample 2. I considered that 
mothers, relocated women, and medical patients were predominantly female samples, 
that adolescents were not similar to adults, that psychiatric patients had pre-existing 
disorders, and of the two student groups, the students in transition were experiencing a 
significant change in their employment or circumstances. The mean score Positive 
Affect score for students (Westbrook, 1976) is 0.70, SD = 0.25.
With regard to the Threat Scale, there is no comparative data available for the 
composite Threat score. However, data is available for comparative groups for the 
component subscales of the Anxiety Scale on which the Threat scores is based (the 
Death Anxiety, Mutilation Anxiety and Separation Anxiety subscales of the Total 
Anxiety Scale). Comparative group are male and female adults and children (Gottschalk 
& Bechtel, 2000). I chose male adult norms (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000) as this sample 
most closely approximates Sample 2. Children and female groups did not match Sample
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2 as closely as male adults. The mean scores for male adults (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 
2000) for the Death Anxiety, Mutilation Anxiety and Separation Anxiety subscales of 
the Anxiety Scale respectively are: 0.30, SD = 0.51; 0.36, SD = 0.55; and 0.30, SD = 
0.46.
For the Cognitive Anxiety Scale, comparative data is available for university 
students, psychiatric inpatients, incoming students, new mothers, and relocated women 
(Viney & Westbrook, 1979), adolescent offenders before and after successful group 
therapy and at follow-up (Viney, Henry & Campbell, 2001), medical patients in crisis, 
before and after successful therapy and at follow-up, (Viney, Clarke, Bunn & Benjamin, 
1985), and patients in a range of palliative care situations (Viney, Walker, Robertson, 
Lilley & Ewan, 1994). I chose university students as the group most closely 
approximating the Sample 2. Relocated women, new mothers, and medical patients in 
crisis were predominantly female samples, adolescent offenders were not adults, 
psychiatric patients had a pre-existing mental health problem, and patients in palliative 
care did not have stable employment, and so did not as closely approximate Sample 2. 
The mean Cognitive Anxiety Scale score for students (Viney & Westbrook, 1979) is 
0.91, SD= 0.62.
For the Guilt, Shame and Hostility the available comparative groups included 
male and female adults and children (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000). For each of these 
scales, I chose the male adult norms (ibid) as the closest approximation to Sample 2. 
Female and children samples did not approximate Sample 2 as closely. The mean Guilt 
and Shame subscales of the Anxiety Scale for adult males (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000) 
are 0.31, SD = 0.49; and 0.42, SD = 0.57 respectively. The mean Hostility score for 
adult males (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000) is 0.70, SD = 0.36.
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With regard to the Depression Scale, available comparative group include male 
and female adults and children (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000), women at the start, 
completion and at follow-up, for treatment for breast cancer (Lane & Viney, 2005). As 
previously, I chose male adult norms (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000) as the closest 
approximation to Sample 2. Female and children samples did not approximate Sample 2 
as closely, and a depressed sample had a pre-existing mental health disorder. The mean 
Depression score for adult males (Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2000) is 5.48, SD = 1.87.
For the Sociality Scale, possible groups for comparison include street youth, 
successful university students, transitional students, external university students, 
relocated women, child-bearing women, relatives of medical emergency patients and 
hospitalised psychiatric patients, and relocated women (Viney & Westbrook, 1979), 
medical patients in crisis at admission, discharge and follow-up (Viney, Clarke, Bunn & 
Benjamin, 1985) and for patients in a range of palliative care situations (Viney, Walker, 
Robertson, Lilley & Ewan, 1994). I chose external university students, as most closely 
approximating Sample 2, as street youth were not adults, child-bearing women, relatives 
of medical emergency patients, relocated women, and medical patients, were 
predominantly female groups, while patients in palliative did not have stable 
employment, psychiatric patients had a pre-existing mental health disorder. Of the 
university students, I considered that transitional university students were not in stable 
employment, leaving successful university students and external students. Of these, I 
considered that external university students more closely approximated Sample 2. The 
mean Sociality scale score for external university students is 0.43, SD=0.23.
The normative data described above is detailed in Appendix S. The Z-scores for 
each participant in the Study 2 sample are presented in Table 16. The critical Z-score 
value to determine whether the Study 2 sample means were significantly elevated was
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determined from normal curve tables for a two-tailed test (post-hoc comparison), at 
Z=1.96, a<0.05.
For the Threat score, an average Z-scores based on the three constituent 
subscales of the Total Anxiety scale (Death Anxiety, Mutilation Anxiety and Separation 
Anxiety) is as used. Table 14 displays the Z-score values, with these graphically 
represented in Figure 12. The mean Z-score for Positive Affect is significantly elevated 
(p<.05) and the mean Z-score for the Sociality is extremely close to being significantly 
elevated (1.93, p<.05 compared with 1.96, p<.05). Taking into consideration a possible 
effect due to the small number of participants in Sample 2, the elevation of the Z-score 
for the Sociality Scale is considered close enough to have reached significance. The 
mean Z score for the Cognitive Anxiety scale also approached, but did exceed, the 
critical value indicating significant elevation. However, as the elevation of the 
Cognitive Anxiety Scale did not as closely approach significance as did the elevation of 
the Sociality Scale, the elevation of the Cognitive Anxiety Scale is considered to have 
not reached significance.
Table 14
Z-Scores fo r  Sample 2 Independent Variable Means, compared to Appropriate Normative Means.
Scale
Positive
Affect Threat Anxiety Guilt Shame Hostility Depn Sociality
Z-score 3.01 0.77 1.77 0.94 0.69 0.14 0.43
1.93
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_____ Critical level for p = 0.05
Figure 12. Profile analysis of independent variable Z-scores from comparing Study 2 means to 
normative means. The dotted line represents the critical Z-score indicating significant 
elevation (Z = 1.96).
The contrasts generated in Figure 12 can be summarized as follows: The Study 2 
mean scores for Positive Affect and Sociality were significant elevated above the means 
of comparative samples, while the Study 2 mean scores for Threat, Anxiety, Guilt, 
Shame, Hostility, and Depression were elevated, but not significantly elevated above the 
means of comparative samples.
These contrasts indicate that participants who maintain mental health report 
significantly elevated levels of positive emotions, no significant elevation in any 
emotions of transition, and significantly elevated levels of positive interpersonal 
relating. As these results are based solely on a mentally health group a full association 
between positive emotions and the full range of mental health cannot be extrapolated. 
However, there is nothing in these results which do not support Hypothesis 2, or 
Hypothesis 3. Therefore, while noting the limitations, it can be stated that these results 
provide limited support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 (positive emotions will be positively 
associated with ongoing mental health, while emotions of transition will be negatively
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associated with mental health; and that social support will be positively associated with 
mental health).
7.4.2 Relationships between independent and dependent Variable.
Possible linear associations between positive emotions, emotions of transition 
and interpersonal relating are also explored. As noted, normality of the distribution of 
PCL-C scores cannot be assumed, so non-parametric correlations (Spearman 
correlations) will be used. Table 15 displays Spearman correlations between 
independent variables (measure of positive emotions, emotions of transition, and 
interpersonal relating), and the dependent variable (post traumatic mental health). As 
mental health is indicated by low scores on the PCL-C, the direction of associations 
need to be reversed when interpreting these associations. For n=22 and one-tailed test 
(as the hypotheses are a-priori), the critical value of Spearman is Ps=.42, p =.05.
Table 15.
Spearman Correlations between Positive Emotions, Emotions of Transition, and Interpersonal Relating, 
and PCL-C Score, for Sample 2 (n -2 2 ).
Positive Threat Anxiety Guilt Shame Hostility Out Deprn Sociality
Affect Total Overt Covert
Ps -0.42 0.19 -0.29 0.57 0.26 0.27 0.42 0.18 0.50 -0.13
p 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.28
Table 17 displays significant associations (p<.05) between positive emotions, 
guilt, hostility out-overt, and depression, and post-traumatic mental health. Reversing 
the direction of association (as mental health is indicated by lower, rather than higher,
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PCL-C scores), and using Cohen’s (1988) descriptions of the size of the associations 
(correlations of +.10 to +.29 are small associations; correlations of +.30 to +.49 are 
medium associations; and correlations of +.50 to 1.00 are large associations), Table 17 
indicates the following significant relationships:
1. A medium and positive association between positive emotions and post­
traumatic mental health;
2. A large and negative association between guilt and post-traumatic mental health;
3. A medium and negative association between hostility out-overt, and post­
traumatic mental health; and
4. A large and negative association between and depression and post traumatic 
mental health.
The significant association between positive emotions, guilt, hostility, and 
depression, and post-traumatic mental health supports Hypothesis 2. The indication of 
only some associations between emotions of transitions and post-traumatic mental 
health, and the relative size of these associations support Hypothesis 4 (with the rank 
order of decreasing, but significant associations, being guilt, depression and hostility).
7.4.3 Describing the profile of Sample 2 using the model of trauma.
Firstly, positive affect is elevated, and there is a large and positive linear 
association between positive affect and mental health. Sample 2 experience more 
positive emotions than an appropriate comparison group. This is consistent with 
positive emotions indicating validation, or no fragmentation beyond an inferential level.
Secondly, threat is not elevated (compared to a male adult sample), and there is 
no significant linear association between threat and mental health. Given that the
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description o f the Threat scale (provided in 7.2.3.1.2), the results indicate that there is 
some elevation, although not a significant elevation, in references to death, injury and 
separation by the subject or in others, in Sample 2. Understanding the assumptions of 
Content Analysis Scales (that people project psychological states through the language 
they use), it can be assumed that there is no significant elevation in psychological states 
fixated on death, injury or separation from others, in Sample 2. This is consistent with 
the expectation of a sample for who no mental health problem are detected. A mentally 
healthy sample should not anticipate a repeat of a traumatic event (which would 
probably be construed by most people as threatening), which is, in turn, validated by 
their experience o f no trauma over time. With no expectation of a repeat event and no 
experience o f a repeat event, constructs of the trauma are not in conflict with 
superordinal construing (with the event becoming construed as historical, rather than 
current). This indicates that either disorder has not been present, or if he had, that it has 
been resolved. Given that the instructions to elicit narratives request participants to 
describe, “your life since the fire”, it is appropriate to assume that constructs 
represented in the narratives would be constructs related to the impact of the fire on 
their lives. Therefore, to imply that people are not reporting threat is to imply that 
constructs relating to death, mutilation or separation are unlikely to be superordinal in 
their construct systems or that they do not anticipate death, mutilation or separation in 
their imminent future. If a person anticipates that death, mutilation and separation will 
not be a part of their imminent future, and their experiences validate this, then the 
construct o f threat is not part of a disorder. Given then disorders such as PTSD can be 
seen as fixations with death, mutilation and separation, measures of threat should be
associated measures of disorder.
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Thirdly, cognitive anxiety is elevated (but not significantly elevated), and there 
is a small and positive linear association between cognitive anxiety, and mental health. 
Some elevation in cognitive anxiety indicates that Sample 2 is experiencing some 
invalidation or fragmentation. However, that invalidation or fragmentation is not 
sufficient to result in disorder (as Sample 2 has no participants indicated for PTSD). If 
invalidation is at a level in people’s hierarchical construct system that can be resolved 
by a higher level in the hierarchy, or if that the level of fragmentation experienced does 
not exceed the inferential level; then invalidation or fragmentation (resulting in 
cognitive anxiety) can be tolerated without disorder. The non-significantly elevated 
level of threat indicates that there is no invalidation of construing at the most 
superordinal level (and therefore if there is invalidation, it is at a lower level in the 
construct hierarchy). Further, the low association between cognitive anxiety and PTSD 
suggests that while there may be some fragmentation, it may be at a low level. Kelly’s 
(1955/1991) Fragmentation Corollary indicates that inconsistencies in construing can be 
tolerated provided they do not exceed an inferential level. While the notion of 
inferential fragmentation is not clearly defined by Kelly, I argue that ‘significantly 
elevated above norm’, is a reasonable standard to determine whether an elevation 
exceeds the inferential level. If this standard is applied to Sample 2 mean Z scores, then 
the inferential level is not exceeded. As the question used to elicit narratives that have 
been rated to provide the Cognitive Anxiety score targeted the fire in HMAS Westralia, 
and life since, it can reasonably be assumed, that any Cognitive Anxiety resulting from 
this narrative, should be between constructs related to the fire and life since the fire, 
compared to existing construct systems before the fire. The Fragmentation Corollary 
may therefore provide guidance as to when trauma exists and when it is resolved, based
on whether levels of fragmentation of existing construct systems and constructs related
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to the incident, are elevated beyond an inferential level. For Sample 2, trauma may have 
existed, but now been resolved, as indicted by levels of Cognitive Anxiety not being 
significantly elevated above appropriate norms normative data.
Fourthly, there are non-elevated levels of guilt, combined with a large and 
negative linear association between guilt and mental health. While the non-elevated 
level o f guilt across the sample is consistent with the finding of no disorder, the large 
association suggests that guilt may have been an issue for Sample 2, and that it has been 
resolved, with positive mental health as the outcome.
Kelly described guilt as: “the awareness o f dislodgement of the self from one’s 
core role structure” (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p361). It is people’s awareness that their sense 
of themselves is not what they believed it to be, they have not acted in accordance with 
their core role, or have done something that is perceived by them as being in direct 
contradiction to their central roles (Landfield & Leitner, 1980). It is awareness by 
people that their behaviour is not consistent with their moral code or construing of their 
role. Kelly argues that guilt results from people’s self-perceptions of not having 
behaved in accordance with their role, rather than people construing others’ as 
constructions of their behaviour.
While Kelly (1955/1991) describes guilt as dislodgement of the self from one’s 
core role structure, this does not mean that guilt should be associated with threat (and 
they appear to be separate factors here). Tangney (1995) argues that guilt is a focus on a 
specific behaviour that could invalidate core identity, rather than invalidation of core 
identity itself. Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera & Mascolo (1995) report that survivors of 
trauma often experience the emotion of guilt, as they take responsibility for the trauma. 
This is viewed as a conviction that they were responsible to prevent trauma, regardless 
of whether others would view the causation of the event in this way. They describe guilt
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as functioning to both help preserve a sense o f control in a seemingly out-of-control 
situation, and to preserve loyalty and validation of community-held moral beliefs, at the 
expense of personal distress.
Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera and Mascolo (1995) describe four conditions that 
increase the likelihood of people construing themselves as guilty that can explain this 
phenomenon. People need to have a usual tendency to feel responsibility for preventing 
bad things from happening; people need to maintain a belief that they have or can 
control what happens around them; they can empathise with others; and they have a 
desire to honour personal and moral commitments. In addition to these considerations, 
Tangney (1995) adds that guilt is mostly to occur in the context of close, intimate 
relationships, rather than causal or peripheral relationships. The issues of personal 
responsibility, control, and moral commitments could be seen as general descriptors of a 
military sample, although this is speculative. The issues of empathy and intimate 
relationships are consistent with Sample 2, who report elevated levels of sociality; 
primarily resulting from solidarity and intimacy. Therefore, the outcome of non­
elevated guilt in Sample 2 is consistent with positive mental health, and the large 
association between guilt and mental health suggests that it is the process of resolving 
guilt that accounts for the positive mental health. Guilt could be expected to be relevant 
to this sample, for whom issues of personal responsibility, control and moral 
commitment are to be expected, and for whom positive interpersonal relationships are 
very important.
Fifthly, there is no significant elevation in levels of shame, and no significant 
linear association between shame and mental health. The level of shame is consistent 
with positive mental health, and the lack of significant association indicates that shame 
has not been an issue for Sample 2. Shame, according to Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera and
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Mascolo (1995), is the awareness by people, of invalidation of other people’s construing 
of their role, rather than of a specific behaviour. That there is no significant association 
indicates that Sample 2 do not perceive negative appraisal o f their roles and identity by 
other significant people.
As described by Tangney and Dearing (2002), guilt and shame are similar moral 
and negatively valanced emotions, and both involve construing failures or 
transgressions. However, they differ in some key dimension. Guilt focuses on failure or 
transgression by specific behaviours, while shame focuses on a broader failure of role or 
identity. Guilt also leads to the experience of tension, remorse and regret, with a need 
for action to restore or resolve the failure or transgression; while shame leads to feeling 
worthless and powerless, and a need to avoid other people. Further, guilt also is a 
construing of self, while shame is a construing of the construing of others. This involves 
a difference in internal versus external focus. Given the difference in the scope of the 
failure or transgression (guilt focuses on behaviour while shame focuses on role or 
identity), it would be expected that there would be a difference in the experience of 
distress associated with guilt and shame. With a more specific focus (i.e.: a specific 
behaviour) that would be lower in most peoples’ hierarchy of constructs, guilt generally 
results in less distress than shame. As the experience of guilt is more specific in focus, 
more likely to lead to action to resolve the failure or transgression, and is a less painful 
experience, than shame, it makes intuitive sense that it should be more easily resolved 
than shame.
Sixthly, while there is no significant elevation in hostility, and no significant 
association between total hostility out, there is a medium and negative linear association 
between hostility out-overt, and mental health. This lack of elevation of general hostility 
scores is consistent with the finding of positive mental health (as hostility should be
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negatively associated with mental health). In the light of Cummins’ (2003) and 
Bannister’s (1977/2003) contentions that hostility and anger are expressions of 
invalidation and of need for change, and is the result of people being unwilling to face 
up to the need to change and develop new constructs in the face of invalidation, the 
linear association between hostility outward, overt, and mental health, can be interpreted 
that change was needed, and has also now taken place. Sample 2 may have experienced 
hostility outward - overt, but have resolved it, resulting in positive mental health. The 
difference between hostility out -  overt (which refers to the subject expressing hostility) 
and hostility out -  covert (which refers to someone other than the subject expressing 
hostility -  perhaps toward the subject) reinforces that it is the subject is resolving 
hostility, rather than someone else. Kelly described hostility as: “the continued effort to 
extort validational evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which has already 
been recognized as a failure” (1955/1991, Vol. 2, p.391). Hostility is commonly 
interpreted as behaviour aimed at resolving invalidation of people’s anticipations of the 
world, though attempts to force or manipulate the world to change, rather than to revise 
their own anticipations. With this in mind, Sample 2 may have initially tried to force the 
world to change to resolve their invalidation. However, given the lack of elevation in 
hostility and the linear association with reports of mental health, it can be inferred that 
Sample 2 has resolved invalidation or fragmentation through construct revision and 
have no longer and need to engage in hostility outwards. An alternate explanation could 
be that, as a group, they have engaged in non-validation, avoiding the awareness of 
invalidation or fragmentation and seemingly continued with positive mental health. 
However, given the time passed since the incident, this explanation is less likely than a 
resolution of hostility outwards -  overt.
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The concept of hostility outwards is similar to that of anger or aggressive 
behaviour. An association between outward anger or aggressive behaviour, and PTSD 
in Vietnam veterans was made by Taft, Street, Marshall, Dowdall and Riggs (2007). 
More broadly, Orth and Wieland (2006) describe a substantial association between 
anger and hostile behaviour and PTSD, in a meta-analysis of 39 studies. They combine 
understanding o f anger and hostility as the same construct, and while having similarity 
with Kelly’s (1955/1991) description of hostility, Orth and Wieland’s understand of 
anger and hostility appears to be more be specific than Kelly’s. However, the 
association between anger and PTSD is clearly articulated, with the direction of 
association consistent with Sample 2.
Seventhly, Sample 2 reports no elevation in depression, but a large linear 
association between depression and mental health. Neimeyer (1985) views depression 
as the result o f constricted construing. Constriction serves to avoid the anxiety 
associated with invalidation or fragmentation, by narrowing the focus of construing to 
individual constructs, where the likelihood of construing the nature of invalidating or 
fragmented relationships between the constructs, is beyond awareness. That there is a 
large and negative association between depression and mental health indicates that 
constriction is negatively associated with mental health. Constriction of construing, 
especially of peoples’ social roles, was viewed by Klion and Pfeninger (1996) as the 
basis of PTSD in Vietnam veterans. They described young men whose first adult role 
was that of a soldier. These veterans learned roles that were highly appropriate to 
combat, but not to non-combat or civilian roles. Further, there was little opportunity or 
encouragement to adapt their roles to circumstances that changed dramatically once the 
war was over or they were no longer combat soldiers. To them, using their constrictive, 
preemptive, combat-appropriate construct systems in non-combat settings failed, yet
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developing alternates was either too daunting a prospect, or they lacked the conditions 
likely to lead to change. The result was a suspension of integration of their combat role 
and non-combat roles, perpetuating invalidation or fragmentation.
This is consistent with my personal construct model o f psychological trauma, 
where disorder is viewed as invalidation and fragmentation between existing construct 
systems and constructs related to a traumatic event, with a need for the development of 
new associative constructs to resolve invalidation or reduce fragmentation to an 
inferential level. Constriction would reduce the likelihood of people developing 
associative constructs, while the opposite of constriction, dilation, should increase the 
likelihood of people developing new constructs.
Sample 2 indicate positive mental health, suggesting that they have either not 
experienced invalidation or fragmentation (beyond an inferential level), between 
existing construct systems and trauma-specific construing; or they have resolved any 
invalidation or fragmentation. Given the significance of the event as a potentially 
traumatic event, it is likely that Sample 2 were challenged by the event, but have also 
developed appropriate associative constructs to avoid disorder. Whether any possible 
invalidation or fragmentation was resolved at the time, or during the years since, 
constriction would be expected to impede this process and dilation facilitate this 
process. The findings o f Study 2 include a significant and negative association between 
depression and mental health supports this view.
Eighthly, Sample 2 report significant elevated levels of positive interpersonal 
relations, with this elevation primarily due to relationships involving solidarity and 
intimacy. There was no linear association between positive interpersonal relating and 
mental health. The existence of positive interpersonal relationships and positive mental 
health is expected, as positive interpersonal relating is necessary for conditions
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favourable for the formation of new constructs. New constructs, especially associative 
ones that allow for integration between existing construing and constructs related to a 
traumatic event, are necessary to resolve invalidation or fragmentation and result in 
positive mental health. Kelly (1955/1991) describes the conditions favourable for the 
development of new constructs as the availability o f fresh elements, validation, and 
having the opportunity to experiment. I argue that these conditions are predominantly 
interpersonal conditions.
Rowe (2005) observed that: “every interaction between people is laden with 
possibilities for validation and invalidation” (p.296). Kelly (1955/1991) describes the 
maturation process as a person moving from relatively simple and impermeable 
dependency constructs (dependent on only one or two people without choice, such as 
parents), to permeable constructs (more freedom to choose and discriminate 
dependencies, from a wider range o f people and other resources, in order to satisfy 
different needs. Chiari, Nuzzo, Alfono, Brogna, D'Andrea, Di Battista, Plata and Stiffan 
(1994), describe maturation as people realising and conserving their existence and 
identity in a network of social relations. Dalton and Dunnett (1992) indicate that a 
healthy situation is when people disperse their dependencies around a number of 
different people, as this provides a range of co-scientists, with a range of different and 
discrete areas of expertise or interest with which to test their theories about themselves 
and their world.
Neimeyer and Neimeyer (1985) argue that the person-as-scientist metaphor 
relates to developing interpretations that are forged within a social context. Only by 
testing and retesting their constructions against the behaviour and attitudes of other 
people do individuals extend and define their understanding of interpersonal experience. 
Neimeyer and Neimeyer (1985) and Dalton and Dunnett (1992) describe the importance
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of using other people as co-scientists or collaborators to help them in their scientific 
endeavours; by helping develop, test, re-test, and refine hypotheses that form 
superordinal constructs. Further, Sargent (1997) notes that scientific evidence, which 
forms the basis of people’s construct systems, is socially constructed, as factual items 
used as evidence for a theory, are constructed through social negotiation. Viney, Clarke 
Bunn and Benjamin (1985) emphasise that the extent to which crises are effectively 
resolved is largely a function of the interpersonal supports available during the crisis. 
They propose that interpersonal relating in crisis have goals of helping recognize and 
work through emotions, and plan behaviour to cope. These, in turn, contribute to 
restructuring and re-construing, leading to growth. Specifically, in crisis, interpersonal 
relating aims at achieving low levels of anxiety and depression, and high levels of 
control and competence.
Two of Kelly’s (1955/1991) eleven corollaries, focus on interpersonal relating. 
The Commonality and Sociality corollaries are viewed by Duck (1982) as carrying the 
weight of Personal Construct Theory’s approach to social behaviour. The Commonality 
corollary holds that the degree of similarity of construing between people determines 
the degree to which their psychological processes are similar. Further, Duck (1982) 
indicates that the psychological similarity between people should be assessed by 
measuring the similarity of their construing. Given that Kelly’s fundamental postulate is 
that “a person’s processes are psychologically channelised by the ways in which he 
anticipates events” (1955/1991, Vol. 1, p.32-37), it stands that the degree of similarity in 
anticipation of events between people will determine the degree of commonality 
between them. Social support would therefore be based on commonality, or the degree 
to which peoples’ construing and anticipations were similar.
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The Sociality Corollary infers that the viability o f social processes is determined 
by the degree to which people try to construe the construing process of others (Tschudi 
& Rommetveit, 1982). This indicates that simply having something in common with 
others is not enough. Rather, in order for social processes to be viable, there is a need to 
go beyond passively having similar construing, to be actively involved in the process of 
trying to construe other people’s construing of their worlds and events. Viney (1996) 
indicates that to be truly supportive, the attitudes and actions of others must validate the 
clients’ construct or view of themselves, and the event.
The nature of effective interpersonal relationships requiring active engagement 
is similar to the essence of the sharing, compatibility, and alignment of affect and 
knowledge-skill across the individual team members that Kozlowski (1998) describes as 
essential for effective social support in high stress environments in the military.
An association between interpersonal relating and trauma-related mental health 
was established in Study 2 (through the mean total Sociality Scale score being 
significantly elevated among the Sample 2, which reported no disorder in the aftermath 
of a potentially traumatic event). However, the association is not a linear one. It can be 
speculated that interpersonal relating may act as a buffer against the development of 
trauma, with a critical level required to overcome any the adverse outcome of an 
invalidational insult such as a potentially traumatic event. It may be that rather than a 
linear relationship, that there is either a sufficient level of effective and satisfying 
interpersonal relationships to develop the new constructs required, or not.
As failure to develop new constructs is consistent with Kelly’s (1955/1991) 
view of disorder, social relating, as a condition mediating the formation of new 
constructs, has an essential part to play in mental health. That Sample 2, with a high 
level o f positive interpersonal relations, (especially those involving solidarity and
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intimacy, rather than authority or simply sharing experiences), report positive mental 
health, despite their involvement in a potentially traumatising event, can be expected, 
because of their significantly elevated levels of perceived positive interpersonal relating.
The personal construct model o f mental health following potential trauma 
proposes that elevated levels of social relating should be reported by participants who 
have experienced a potentially traumatic event, yet who have either not developed 
disorder, or resolved any disorder.
Kelly (1955/1991) described conditions both favourable and unfavourable to the 
development of new constructs. In Chapter 5, I argued that these conditions were 
largely based on interpersonal relating, suggesting that interpersonal relating could 
mediate the formation of new constructs. I also noted the views of Epting and 
Amerikaner (1980), that argument that interpersonal relationships can facilitate or 
inhibit movement from loose to tight construing and therefore mitigate progress in the 
Creativity Cycle. Further, Leitner and Pfenninger (1994) argue that construing does not 
happen in a social vacuum, but relies on a dynamic interaction between people and their 
worlds to take place. Tschudi and Rommetveir (1982) describe interpersonal relating as 
key to disorder and mental health. Finally, Walker (1996) viewed social relationships as 
necessary for evolving construct systems and for testing out discriminations, adding that 
interpersonal relating is a central aspect of personal construct psychology and of the 
process of developing and revising construct systems.
McFarlane and van der Kolk (1996) suggest that as long as social support 
networks remain intact, people are relatively well protected against even catastrophic 
stresses. They seek attachment to others, and validation about events and support from 
others is a vital aspect of preventing and treating post traumatic stress. Similarly, 
Davidson (1995), Creamer (1996), and Irving, Telfer & Blake (1997), contend that the
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degree of social support directly contributes to coping and the relative risk of 
developing PTSD. Grossman (1995) and Slusarcick (1999) add that social support is as 
influential in determining the magnitude of stress related psychological injuries, as the 
degree of trauma in the original incident. They, along with Davidons (1995), note that 
the presence of social support acts to buffer PTSD, while the absence of it serves as a 
vulnerability factor. Fairbank and Nicholson (1995) described Vietnam veterans with 
PTSD as perceiving themselves as having progressively fewer social supports over time 
than did control groups, suggesting that as social support drops, PTSD symptoms rise.
With regard to social support in the military, Manning (1994) noted that “one of 
the enduring legacies of World War II military psychiatry was the recognition that the 
incidence of psychiatric casualties in various units had more to do with characteristics 
of the unit than with the characteristics of the casualties themselves” (p.2). He 
contended that psychological breakdown in the battlefield involved a sudden change in 
the relationship between soldiers and their primary group or team, with individuals 
losing the sense of belonging to a powerful group, leaving them isolated, overwhelmed 
and disorganised. This emphasis on interpersonal factor, rather than on individual 
factors as the cause of disorder is also described by McCarroll, Jaccard & Radke (1991). 
Glass (1955), noted that morale (group unity or group identification), leadership, and 
communication, were the most influential factors in determining resistance to 
breakdown, and that a group with these traits has relatively little non-effective 
behaviour or psychiatric breakdown. In their study of Australia peacekeepers, Hodson, 
Ward and Rapee (2003) reported a correlation between high posttraumatic systems and 
loneliness, and social support.
King, King, Fairbank, Keane and Adams (1998) considered that for Vietnam 
veterans, the development of PTSD was associated with three factors, namely the
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degree of impact of the traumatic event, the personality of individuals involved, and the 
presence of meaningful social support. However, even much of what was described as 
personality factors involved was associated with the ability to develop meaningful 
social networks. King et al (1998) described both structural social support (the size and 
complexity o f social networks) and functional social support (perceived emotional 
sustenance and instrumental assistance), with the opinion that functional social support 
would have more influence on the likelihood of a person developing PTSD in the 
aftermath of traumatic event, as its presupposed that if a person received emotional and 
instrumental assistance that also had a functioning social network. McCann & Pearlman 
(1990) and Janoff-Bulman (1983) note that simply caring about someone, or having an 
interest in them does not constitute helpful social support. People must be perceived to 
be of help by the sufferer in order to benefit. They indicate that many good-natured 
people can try to be supportive, but can actually hinder or harm the recovery process if 
they do not try to understand the person's subjective experience. Like Smith (1985) and 
Viney (1996), they indicate that to be truly supportive, the attitudes and actions of 
others must validate the clients’ construct or view of themselves, and the event.
In their review of eight research reports, Guay, Billette and Marchand (2006) 
indicate that there is a very strong association between social support (especially 
functional social support) and PTSD, although they noted that research on the processes 
by which social support mediates PTSD, is still in its infancy. The personal construct 
psychology model and the findings of Study 2 go some way to answer Guay, at al s 
(2006) call for more research into these processes.
From the information I have presented, a sample that have experienced a 
potentially traumatic event, yet who have maintained or restored mental health, should 
have elevated positive social relating. Social support should contribute directly to their
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ability to develop new associative construct required to overcome invalidation or reduce 
fragmentation to an inferential level.
7.4.3.1 Summary
Sample 2 experienced an event likely to cause PTSD, and are drawn from a 
larger sample where about one in three were indicated for PTSD at any time since the 
fire, with one in six being indicated for PTSD longer-term. However, no one in Sample 
2 reported symptoms at a significantly elevated level, or could be considered for a 
possible diagnosis of PTSD. This suggests that they either never developed disorder, or 
if they did, have resolved it in the four to six years since the fire, by developing new 
associative relationships to integrate them.
The presence of elevated levels of positive emotions is consistent with the 
experience of validation and integration of existing construct systems and constructs 
related to the fire, or at least no fragmentation in excess of an inferential level.
The presence of elevated levels of positive social relationships is also consistent 
with the conditions that mediate the development of new constructs necessary for 
resolution of disorder.
The presence of some non-significant elevation in Anxiety is expected, as some 
fragmentation can be tolerated as long as it does not exceed an inferential level.
There are linear relationships between Guilt, some aspects of Hostility, and 
Depression, and mental health. It can be speculated that these relationships indicate the 
type of issues that may have been resolved by Sample 2. These include issues related to 
participants’ behaviour in relation to their moral code or core role, their need to actively 
engage in construct revision as opposed to trying to force the world to change in order 
to resolve invalidation or fragmentation, and constriction of construing.
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7.4.4 Support for the hypotheses of Study 2
The specific hypotheses to be tested in Study 2 are:
1. Threat will be negatively associated with mental health;
2. Positive emotions will be positively associated with mental health, while 
emotions o f transition will be negatively associated with mental health;
3. Constriction of construing will be negatively associated with mental health;
4. Positive social support will be positively associated with mental health.
Study 2 does not indicate any linear association between threat and mental 
health. Further, there is no significant elevation or declination in measures of threat 
compared to normative data. However, Sample 2 only represents one aspect of mental 
health, that of positive mental health. There were no participants in Sample 2 that 
reported the opposite spectrum of mental health; that of disorder. From the personal 
construct psychology model of mental health, threat can be expected to have more of a 
relationship with disorder, than with positive mental health, and if only one spectrum of 
mental health is measured, then threat may not be as apparent. While the results of 
Study 2 do not support Hypothesis 1, the range of mental health reported by Sample 1 
may have been insufficient in range to result in a significant linear association between 
the two. There are no results in Study 2 that disconfirm Hypothesis 1.
Study 2 indicates a significant and positive, linear association between positive 
emotions and mental health. Further, mean positive emotions scores are significantly 
elevated for Sample 2, who report only positive mental health. Study 2 indicates 
significant and negative, linear associations between some, but not all, emotions of 
transition, and mental health. Those emotions of transition that are associated with 
mental health are; guilt, hostility and depression. By decreasing order of association,
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these are; guilt, depression and hostility out (overt). There are no significant 
associations between threat, anxiety, shame and hostility out (covert) and mental health. 
While there are limitations on the degree of support provided (due to the limited range 
of mental health in the sample), the results provide partial support for Hypothesis 2.
Study 2 indicates a significant and negative association between depression and 
mental health. In personal construct psychology, depression is construed as an indicator 
of constriction of construing; therefore, there is a significant and negative association 
between indicators of constriction of construing and mental health. Noting the limitation 
on strength of support due to the limited range of mental health included in the sample, 
the results provide partial support for Hypothesis 3.
Study 2 does not indicate a significant linear association between social support 
and mental health. However, Sample 2 contains only participants who report positive 
mental health, and the mean score for positive interpersonal relating is significantly 
elevated. This suggests some positive association between social support and mental 
health. Further, as Sample 2 does not have the full range of mental health possibilities, it 
may be that there was insufficient range in one measure, to result in a significant linear 
association between the two. The elevation in social support among a sample with 
positive mental health supports Hypothesis 4.
In summary, Study 2 partially supports Hypotheses 2, and 3, provides some 
support for Hypothesis 4, and no support for Hypothesis 1. However, Study 2 does not 
provide any discontinuing support for any hypothesis, and the limited support for some 
hypotheses may be attributable to the limited range of mental health reported by Sample
2.
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7.4.5 Support for my proposed model of maintaining mental health in the face of 
potentially traumatic events.
I will now discuss results and interpretations of Study 2 in light of the 
propositions that comprise the model proposed in Chapter 6.
Firstly, Proposition II of the model holds that construct systems have 
hierarchies, and that the most important constructs are those related to processes that 
govern self-maintenance. Those who report positive mental health after potential trauma 
should not report threat, as is the case with Sample 2. Study 2 supports Proposition II.
Secondly, Proposition IV indicates that the outcomes of comparisons should be 
validation (resulting in positive emotions), invalidation (resulting in emotions of 
transition), or non-validation. Study 2 indicates that those with positive mental health 
report the presence of positive emotions and a lack of any significant elevation of 
emotions of transition. This supports Proposition IV.
Thirdly, Study 2 indicated a decreasing order of the degree of associations 
between guilt, hostility and depression, and mental health. This supports Proposition 
VIII.
Fourthly, Study 2 indicates that while the association between positive social 
relating and mental health is not a linear one, the mean scores of the sample (who 
reported no disorder) for positive interpersonal relating was significantly elevated. This 
indicates an association between the two, supporting Proposition IX.
Fifthly, Sample 2 reported significantly elevated scores on the measure of 
positive emotions. While one of the five measured emotions of transition appeared 
elevated, none achieved the level of a significant elevation. Further, there was no linear 
association established between emotions of transition and mental health. This supports
Proposition X.
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Study 2 provides support for five of the 11 propositions in the model. None of 
the propositions in the model appear to be contradicted by the findings of Study 2.
7.4.6 Assessing the model against the standards for personal construct models and 
models o f psychological trauma
The model proposed in the propositions in Chapter 6 can be assessed against the 
six standards for personal construct models proposed by Viney (2006) and the standards 
derived from Horowitz (1997), Jones and Barlow (1990), and Brewin, Dalgleish and 
Joseph (1996).
7.4.6.1 Personal construct theory models.
With regard to Viney’s (2006) standards for personal construct models; the 
model is based on, and is consistent with, Kelly’s (1955/1991) theory of personal 
constructs, and Sewell’s application of personal construct psychology to psychological 
trauma. Rather than being a new model, it is an adaptation and extension of the model 
developed by Sewell. The model is intended to be easy to understand, through 
development from broad psychological experience, to experiences specific to 
psychological trauma. The propositions involve mostly common language usage and 
where specifics are used, they are explained. The model appears internally consistent. 
The model is proposed in 11 propositions, concisely containing a broad range of 
information. The model can be applied to all common responses to psychological 
trauma, ranging from no adverse response and maintaining positive mental health, 
through to ongoing and treatment-resistant disorders. Likewise, it should apply to all 
event types. While providing this comprehensiveness, the series of propositions are 
specific enough to make meaningful predictions. This description of the model as
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proposed appears to satisfy the six standards for personal construct models proposed by 
Viney (2006).
7.4.6.2 Models of psychological trauma.
The usefulness of this model to the field of psychological trauma depends on to 
what extent it satisfies the standards for models of trauma stated in Chapter 4. These 
standards, derived from Horowitz (1997), Jones and Barlow (1990), and Brewin, 
Dalgleish and Joseph (1996), are:
(1) There are characteristic symptoms of PTSD;
(2) Responses can range from normal to abnormal, with a range of severity;
(3) Symptoms can be enduring;
(4) Disorder may have a delayed onset;
(5) Symptoms can be phased, and worked through to resolution;
(6) Pre- and post-event characteristics influence responses; and
(7) Models should be testable.
The characteristic symptoms of PTSD can be explained through the personal 
construct psychology model. The desire to seek stability in anticipations leads people to 
constantly review those constructs that are in conflict, or where there is instability in 
anticipation. Traumatic events are the result of fragmentation beyond an inferential 
level, between construing related to the traumatic event and existing construct systems. 
Fragmentation or invalidation will result in constant reviews of constructs in an attempt 
to reconcile the fragmentation and integrate constructs. This leads to the intrusive re­
experiencing of events, and an ongoing process of comparing this to how the person 
anticipated life and events prior to the trauma.
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Both the avoidance symptoms in PTSD, and delayed onset PTSD, can stem from 
constriction. Kelly (1955/1991) notes that when faced with events that cannot be easily 
assimilated into existing construct systems, people can respond in three ways. The first 
is to resolve the invalidation and fragmentation through construct revision and the 
formulation of new constructs that resolve invalidation or reduce fragmentation to no 
more than an inferential level. The second is to live with the anxiety for a while. The 
third is to postpone the revision of constructs, by effectively ignoring the invalidation or 
fragmentation.
Kelly (1955/1991) describes this third process, that of constriction, as people 
drawing in the boundaries of their perceptual fields in order to minimize awareness of 
the incompatibility of constructs. Neimeyer describes constriction as a: “temporary 
respite from the relentless process of reconstructing our outlooks” (1985, p 84), by 
cutting down the field of construing to a manageable size. The effect of constriction in 
trauma is achieved by either: focusing only on pre-trauma construct systems and 
ignoring all aspects of the trauma-specific construing; or focusing only on trauma- 
specific construing, and ignoring pre-trauma construct systems. This process of dealing 
with only one issue at a time, and refusing to be drawn into comparisons or relationships 
between the two, effectively delays the anxiety of invalidation and fragmentation. Most 
importantly, constriction delays the process of construct revision and cycles of transition 
that could create new associative constructs and resolve the invalidation or 
fragmentation.
People can use their pre-trauma constructs and post-trauma constructs, even if 
they are incompatible. However, they can t use both at the same time, as this would 
expose them to the invalidation and fragmentation they are seeking to avoid.
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Constriction is a temporary fix, with the temporary gain of avoiding the anxiety or 
invalidation, while maintaining the appearance of resolution.
More than being a temporary delay, constriction can lead to great problems than 
those the person seeks to avoid. Firstly, constriction can develop into depression, with 
its highly polarised construing, its tendency to extract only negative information about 
experiences, and emotional and vegetative features. Secondly, constriction does not 
resolve invalidation and fragmentation. It merely avoids its awareness and 
consequences.
However, the process may result in possibly greater validation for each 
individual view, increasing the degree of anxiety that will be experienced if constriction 
is not maintained. Constriction can delay the effects of invalidation and fragmentation, 
but the short-term benefits of delaying or avoiding anxiety comes at the cost of greater 
and more insurmountable anxiety, later. Neimeyer (1985) notes that constriction can 
only begin once people experience considerable invalidation. In the case of trauma, 
constriction could be the result of failure in the process of assimilation of trauma- 
specific construing and existing construct systems in the immediate aftermath of 
traumatic events. It is a response to initial anxiety stemming from invalidation or 
fragmentation that would present as resolution; yet is actually a process to avoid the 
comparison that led to invalidation or fragmentation. The longer it is held onto, the 
greater the potential harm (when people’s construing becomes dilated enough to have to 
face the incompatibility or fragmentation brought about by the trauma).
Constriction is also involved in the emotional numbness, or symptoms of 
depression, of PTSD. Neimeyer (1985) notes that constriction becomes depressive when 
spontaneous elaboration is curtailed. Further, constriction of construing results in 
construct systems increasingly tailored to extracting negative, rather than positive
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information from experiences; highly polarizing constructs; global and undiscriminating 
emotional judgments; and self perceptions as being different from others.
The symptoms of arousal in PTSD are a physical manifestation of threat and 
anxiety. Threat is the immediate and intimate risk of annihilation, and anxiety is the 
awareness of the need for construct revision. The physical manifestation of these is 
potential for action, as most people would anticipate a need for action to resolve either.
My model predicts that once people develop awareness of invalidation and 
fragmentation beyond an inferential level, the experience of threat and anxiety will 
continue to exist until either new constructs are developed to resolve the invalidation, or 
existing constructs become permeable enough to accept new information from trauma- 
related construing. As both are curtailed by constriction, the disorder can be long- 
lasting.
The phased nature of symptoms results from the cycles of transition. Cycles of 
transition are processes that develop in stages, leading to resolution. Each stage in the 
cycles of transition requires different processes and produces different outcomes, 
providing the different phases of recovery. People can move toward resolution but 
become stuck in the process, suspending recovery until the blockage can be moved 
through.
Pre-event characteristics such as perceived sense of control and coping, 
contribute to both existing construct systems with which to compare trauma-specific 
constructs, along with determining the permeability and range of convenience of 
existing construct systems. This contributes directly to whether existing construct 
systems are invalidated by the experience of trauma, or whether fragmentation occurs. 
Post-event characteristics such as social support provide favourable or unfavourable
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conditions for the development of new constructs that could integrate existing construct 
systems and trauma-specific construing, or resolve fragmentation.
Finally, the propositions from the model have been tested by this study. The 
process of comparing existing construct systems and trauma-specific construing cannot 
be directly observed; however, the experience of these processes, and the emotions that 
signify the processes, can be reported and observed. Emotions or transition such as 
threat, anxiety, guilt, shame, hostility, shame and depression, and the characteristics of 
social support have been tested and measured. Assessing construct systems and 
constructs related to trauma is undertaken in personal construct psychology; although 
the same problems of post-hoc assessments exist in personal construct psychology as 
they do for any other field of research in psychological trauma.
From this analysis, my personal construct psychology model of psychological 
trauma proposed appears to satisfy all the standards for models of psychological trauma, 
derived from Horowitz (1997), Jones and Barlow (1990), and Brewin, Dalgleish and 
Joseph (1996). Having established this as a useful and viable model of psychological 
trauma, I have now tested the model and established its viability and usefullness.
7.4.7 Clinical Implications of the Findings
Study 2 reveals several factors that appear as key determinant to maintaining 
positive mental health in the face of potential trauma, for this sample. These key factors 
can be used to determine management plans for people who, in the future, may be 
exposed to trauma. Study 2 highlighted issues related to guilt, hostility, depression, and
social support.
Firstly, there was a large and inverse association between guilt and positive 
mental health. Therefore, the clinical implication is that guilt needs to be resolved to
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maintain mental health in the aftermath of potentially traumatic events. Guilt is 
conceptualised as the awareness by people, that their sense of themselves is not what 
they believed it to be, they have not acted in accordance with their core role; or have 
done something that is perceived as being in direct contradiction to their central roles 
(Landfield & Leitner, 1980). Therefore, interventions should target people’s 
comparisons between their behaviours during and after a potentially traumatic event, 
and their construing of their core role, seeking to resolve any contradictions. Such 
interventions would involve bringing to awareness construing of behaviour during and 
after an event, along with cores roles of moral codes, and addressing any invalidation or 
fragmentation.
One type of therapy based in personal construct therapy that may be useful to 
resolve guilt, is Kelly’s (1955/1991) fixed-role therapy. The aim of fixed role therapy is 
for people to experiment with different behaviours and interpersonal relating than those 
which have led to disorders. By doing so, people come to accept that there are alternate 
ways of construing themselves and their worlds; opening up one of the basic principles 
of personal construct therapy; that of constructive alternativism.
If guilt is based on people construing others construing them as behaving in 
ways that are contrary to their core role structure, finding alternate ways of construing 
their roles or behaviours would be essential for resolving guilt.
Kelly (1955/1991) describes fixed-role therapy as beginning with people 
providing a self-characterisation; always written in the third person, as-if describing the 
role of a character in a play or describing the person to a friend. A therapist reads 
through this self-characterisation to identify constructs, and then develops an alternate 
characterisation; again, similar to a description of a character in a play. The constructs 
chosen for the fictional characterisation are not simply the opposite of those expressed
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in the original characterisation. Rather, novel constructs, or ones that are orthogonal to 
those expressed in the original self-characterisation, are used. Thus, constructs in the 
fictional characterisation are not the opposite of those in the original characterisation; 
rather, they are different and present potentially a different aspect of the character that 
the client has never even contemplated.
The client is then encouraged to act out ‘as-if they were the fictional character 
for a fixed period of time; such as for two-weeks. They continue in therapy during this 
time, tuning and testing their understanding of the new character and their role. The aim 
is not to define how the person is to behaviour permanently, but to appreciate 
constructive alternativism and to free themselves from being ‘stuck’ with construing 
that is invalidated. The role developed by the therapist is not the one they have to take 
on; in fact, Kelly (1955/1991) suggests that if the person wants to take on the role at the 
expense of accepting that the role represents their control over their construct system, he 
may develop an alternative character for them to try for several weeks more. The 
awareness of constructive alternativism is more important that the example used to 
create this awareness.
Fixed role therapy can give people an opportunity to experiment with alternate 
core roles, and interactions with other people. Bannister (2003) indicates that people 
might find that other behave differently toward them in their secret enactment of the 
fixed role, receiving new evidence of both what roles are possible, but also how other 
people might respond to them. The essence of fixed-role therapy, according to Bannister 
(2003) is to help people realise that their personalities are to a significant extent, their 
own inventions, and subject to reinvention and change. In other words, they are not 
stuck with the personalities that they may have seen as failing them, leading to disorder.
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Fixed-role therapy is a practical means of engaging in the cycles of transition described 
by Kelly (1955/1991) for resolving invalidation or fragmentation.
While Kelly (1955/1991) did not define fixed-role therapy specifically for guilt, 
guilt involves how people construe themselves and their behaviour, how they construe 
other people construing their behaviour, and how they construe their core roles. Like all 
disorder, guilt also involves people repeatedly using constructs that are invalidated by 
their experiences. Therefore, the opportunity to experiment with new construing of 
behaviour, others construing, and core roles, and the possibility of freeing themselves 
from the invalidated construing and to accepting alternate ways to behave and interact 
with others, should be highly beneficial. The aim of fixed-role therapy for guilt would 
be to create alternate constructs with which to anticipate how the person will behave in 
the future, and how they may be construed by others, compared to how they construe 
their core role structure.
Secondly, there was a medium and inverse association between hostility directed 
outwards, and mental health. Therefore, the clinical implication is that hostility directed 
outwards needs to be resolved, to maintain mental health in the aftermath of potentially 
traumatic events. Hostility refers to people trying to resolve invalidation or 
fragmentation by manipulating the world to change, in order to avoid having to revise 
their existing construct systems. Interventions to resolve hostility would necessitate 
people becoming aware of their construct systems and of the invalidation created by 
potentially traumatic events; and then seeking to resolve this through construct revision, 
rather than hostility. It would involve taking responsibility for, and being committed to, 
construct revision; or the development of new associative constructs that would resolve
invalidation.
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Thirdly, there was a large and inverse association between depression and 
positive mental health. Therefore, the clinical implication is that depression needs to be 
resolved, to maintain mental health in the aftermath of potentially traumatic events. 
Depression is conceptualised in personal construct theory as an indicator of constriction 
of construing. Constriction, in turn, is conceptualised as a shrinking of people’s 
perceptual fields, in order to avoid awareness of invalidation and fragmentation. 
Interventions that encourage people to dilate, or broaden the range of their construing, 
should be encouraged. However, given that constriction may have been employed to 
avoid facing invalidation and fragmentation, people may well need support to help them 
tolerate facing the invalidation and fragmentation that would be necessary to dilate their 
construing.
Finally, positive social support was significantly elevated in Sample 2, who had 
maintained positive mental health. Therefore, while not a simple linear relationship, the 
clinical implication is that social support should be maximized, to maintain mental 
health in the aftermath of potentially traumatic events. In particular, relationships based 
on solidarity (resources), and intimacy (social satisfaction), should be encouraged. 
Interpersonal relating may be a key component to all the clinical implications previously 
described. The development of new and associative construing, necessary to resolve 
invalidation and fragmentation, relies on social relating. By providing the opportunity 
for new information, validation and a laboratory in which to experiment, while reducing 
pre-occupation with old material, invalidation and threat; social relating can mitigate 
new construct development, and therefore resolution of disorder. Therefore, 
interventions that work to maximize social relations based on providing new 
information, that validate those involve, and encourage and support experimentation,
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while minimizing pre-occupation with old material, invalidation and threat, or at least 
shaping social relating in these directions, should be encouraged.
7.4.7.1 Support for the clinical findings
The emphasis on social support in planning for managing people exposed to 
traumatic events is supported by the findings of Hodson, Ward and Rapee (2003) and 
Creamer and Forbes (2003). They argue that social support should be planned for in the 
deployment of military personnel, during deployment, and in the time following 
deployment.
The centrality of social support to post traumatic mental health is emphasized in 
guidelines for the management of people exposed to traumatic events, by the Australian 
Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health (2007), the UK National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (2005) and the US National Centre for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(2004). They state that lack of effective social support is a risk factor for the 
development of PTSD; that access to and use of social support should be investigated in 
initial screening and assessment of people exposed to trauma; that social support is 
associated with recovery from trauma; that addressing needs for social support should 
be a part of psychological first-aid for people exposed to traumatic events; and that 
social support should be maximized for people who develop PTSD.
Similarly, the Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health’s (2007), the 
UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence’s (2005) and the US National Centre for 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder’s (2004) treatment guidelines for PTSD also describe 
feelings of guilt as common, stemming from forced impossible choices, and experiences 
of humiliation experienced during and following traumatic events. Further, guilt is 
viewed as a precursor to anger and aggressive behaviour, and as a feature that prolongs
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mental health problems in the aftermath of trauma. Therefore, managing and resolving 
guilt is viewed as an important treatment factor.
Study 2 highlighted issues related to guilt, hostility, depression, and social 
support. From a personal construct theory perspective, these issues could be construed 
as resolving inconsistencies between how people view themselves and their moral code, 
with their behaviour during and after a traumatic event; resolving to make changes in 
their own meaning-making of the event and their lives, rather than trying to force the 
world to change in order to maintain consistency; dilating their construing of the event 
and their role in it through reconstruing; and seeking others with whom they can 
experiment and reconstrue with through receiving new information, validation, a safe 
and non-threatening social laboratory in which to experiment and reconstrue, and who 
will help them avoid pre-occupation with old material.
The Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health (2007), the UK National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (2005), and the US National Centre for Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (2004) all advocate cognitive therapy as first line treatments for PTSD. 
Cognitive therapy is described in each of the sets of guidelines. The Australian Centre 
for Posttraumatic Mental Health states that cognitive therapy:
“helps the individual to identify, challenge and modify any biased and distorted 
thoughts and memories of their traumatic experience, as well as any subsequent 
maladaptive or unhelpful beliefs about themselves and the world they may have 
developed” (2007, p27).
The UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence states that cognitive therapy involves: 
“the identification and modification of misinterpretations that lead the patient to 
overestimate threat. In PTSD, this threat stems from interpretations of the
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trauma and its aftermath ... By discussing the evidence for and against the 
interpretations, and by testing out the predictions derived from the 
interpretations with the help of the therapist, the patient arrives at more adaptive 
conclusions. The patient is encouraged to drop behaviours and cognitive 
strategies that prevent a disconfirmation of the negative interpretations, e.g. 
excessive precautions to prevent further trauma or excessive rumination about 
what one could have done differently during the event.” (2005, p53).
Finally, the US National Centre for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder describes cognitive 
therapy as:
“educating patients on the relationships between thoughts and emotions, 
exploring common negative thoughts held by trauma survivors, identifying 
personal negative beliefs, developing alternative interpretations or judgments, 
and practicing new thinking” (2004, p38).
These processes appear to involve people bringing to awareness the meanings 
they ascribe to traumatic events, assessing the usefulness of these meanings, and 
revising the meanings as necessary. I argue that these processes are consistent with the 
processes of construct revision through the cycles of transition described in personal 
construct theory. The three cycles of transition described in Chapter 5 involve bringing 
to awareness construing that is invalidated or fragmented. The Creativity Cycle involves 
progressively tightening and loosening construing in order to try new ways of predicting 
and construing events in order to validate the constructs and expand their 
understandings. The C-P-C Cycle involves being open to all possibilities that a situation 
may offer, being able to make and maintain a range of possible predictions from which
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to choose, rather than having exacting and tightly defined predictions, logically 
narrowing down this range of possible predictions based on what predictions about an 
event can be drawn from the existing construct systems, and choosing and being 
committed to one that seems to fit best. Finally, the Experience Cycle involves making 
predictions about the future based on existing constructs, investing in the process of 
construct revision, assessing the adequacy of predictions with the reality of experience 
of the world, confirming or disconfirming the outcome of the experience of encounter, 
and revising the process if needed.
There are significant differences between cognitive behavioural therapy and 
personal construct psychotherapy; most notably that cognitive behavioural therapy is 
more objective and dictated by the therapist, while personal construct psychotherapy is 
more subjective and client-centred. However, both may share similar therapeutic tools 
and goals at times and there can be overlap between the two.
Specific approaches to personal construct therapy that may apply to the 
treatment of people with PTSD already exist. Klion and Pfenninger (1996) described a 
personal construct psychology therapy for PTSD that has aims to interweave past, 
present and future into an integrated, consistent, and acceptable story of war veterans 
lives. Similarly, Oades and Viney (2000) describe an experience cycle methodology that 
has been successful in producing significant construct revision.
Prolonged or repeated exposure to memories of the trauma increases the 
likelihood that people will have to bring into their awareness, the invalidation or 
fragmentation they have been avoiding through constriction. While exposure would 
result in increased emotions of transition, awareness of the invalidation or fragmentation 
is a necessary first step toward engagement in the cycles of transition necessary to 
resolve the invalidation or fragmentation.
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The need for prolonged exposure may be to overcome the resilience to 
reconstruing that people with disorder have developed. Engaging in construct 
construing takes courage and the ability to tolerate the seeming chaos that Leitner and 
Pfenninger (1994) describe as necessary for reconstruing. Constructs related to trauma, 
or of existing construct systems, may have a range of levels of conscious awareness, 
including those that are pre-verbal. In these cases, people may either not have conscious 
awareness of the constructs, or not have symbols, such as language, with which to 
articulate them. Without conscious awareness or ability to symbolize constructs, people 
may have no awareness of the invalidation or fragmentation that is at the heart of then- 
disorder. Repeated or prolonged exposure may be necessary for people to eventually 
bring to awareness or articulation, the construct invalidation or fragmentation that had 
led to disorder, and to open up the way for engagement in the cycles of transition and 
recovery of mental health. Social relating may be necessary to help people tolerate the 
distress of awareness of invalidation and fragmentation.
There is a great deal of similarity, or at least consistency, between the clinical 
implications for the management of people exposed to traumatic events derived from 
the personal construct model of mental health and trauma, and the guidelines from the 
Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health (2007), the UK National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (2005), and US National Centre for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(2004). While the guidelines do not endorse the model upon which Study 2 is based, 
they endorse clinical practice, with which Study 2’s clinical implications are wholly
consistent.
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7.4.8 Limitations of Study 2
7.4.8.1 Limitations related to the sample
A clear limitation with this study concerns the size and scope of the sample 
used. A sample size of 22 limits the confidence of the results, and limits the application 
of statistical analyses that can be conducted with the data. Along with the size of 
Sample 2, there are limitations on the ability to generalize from the sample. Firstly, 
there is a gender bias in the sample, with significantly more males than female. 
Secondly, the sample is a military sample that has experienced a specific work-related 
accident. These factors limit the ability to generalize the findings.
Further, while it is inferred that perceived positive social relating is associated 
with mental health in Sample 2, the limits of the sample reduce the confidence of this 
finding. It may be that elevated levels of perceived social relating is a feature of military 
personnel in general, rather than just a feature of those with positive mental health. This 
would need to be confirmed with a control sample.
7.4.8.2 Limitations due to the scope of the study
The scope of the data-set also limits the confidence in the conclusions that can 
be drawn. All participants were considered to be those displaying good mental health in 
the aftermath of a traumatic event and this study tests only the applicability of the model 
to participants who display good mental health. To fully test the model, it should also be 
applied to participants with the full range of possible post-trauma mental health 
outcomes, including disorder. This study initially included invitations to participants 
with a broader range of mental health outcomes; however, of the group who were 
invited to participate ^=48  and with nine who would have been considered to not report
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good mental health), 23 agreed to participate, and only one of these did not report good 
mental health. For this study, I considered it important to control for the type of 
incident, and focus on a cohort who all experienced the same event. Hence the decision 
to focus exclusively on participants reporting good mental health was made on the basis 
of the availability of participants, rather than a theoretical decision. While this may limit 
the cope of the study, the study retains the important focus on mental health, rather than 
disorder. I speculate that a sample with a wider range of mental health than reported in 
Sample 2 would result in greater support for the hypotheses posed for Study 2.
A further consideration in the scope of the study was that it was limited to only 
one event (fire at sea) and one type of participant (predominantly males in the Navy). 
While the description of the event provided fits comfortable into the conceptualization 
of potential trauma, the specifics may not be frequently encountered. This may limit the 
degree to which results can be generalized, and some caution should be used in 
comparing the results with other samples.
The one proposition of the model that was not confirmed by Study 2 may be 
more a feature of the limited sample, than failure of the model. Proposition III is that 
events usually considered to be potentially traumatic usually involve construing an 
imminent risk or confrontation with threatened death or personal safety, with a high 
level of awareness. Construing imminent death or safety involves construing processes 
that govern personal maintenance. Therefore, disorder should be associated with threat. 
While there was no association between threat and mental health, Sample 2 only 
included participants who had maintained mental health. Therefore, it is speculative to 
drawn confirmation from a sample that did not include disorder. If the sample included 
participants with disorder, the findings would be more directly relevant. Therefore, the 
limitations of the sample may not have provided a valid test of this proposition.
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Only the presence of PTSD has been used to define mental health in the 
aftermath of exposure to trauma. While PTSD may be a highly applicable disorder, it 
may be far from the only one likely to impact on people exposed the potentially 
traumatic events.
A limitation of the study related to the measures used and the ethical standards 
adhered to. As noted in 7.2.4.1, there can be ethical problems associated with trauma 
focused research, if the measures used result in exposure to cues of the original event 
that may be distressing to participants, where there is limited consent, and where the 
research does not produce meaningful results. The choice of only one type of measure 
of independent variables (Content Analysis Scales) may limit the scope of data 
provided. However, the use of this type of measure has significant advantages over 
other types of measure, with regard to the ethical considerations noted with this 
particular sample. The use of Content Analysis Scales does not require exposure to 
trauma related cues with this sample, as the exposure criteria for PTSD with this sample 
can be assumed. All participants are free to engage in as much description of the 
original event as they want, with the instructions to elicit narratives not requiring direct 
discussion of the original event (although it is accepted that the original event provides 
the context for their narratives). Further, as measures of psychological states are based 
primarily on the language used by participants, direct references to the original event are 
not required (as the context of narratives is directed at their lives since the fire). 
Applying Content Analysis Scales to narratives related to participants’ lives sine the 
fire, provides a rich understanding of the psychological processes of the participants. 
Therefore, the use of Content Analysis Scales results in few ethical issues while 
producing rich and meaningful data. These benefits significantly outweigh the few
limitations of these measures.
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7.4.83 Emotions not in the model
I used content analysis scales to assess threat, anxiety, guilt, hostility, shame, 
and depression. However, there are no readily available measures for fear and 
aggression that could have been used to round out Kelly’s (1955/1991) list of emotions 
of transition. A measure of fear may be redundant, as Kelly’s construct of fear is 
subordinate to threat. Therefore, a measure of fear may only be necessary if constructs 
of trauma are subordinate to threat. Given that it is anticipated that trauma impacts on 
core construing, it is predicted that threat should be a more important construct that 
would subsume any measures o f fear. While there is also no direct measure of 
aggression, there is a measure of positive emotions. Kelly’s (1955/1991) definition of 
aggression was that of a positive approach to engaging in the process of construing and 
reconstruing. McCoy (1981) argues that success in the process of construing and 
reconstruing will be indicated by the presence of positive emotions. Therefore, while 
there are no direct measures of aggression, there are measures of positive emotions, 
which are conceptualised by McCoy (1981) as indirect evidence of the presence of 
aggression.
As noted, the limitations of the sample impact on what propositions could be 
validly tested. A more comprehensive understanding of the model could have been 
made if both the scope of the sample and the emotions measured were broadened.
7.4.9 Strengths of Study 2.
7.4.9.1 Focus on mental health rather than disorder -  leading to implications for care
The studies by Sewell, from which the model of mental health in the face of 
trauma was developed, focused more on the development of disorder, rather than the
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maintenance or development of mental health. However, studies that focus on disorder 
can only infer what need to be done to prevent or treat traumatic stress. This study 
provides direct support for specific directions by focusing on those who display long­
term mental health, despite their exposure to potentially traumatic events, and implies 
pathways that may lead to the maintenance of positive mental health in the aftermath of 
potentially traumatic events. As such, this study has more direct relevance to clinical 
practice, than studies that focus on disorder.
7A 9.2 Ethical methodology for trauma
A significant ethical concern for research into psychological trauma is the 
possibility of re-traumatisation, and the need to balance this issue against the possible 
gains of the research. The approach taken in this study was to determine involvement in 
an event defined as potentially traumatic by description of the event from a board of 
inquiry, ehminating the need to question individual participants about their experiences. 
While the Board of Inquiry may have had the potential to cause re-traumatisation, this 
project did not. Further, rather than asking participants to describe specific symptoms, 
the approach using narratives that later could be analysed through content analysis 
scales, allowed participants to describe their experiences in whatever words they chose 
to. This approach still yielded meaningful results, based on the assumption of content 
analysis, that the language people chose to use in narratives can reveal aspects of their 
psychological state. Without direct reference to the event and with control over the 
information they report, the approach I adopted in Study 2 is ethically sound, yet
effective.
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7.4.93 Standardised exposure
That all participants experienced the same event is considered a strength of this 
study. Many studies into trauma rely on multiple events in order to obtain a pool of 
participants large enough to draw conclusions from. This introduces event-type as a 
potentially confounding variable. Study 2 yielded a sample pool large enough to drawn 
conclusion from, with all participants having experienced the same event. While there 
may still be some variation in exposure within the participant pool in Study 2, all 
participants were on the same ship, therefore all at risk if the fire could not be controlled 
and all were involved in fighting the fire. In this situation, the potential impact of a 
possible confounding variable due to the event is significantly reduced.
7.4.10 Further Research
The confidence in findings of this study could be increased through repeating the 
study with a larger sample size, preferably a sample that included participants who 
maintained mental health, along with those who developed disorder. This would be 
necessary to test more of the proposed model (which explains both positive mental 
health and disorder, in both the short and long-terms).
While controlling for the type of traumatic event was an important feature of this 
study, a future study could include a broader range of traumatic events, to expand the 
applicability of the model.
With the implication that high levels of interpersonal relating, as measured by 
the Sociality Scale, may mitigate against the impact of high levels of emotions of 
transition and result in positive mental health, it would be important to measure this 
effect with a sample that report disorder. Future studies could also focus on the possible 
mitigating effects of interpersonal relating in much more depth than this study allowed.
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If Study 2 were considered as the basis of further study, then the significant findings of 
interpersonal relating based on perceived receiving of intimacy and resource based 
relationships would be most important. Further study could also include measurement 
of a broader range of emotional states, both positive and negative, in order to indicate 
mental health and disorder.
Also following from Study 2 is a need to explore the possible association 
between the emotions of transition of guilt, hostility and depression. Specifically, it is 
important to know whether the profile of associations generated from Sample 2 is 
unique to this sample, or can be repeated with other samples. This would have important 
implications for validation of the model, along with important implications for 
validating strategies for the management of people exposed to potentially traumatising 
events.
Probably the greatest imperative for future study to come from this study is to 
apply the approach to a sample with includes participants with both disorder and 
positive mental health. This would allow for greater testing of the hypotheses and 
propositions in the model than could have been achieved by only using participants who 
have maintained positive mental health.
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Chapter 8. Synthesis o f the two studies of prevalence of trauma in the Navy, and the 
testing of a personal construct model of maintaining mental health.
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8.1 Major findings of the two studies concerning mental health following potentially 
trauma, in the Navy
Symptoms sufficient to indicate PTSD were reported by about one-third of a 
sample of the crew of HMAS Westralia four months following the fire. This number 
dropped to about one-quarter by 11 months, and to about one-sixth by four to six years. 
The majority o f people involved did not display disorder at any time, and for those that 
did initially, about half recovered to the extent that they no longer indicated PTSD by 
four to six years. Only one participant indicated developing a disorder over time that 
was not indicated earlier. If this was a possible example of delayed onset PTSD, it 
indicates that this variant of the condition occurs in a minority of (12.5% of the those 
with indicated PTSD at some time since the fire). These prevalence rates contribute to 
the understanding of PTSD in the Navy.
At four to six years, over half the participants were indicated for general 
psychological distress, and about one-quarter with possible alcohol misuse.
There is no indication of any significant association between gender and rank, 
and indications of disorder (PTSD, general psychological distress or alcohol problems) 
at any of the three screening (four months, eleven months or four to six years). While 
the overall prevalence of disorder reduced over time, most individuals maintained their 
status as either indicated for disorder, or as maintaining mental health, at the three times 
when measurements were taken - up to six years.
The prevalence of indicated PTSD in Sample 1 assessed at four to six years after 
the fire was more than ten times that of an established background rate in an Australian 
Navy population, and more than twice the prevalence of Australian Navy personnel 
involved in the 1991 Gulf War. It was about seventy-five percent of the prevalence of
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PTSD in British Army veterans of the Falklands War (measured five years after the 
war), and in civilian oil rig workers 10 years after they survived a large fatal fire at sea.
The prevalence of general psychological distress and alcohol problems, assessed 
four to six years after the fire was about the same as an Australian Navy sample taken 
10 years after the 1991 Gulf War; and about the same as a sample of US Army, male 
veterans recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Variations in prevalence of 
general psychological distress and alcohol problems with time, could not be made in the 
same way as for PTSD, due to the single, cross-sectional method of assessment.
Sample 2 comprised a subset of Sample 1. They are a sub-set of people exposed 
to an event that produced rates of PTSD similar to war and large scale disaster, yet 
either maintained good mental health in the four to six years after the event, or restored 
it by four to six years after the event.
For people exposed to potential trauma, yet who displayed good mental health in 
the long term, there was no observed association between threat and mental health. For 
people exposed to potential trauma, yet who displayed good mental health in the long 
term, positive emotions are positively associated with mental health, while some 
emotions of transition are negatively associated with mental health.
Some emotions of transition (guilt, hostility, and depression) are more 
significantly and negatively associated with mental health than others (such as threat, 
anxiety, and shame, which were not significantly associated with mental health).
For people exposed to potential trauma, yet who displayed good mental health in 
the long term, there was a significant association between resolving guilt, and mental 
health. For people exposed to potential trauma, yet who displayed good mental health in 
the long term, there was a significant association between resolving hostility, and 
mental health. For people exposed to potential trauma, yet who displayed good mental
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health in the long term, there was a significant association between resolving 
depression, and mental health.
For people exposed to potential trauma, yet who displayed good mental health in 
the long term, positive social support (especially relationships based on resources and 
intimacy) is positively associated with mental health. Social support appears to be a 
condition leading to maintaining or restoring mental health.
Three of the four hypotheses of Study 2 were supported, and none were 
discontinued.
8.2 Clinical implications of the findings of the two studies concerning mental health 
following potentially trauma, in the Navy
From the findings of the two studies, the following clinical implications can be 
drawn. The fire in HMAS Westralia was different to every day experiences, for those 
most involved. The prevalence of disorder in those exposed to the fire in HMAS 
Westralia is significantly higher than baseline rates. The mental health outcome to this 
incident is similar to those from war or disaster. This indicates that people exposed to 
similar events under similar circumstances in the future, should be considered at higher 
risk than the general Navy population, of developing disorder.
While disorders such as PTSD are associated with traumatic events, the people 
who develop long-term disorder are in the minority, while those who maintain positive 
mental health in the long-term, are in the majority. Resilience to avoid developing 
disorder at as early as four months after a potentially traumatic event, seems to be the 
most common outcome for those involved. Therefore, interventions that restore mental 
health will not be necessary for all people exposed to potential trauma. Given that most 
of those who were indicated for PTSD at four to six years were also indicated for PTSD
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at four months, interventions to relieve PTSD symptoms should be targeted at those 
who are symptomatic in the months following a potentially traumatic event.
Limited recovery from disorder takes place over time. For those in Sample 1 
who developed disorder in the months following a traumatic event, about half reduced 
their symptoms to sub-clinical levels. Recovery appears to occur more in the months 
following disorder, rather than years. Therefore, interventions aiming to maintain or 
restore mental health would be more appropriate earlier, than later.
There are significant associations between guilt, hostility and depression, and 
mental health. This highlights the need for all people to resolve issues of guilt 
(construing of their behaviour are comparing favourably to their own moral code or 
self-expectations), and hostility (examining their own construing and engaging in cycles 
of transition when needed, rather than trying to force the world to fit into their 
invalidated or fragmented construing). Further, depression, which indicates a 
constriction of construing, also needs to be resolved, presumably by loosening or 
dilating of construing (such as by engaging in, and completing the Creativity Cycle). All 
people exposed to trauma could benefit from engaging in the process of reviewing and 
identifying invalidation or fragmentation beyond an inferential level, construing related 
to their behaviours, roles and expectations of self.
Positive social relating is associated with mental health. People exposed to 
potential trauma should ensure that they maintain and increase positively perceived 
social relating (in particular relationships that are perceived as resourceful and intimate 
to the subject), in order to maximize conditions favourable to the development of new 
constructs (ones that provide fresh ideas, validation, and a social laboratory in which to 
experiment and engage in cycles of transition), and minimize conditions unfavourable to 
the development of new constructs (ones that threaten, that allow or encourage
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preoccupation with old material, or don’t facilitate engagement in the cycles of 
transition).
Content analysis scales are effective research tools for psychological trauma. 
Study 2 is the first known study to utilize content analysis scales specifically for 
research into maintaining mental health following trauma. As a personal construct 
theory-based measurement, they are highly consistent with the model, which is based in 
the same theoretical framework. However, this research also highlights the applicability 
of content analysis scales to be used alongside, and integrate with, objective measures, 
and provides encouragement for their application in research into psychological trauma 
outside a personal construct psychology framework. Further, content analysis scales 
have significant ethical benefits and sensitivities for trauma based research.
The proposed personal construct psychology model of mental health in the face 
of potentially traumatic events is partially supported by these findings, and can be 
tentatively used as a clinical guide to understand the experiences of people exposed to 
potentially traumatic events. The model is consistent with standards for Personal 
Construct Psychology models, and standards for models of trauma.
8.3 The aims of the two studies concerning mental health following potentially trauma, 
in the Navy
The aims of the two studies were to assess the prevalence and extent of 
psychological trauma and distress, in personnel who survived a potentially traumatic 
event, namely the fire in HMAS Westralia; and test the value of hypotheses derived 
from the propositions of my model.
The first aim was met by conducting Study 1 that established and compared 
rates of indicated PTSD, general psychological distress, and alcohol misuse, in Navy
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survivors of a fatal fire at sea. Data for indicated PTSD was available at three different 
times since the fire, and allowed good comparison with other military and non-military 
personnel. The first aim was fully met.
The second aim was met by first testing my personal construct model of 
maintaining mental health and psychological trauma. The model of maintaining mental 
health was tested using a sub-set of participants from Study 1, who had been exposed to 
a potentially traumatic event, yet had either maintained or restored positive mental 
health in the long term. Participants in Study 2 provided narratives that were analysed 
using content analysis scales to measure emotions of transition, social relating and 
constriction of construing. The results provided a valid means of testing some aspects of 
the model. While not all propositions of the model could be fully tested by this sample, 
the model, as a whole, was tested through the resulted of Study 2, and this aim was 
achieved.
The two studies work together to provide an understanding of what can happen 
following trauma (Study 1), why this happens (Study 2), and then provides the 
opportunity for speculation on approaches to the future management of people exposed 
to potentially traumatic events. The aim of advancing the understanding of 
psychological trauma through the development of a model of maintaining mental health 
in the aftermath of exposure to potentially traumatic events and testing of this model has 
been achieved.
8.4 Limitations of the studies.
Limitations due to the relative small size of the two samples, the focus on only 
one event type, and a narrow range of mental health responses in Sample 2, limit, to
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some extent, the confidence of the findings, the ability to generalize from the findings 
and the degree to which the model could be tested and validated.
8.5 Further studies recommended
Studies that include navy samples and that are longitudinal to explore how 
disorders such as PTSD develop and change over time are required to compliment the 
existing knowledge of PTSD (which is focused more on other samples, and which tends 
to be more cross-sectional in methodology).
More studies that explore the processes leading to long-term mental health are 
needed to compliment the vast number that focus only on the outcome of disorder.
The application of Personal Construct Theory to the field of psychological 
trauma has great potential to understanding the processes behind mental health in 
general, and should be pursued. The models proposed by Sewell and proposed in this 
thesis require further development. This is an area ripe for further research.
Research that applies models to samples from a wide range of backgrounds and 
who have experienced a wide range of potentially traumatic events is necessary to fully 
test models, to increase the ability to draw generalizations from trauma-based research, 
and most importantly, to lead to validated interventions to maiximise mental health 
outcomes in those exposed.
8.6 Summary of the thesis and concluding comments
I developed this research with the aim of advancing the understanding of mental 
health in the aftermath of exposure to potentially traumatic events. I started with a 
literary review focusing on the description and history of PTSD in a military context.
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I then moved to illustrate the potential impact of PTSD in a military sample, by 
describing a case study of navy personnel who survived a major fire at sea that resulted 
in the deaths of four of the crew. The prevalence of PTSD, general psychological 
distress and alcohol problems were reveled through both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal methodologies, and then discussed. While this type of prevalence case- 
study following traumatic events in a military context is common, the focus on Navy 
personnel and the maritime and naval context is far less common.
From here, I moved to begin an understanding of the intra-personal processes 
that influence the mental health of people who have experienced events such as the fire 
in HMAS Westralia. I provided another literary review and critique, this time of the 
existing major theoretical models of PTSD and how such models can be evaluated. I 
content that while all existing models of PTSD explain some aspects of mental health in 
the aftermath of exposure to traumatic events, none fully or satisfactorily explain the 
processes that result in the wide range of experiences reported in the literary reviews 
and in Study 1.
To address this shortcoming, I turned to Personal Construct Theory. One of the 
main underpinnings of Personal Construct Theory is the uniqueness of individual 
construing of events, and understanding and accounting for the processes that lead to a 
both a wide range of individual and collective responses to life’s experiences. I first 
describe Personal Construct Theory in general, and then focus on how it can be applied 
to the field of psychological trauma. While Personal Construct Theory has been applied 
to explain post-traumatic responses, I argue that to date, this application has been 
limited, and that the full potential of Personal Construct Theory to explain and help 
understand the processes behind post-traumatic responses is far from being realized. To 
this end, I proposed a Personal Construct Theory model of PTSD, developing the
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existing work and model of Sewell, which was, in turn, developed from Kelly’s theory 
of personal constructs. The model I proposed expands Sewell’s model is two ways. 
Firstly, I accounted for both maintaining mental health as well as developing disorder in 
response to potential trauma. Secondly, the model accounts for the processes by which 
disorder or mental health is maintained over time, and how disorder can be resolved and 
mental health restored. I argue that a model that includes both mental health and 
disorder is necessary to fulfill standards for models of psychological trauma. Further, 
this model more easily leads to implications for strategies to intervene with people 
exposed to potentially traumatic events in the future, in order to maximize optimal 
mental health. I see these as natural developments of the original model proposed by 
Sewell.
Study 2 tests the model proposed. As the sample is limited only to those who 
have maintained positive mental health rather than those with disorder, the study is 
limited and cannot test all aspects of the proposed model. However, Study 2 affirms 
those aspects of the model that it can test, and does not disconfirm any. Further, with the 
long term maintenance or restoration of mental health as the most likely outcome from 
exposure to traumatic events, Study 2 is more representative of more people exposed to 
traumatic events than studies that focus solely on those with disorder. This is not to say 
that Sample 2 did not experience an event likely to result in disorders such as PTSD. 
Study 1 provided the context for Study 2, and indicated that more that a third of those 
involved in the fire in HMAS Westralia were indicated for PTSD at some time since the 
fire, and nearly one in six of those involved in the fire, were indicated for PTSD at four 
to six years since the fire. This prevalence is similar to sample involved in major combat 
such as was experienced in the Vietnam War. Sample 2 may have been limited by self­
selection; with only those not experiencing disorder being willing to participate.
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However, this does not limit the applicability o f the model; only the extent to which it 
has been tested by this particular sample.
Finally, I drew clinical implications from the model. My objective is to take 
what can be learned from the model, and consider how this might be applied in the 
future, to lead to strategies that avoid or relieve disorder in people who may be exposed 
to potentially traumatic events.
Thus, the two studies can be synthesized to understand what can typically 
happen following exposure to potentially traumatic events to understand the processes 
involved and what influences them; and finally, how this understanding could 
potentially be applied in the future to improve the mental health outcomes of people 
involved in similar events. While Study 2 determines what processes work to maintain 
mental health following exposure to trauma, it is Study 1 that sets the scene and 
provides the most meaning to Sample 2, by defining the sample. Each of the two studies 
stands on its own. However, when the data from these two studies is synthesized, it 
provides a much broader understanding of the experience of those who have 
experienced potential trauma, along with the processes involved in achieving this 
outcome. The synthesis of the two studies leads to insights into what processes should 
be encouraged for people exposed to future potentially traumatic events, in order to 
maximize the likelihood of maintaining mental health.
While disorder is often of greatest clinical interest to those who work in the field 
of psychological trauma, I argue that the processes that help maintain positive mental 
health in the face of potentially overwhelming events, should take this place. People 
who are exposed to potential trauma, yet either maintain positive mental health or 
restore positive mental health, should be of greatest interest to clinical psychologists, as 
they have achieved the resilience or the restoration of mental health that clinical
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psychologists should ultimately hope for in all their charges. People who maintain 
positive mental health have construct systems that can tolerate the disruption potentially 
traumatic events, or have the flexibility o f construing to integrate constructs of 
traumatic events that threaten to invalidate or fragment their construing, and they have 
the motivation and conditions that allow them to engage in the cycles of construing. 
How they achieve this, or take the steps to do so, is what clinical psychologists need to 
understand to help people exposed to potential trauma. The studies presented in this 
report help in this process.
Firstly, people need to have conscious awareness of their construing related to 
trauma, and whether this construing invalidates, or is fragmented with, their existing 
construct systems. Secondly, they need to resolve issues related to their behaviour and 
role in events with their moral codes. Thirdly, acceptance of their responsibilities to 
review their own construing to resolve invalidation and fragmentation, rather than trying 
to force the world to change, is important. Fourthly, people need to be able to, and to 
tolerate, dilating their construing of potential trauma, and of their existing construct 
systems, in order to resolve invalidation or fragmentation. Finally, to undertake these 
steps, positive social relating, based on perceived resources and intimacy, appears
essential.
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Appendix A. Executive Summary of the report of the Board of Inquiry into the fire in
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R E P O R T  O F  FIR E IN HM AS W E S TR A L IA  O N  5 M AY 1998
1 - to accordance with the Maritime Commander’s instmctioiis an inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the fire m die main machinery space of HMAS WESTRALIA 
on 5 Elay 98 has now been completed.
2. The inquiry was conducted in HMAS STIRLING from 11 -22  May- 98, HMAS 
PENGUIN from 25 - 29 May 98 and again in STIRLING from 2 June - 17 July 98. The 
members o f  the Board visited WESTRALIA on a number o f occasions including 9 and 12 
May 98.
3. Members of the Board o f inquiry are:
Commodore Richard Lamacraft, RAN (President)
Christopher William Filer, PSM, Inspector Marine Accidents 
Captain Russell Bryan Schedhck, RAN
Assistant Chief Officer Lindsay Cuneo, Fire and Rescue Service o f WA 
Commander Edward George Walsh, CSC RANR
4. The Board was directed by its terms o f reference to investigate all die relevant 
circumstances surrounding the fire in WESTRALIA on Tuesday 5 May 98, die death o f 
personnel in that fire and the injury of other members of die ship's company. The Board 
was directed that die inquiry should include, but not be limited, to:
(1) the cause o f die fire and the manner in which it was fought:
(2) all the circumstances relevant to the death and injury of personnel:
(3) the involvement of the ship’s company including their training and 
competence:
(4) the materiel state of WESTRALIA at the time of the fire: and,
(5) the involvement o f other naval units and external agencies.
5_ As the Board became aware o f important safety issues that required immediate
attention, these were raised with the Maritime Commander. Four issues were raised, these 
were:
a. use of flexible fuel hoses in certain circumstances:
b. escape training using emergency life support respiratory devices:
c. firefighting re-entry procedures after C02 drenching: and
d. HMAS WESTRALIA compartment escape routes.
1
265
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENT
6. Prior to the ship sailing from Fleet Base West on 5 May 98, WESTRALIA had
undergone an assisted maintenance period tor about 6 weeks. Duong tins period, members 
of the ship’s company o f WESTRALIA in conjunction with Fleet Intermediate 
Maintenance Authority and the ship’s contractor, ADI Limited, earned out maintenance 
work. The work included the fitting o f new flexible fuel hoses to the ship’s -main engines 
by a subcontractor under the direction o f ADI lim ited.
2. Trials were conducted with the ship alongside the wharf on 22 April 98. The
ship sailed on 29 April 98 and conducted a series of sea trials, both whilst under way and at 
anchor. On. I May, WESTRALIA returned to Fleet Base West. Final preparations for an 
overseas deployment were conducted on Monday, 4 May 98.
R At 0900 on 5 May 98, WESTRALIA sailed from Fleet Base West for the
Western Australia Exercise Area to rendezvous: with HMA Ships SUCCESS, DARWIN 
and ADELAIDE. WESTRALIA proceeded north through Cockbum Sound to Gage Roads.
9. At about 1030, when about 2% miles east o f the Fairway Buoy in the 
Deepwater Channel, a feel leak was noticed m the area o f the number 9 cylinder on the 
inboard side of the port roam engine. It was a significant leak, with fuel was emerging 
under pressure in a manner similar to a garden hose.
10. The leak was reported to the machinery control room and on inspection, it was 
initially thought that the fuel might be leaking from a banjo bolt m the vicinity of number 9 
or 10 cylinders. The port main engine was shut down to enable repairs to be carried out 
and personnel in the main machinery space set up some fire fighting equipment. The 
standing sea fire brigade mustered m the machinery control room.
11. At about 1035, fire broke out in the main machinery space. Personnel saw the 
fire start on the outboard side of the starboard mam engine. A i4woofing” sound was heard 
m the machinery control room and a flame and black smoke appeared through a cable duct 
near an um on the port side.
12. A fire report was made to the bridge and emergency stations was sounded. A 
brief inspection of the main machinery space through the door of the machinery control 
room revealed thick black smoke and flames. Visibility was severely limited. Four people 
escaped from the mam machinery space into the machinery control room. Three of the 
personnel were injured and were initially treated by the ship’s emergency medical 
organisation and later assisted by medical staff from SUCCESS, STIRLING and the Sea 
Training Group. 13
13. The fire was intense, causing rapid smoke build up and extreme heat. Despite 
some heroic but unsuccessful firefighting efforts, the atmosphere in the mam machinery 
space soon became inadequate to support life. Electrical cabling on the deckliead over the 
fire was quickly damaged (Figure 1) with a consequent loss of sendees, including some
communications.
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Figure 1. Fire damaged cabling above the main engines (underneath the 
machinery control room) Photograph courtesy of W A  Police Service
14. The starboard main engine was shut down and electrical power to the main
machinery space isolated. The emergency generator started automatically. The machinery' 
control room was evacuated at 1038. One minute Later, the Engineering Officer 
recommended to the Commanding Officer that the main machinery space be drenched with 
carbon dioxide (CO;). One person was thought to still be in the machinery space and the 
recommendation was not accepted at that time.
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15. After the machinery control room evacuation, the. emergency power circuits
were subject to severe voltage fluctuations, probably as a result of fire damage in the tnam 
machinery space. Power to die gyro compass and the communications centre was lost. 
After these initial problems, the power supply to the navigation equipment, including the 
radars, was stabilised.
16.. The ship's, situation was communicated to Fleet Base West via a mobile
telephone at 1045.. Maritime Headquarters West notified RAN ships in die Western 
Australian exercise area shortly after.
17. At 1050, a  hose team entered the main machinery space from the fridge fiat to
fight the fire. After making a successful entry despite intense heat and thick smoke, the 
team was withdrawn to a low  the C 0 2 drench to be activated. This occurred at 1101. In the 
intervening period, pipes were made for a number o f missing personnel.
IS. The drench was remotely initiated but some o f the CO2 bottles failed to
discharge and were discharged manually seven minutes later. H ie boundary o f the main 
machinery space was monitored for hot spots and the conclusion reached that the fire had 
not been extinguished. At 1126, hose team 2 entered the mam machinery space via the 
fridge flat to attack the fire again.
19. The first external assistance, a boat from STIRLING, arrived alongside at 1143, 
and transferred a medical officer and a CPOMED. At the same time, the Sea King 
helicopter from SUCCESS landed another medical officer and medical and firefighting 
equipment.
20. At 1151, hose team 3 relieved hose team 2 and continued fighting the fire from 
the top plates of the main machinery space . Foam was pumped into the space through the 
funnel at 1153. At 1206, the hose team discovered the body o f LSMT Meek on the top 
plates adjacent to the port ladder to the middle plates. Hose team 1 relieved hose team 3 at 
1210 and progressed down to the middle plates and fought the fire from there. They found 
the bodies o f  MTDN  Petty, POMT Smith and ABMT Carroll poor to reporting at 1232 that 
the fire wras extinguished.
21. At 1218, HMA Ships SYDNEY, DARWIN and ADELAIDE were seen 
approaching on the starboard side. Within two minutes of tha t the Fleet Base West tug 
TAMMAR passed a line to the forecastle. The tow commenced with the ship about 150 
metres from a shoal. The towlme parted at about 1250.
22. The civilian tug WAMBIRI winch operates out of the Port of Fremantle, had 
been standing by WESTRALIA since about 1220. She connected up at 1314. despite some 
difficulties on WESTRALLAs forecastle m handling the heavy towing hawser. The tow
then resumed.
23. At 1250. a medical team 111 breathing apparatus entered the mam machinery 
space to formally assess and identify the four bodies. All were declared deceased by the 
medical officer from SUCCESS. Five injured personnel were medevaced to St John of 
God Hospital in the Perth suburb of Murdoch at 1350. One additional person was treated 
on board for smoke inhala tion and there were a number of personnel similarly affected who
did not seek treatment.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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24. H ie four deceased personnel were extricated from die mam machinery space
over the period from about 1515 to 1730. H us task was undertaken by ship’s staff, the two 
medical officers, medical personnel from SYDNEY, DARWIN, STIRLING and the Sea 
Training Group.
25;  The ship berthed at Fleet Base W est at 1811. A t about 1830, a Reserve legal
officer, a Disaster Victim Identification Team", and a forensic pathologist boarded the ship. 
A  comprehensive inspection o f die main machinery space was conducted. Photographs 
were taken, as well as a video film. PoEce conducted fbmial identification procedures of 
the four deceased, and a number o f  flexible fuel hoses "were photographed and taken into 
custody by die Reserve legal officer. Further inspections o f  the main machinery space were 
conducted by police officers from the Arson Squad on the following day.
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FIRE WAS FOUGHT
26. The fire was fought in three basic stages using sequentially, "first aid’ 
extinguishers, the fixed mam machinery space fire smothering system and hoses equipped 
with water wall and foam nozzles. The fire was overhauled and extinguished, reflecting 
favoixably on the tenacity o f  the hose teams and the effectiveness o f hose team training. 
The direct attack on the fire was supplemented by boundary cooling and, later, die 
introduction o f foam through die funnel door.
27. Following the report o f the fuel leak from the inboard side o f the port main 
engine, an attack hose with a foam nozzle was laid out on the middle plates. A  90 hire 
foam extinguisher was also made ready. By 1033, the standing sea fire brigade had 
mustered in the mam switchboard room, but were not committed to die mam machinery 
space. Foam was not lard on top o f die leaked fuel.
28. When the fire erupted at 1035, the Engineering Officer o f the Which alerted the 
bridge and emergency stations was immediately piped, hi the main machinery space, 
sailors attempted to fight the fire using "first aid appliances’. The fire, however, was too 
fierce and the use o f extinguishers was ineffectual. The prepared hose and nozzle was not 
used.
29. H ie crew went to their emergency stations dressed in coveralls, anti-flash 
hoods and gloves. The Engineer and support staff manned damage control headquarters. 
The ait and forward damage control section bases were established. Almost immediately 
after the machinery control room was evacuated, the Engineer advised the Commanding 
Officer to C 0 2 drench the main machinery space. The Commanding Officer declined as he 
was concerned that the missing personnel may still be alive within the mam machinery 
space.
30. Hose teams were organised and dressed in Fearnought suits and open circuit 
compressed air breathing apparatus. Smoke boundaries were established, fuel isolated and 
ventilation closed down. At 1050, a hose team entered the mam machinery space through 
the fridge flat aft on 1 deck, usmg standard firefighting techniques for fighting major fires. 
At 1100. when it was clear that any person within the mam machinery space could not have
1 Representing the WA Stare Coroner -  Composing Officers from the WA Police Arson Squad the 
Emergency Operations Unit and the Forensic Division
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survived, the Commanding Officer approved the release o f  the CO? drench. At about 1101, 
the hose team was withdrawn to allow the CO? fixed smothering system to be operated.
31. The CO2 was released from the fire control room on 01 deck. One to a 
malfunction, in the CO2 release system, only 50-65 per cent o f the bottles were activated. 
About seven minutes later, the remaining bottles were released manually. During tins time 
boundary cooling was maintained around the main machinery space perimeter.
32. At 1126, about 15 minutes after the manual release of the CO?, the second o f 
the three fire teams re-entered the space to fight die fire. The three hase teams fought the 
fire over the following hour, and during that time the four fatalities "were located. The fire 
was reported as extinguished at 1232.
33. The Board cannot say whether the CO2 extinguished the fire or not. The 
decision to re-enter the main machinery space to fight the fire, after only fifteen .minutes 
was, however, premature and showed a lack o f understanding o f the may in which a fire 
extinguishing system using oxygen depletion works. This lack o f understanding increased, 
the risk to the ship and the hose teams.
34. While there is much to commend in the way the ship’s company fought the fire, 
the Board is concerned at a number of important issues which are discussed in detail on in 
die body o f the report. The most significant issue was the lack of understanding by key 
personnel o f the ship’s CCb system.
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TRAINING AND COMPETENCE
35. All members o f the ship's company contributed, m some way or other, in 
successfully overcoming the major main machinery space fire and m providing good 
medical care to the casualties sustained.
36. Containment of the fire and major fire fighting efforts to combat it were 
ultimately successful. The requirement for boundary cooling was well understood although 
containment o f the forward boundary of die fire (the bulkhead between the mam machinery 
space and aft pump room) was slow to be set up. Firefighting teams from both forward and 
aft damage control section bases conducted major firefighting competently and with 
vigour.
37. Ventilation control was not well understood. The ship had developed a 
standard operational procedure which involved closing both the supply and exhaust 
ventilation to the mam machinery' space m the event o f a fire. Although appropriate as 
preparation for use of the C 0 2 drench, it prevented heat and hot gases from escaping, thus 
increasing the dangers and difficulties faced by personnel re-entering the main machinery 
space to conduct search and rescue and firefighting.
3g ship knowledge, particularly of emergency systems, displayed by some officers
and senior sailors when giving evidence, was less than satisfactory.
Documentary’' evidence received by the Board indicate that 20-25% of the crew 
had not received all the required pre-joining training for then billets. Additionally, 
approximately 10% of the crew were not in-date for damage control training.
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40. The ship had progressed animal continuation training satisfactorily, although
some training .serials were not carried out as realistically as they might have been. Some 
important damage control training serials had not been practiced regularly. Escape drills,
particularly using emergency tile support respiratory devices, had not been regularly 
practiced. " '
MEDICAL RESPONSE TO  THE INCIDENT
4 L  O f the four personnel who escaped from the mam machinery space after the
outbreak o f  the fire, three suffered smoke inhalation, two o f them also sustaining bums to 
their hands. These personnel were treated initially by  the two medical sailors and the 
Ship's M edical Emergency Team (SMET) members in the starboard boat space and then 
moved to RASCO (replenishment control station). They were assessed and stabilised by 
the two medical officers who embarked and then left in die care of the SMET members 
whilst the medical staff attended to  matters in die vicinity o f  the main machinery space. 
Two other personnel became casualties, both suffering acute situational reactions. Five 
casualties were medevacced by Sea King helicopter, without medical escort. One other 
member o f  the ship ' s company presented with mild smoke inhalation, was treated cn board 
and returned to duty. There is evidence that other personnel suffered mild smoke 
inhalation but did not present for treatment.
42. The clinical management o f  the casualties was most satisfactory under the 
circumstances. The overall medical management o f the incident suffered from the fact that 
no member o f  the medical organisation maintained the overall coordination and resource 
management role. This resulted in die casualties treated in RASCO being left m the care o f  
the SMET members, their requirements for the medevac being inadequately considered, 
and it being conducted without a medical escort of any kind.
43. There were no evident deficiencies in the clinical skills and training o f any o f 
the personnel involved in treatment o f casualties. The SMET members in particular 
displayed a high level o f skill and professionalism, noting the essentially part-time nature 
o f  their role.
THE DEATH AND INJURY OF PERSONNEL
44. The four personnel who died m the incident did so from acute carbon
monoxide, poisoning resulting from smoke inhalation. Based on the rapidity of fire 
development and the production of smoke within a large but confined space, and noting the 
reported levels of carboxyhaemoglobin in each of the deceased, it can be concluded that all 
were unconscious within five minutes of the outbreak of the fire, and died within ten 
minutes, well before the CO: drench.
Came of Death
45. The Board finds that the causes of death were as follows:
e. Midshipman Megan Anne Pelly L i54029 Date of Birth 8 December 
1975 -  Died accidentally from acute carbon monoxide poisoning due 
to smoke inhalation m the mam machinery space of HMAS
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WESTEALIA off the coast of W eston Australia in the vicinity o f 
Perth at approximately 1045 on 5 May 98.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
£  Petty Officer Shaun Damian Smith S13825S Date of Birth 27 
November 1968 - Died accidentally from acute carbon monoxide 
poisoning due to smoke inhalation in the main machinery space o f 
HMAS WESTRAUA off the coast o f Western Australia in the 
vicinity o f Peril at approximately 1045 on 5 May 98.
g- leading Seaman Bradley John Meek S i47321 Date o f Birth 16 July 
1972 - Died accidentally from acute carbon monoxide poisoning due 
to smoke inhalation m the main machinery space o f HMAS 
WESTRAUA off the coast of Western Australia m the vicinity o f 
Perth, at approximately 1045 on 5 May 98.
h. Able Seaman Phillip John Carrol! S155254 Date o f Birth 17 June 
1974 - Died accidentally from acute carbon monoxide poisoning due 
to smoke inhalation in the mam machinery space o f HMAS 
WESTRAUA off the coast of Western Australia in the vicinity o f 
Perth at approximately 1045 on 5 May 98.
EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
46. WESTRAUA did not make any general emergency or urgency broadcast to 
alert other shipping and civilian authorities. Although the Port o f Fremantle was only 
seven nautical miles away, the Fremantle Port Authority was not asked for help or 
resources. The fact that the Port had significant firefighting resources on almost immediate 
call, was not known to the command team m WESTRAUA.
47. WESTRAUA received prompt and effective support from SUCCESS, 
ADELAIDE, ANZAC, DARWIN, SYDNEY and STIRLING, which were able to provide 
assistance within 70 minutes of the outbreak of the fire. This large number of assets was 
well coordinated by ADELAIDE. Each request for support made by WESTRAUA was 
met quickly and safely.
48. Prompt and effective additional medical support was provided by STIRLING 
{MO and CPOMED4), SUCCESS (MO), ADELAIDE (WOMED), SYDNEY (POMED4 
and ABMED3), and DARWIN (ABMED3). Additional medical equipment (Thomas 
packs, intravenous fluids and oxy-viva sets) was also provided.
49 St. John o f God Hospital, Murdock was well placed to receive the casualties
by air. triage, resuscitate and stabilise them, and, if it had proven necessary, transfer them 
to more sophisticated treatment facilities m central Perth. St. John's Ambulance provided 
two ambulances on site to cater for the possible need for transfer to another hospital.
Critical Incident Stress Management
5Q \  major critical incident stress management activity swung into operation very
shortly after the fire was extinguished. Ships m company and STIRLING provided peer 
support members, chaplains, psychologists and social workers who all provided on-site
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support. Members o f W ESTRAHA’s crew, and members from other ships who had 
assisted on board WESTRALIA, were targeted.
51. An informal ‘de-fusing’ was undertaken through the CO addressing the ship's 
company on return to Fleet Base West on the evening of the incident. An information 
session was conducted for die whole ship's company at STIRLING on 6 May, and group 
Me-briefing" was conducted at STIRLING on 7 and 8 May. This de-briefing focused on 
each individual's recounting o f their activities and was done in groups o f about 30 
personnel who had shared similar experiences on the day. The feedback from ship’s 
company was mostly favourable, although some felt it was o f little use and others attended 
against their will.
52. There was some suggestion that de-briefing conducted before personnel had 
had the opportunity to record their recollection o f events, may have exacerbated the process 
o f  "contamination" o f  evidence that can occur through witnesses discussing matters among 
themselves.
Assistance to families
53. A  comprehensive attempt to inform the next o f kin o f personnel on board was 
generally highly successful, with some families receiving more than one contact from 
authorities.. The Personal Services Officer WA, the Defence Community Organisation and 
STIRLING provided significant assistance to families during and in the days following the 
incident. Briefings, and wharfside facilities for all, and travel and accommodation 
arrangements for the relatives o f the casualties, were ail provided expeditiously and
54. There were some difficulties with notification of the next o f kin o f the 
fatalities. Although they were informed early about the missing personnel, the intense 
media interest on the day resulted in the announcement o f the deaths, but without names, 
before ail o f the next o f kin received official confirmation.
55. There was a significant chaplaincy effort involving on board provision of 
support dermg the day, and on subsequent days for both the injured and the relatives o f the 
casualties.
FIREFIGHTING AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT
56. Although the fire fighting effort was successful, the report details equipment
problems with breathing apparatus, protective clothing and safety equipment. The Board 
has made a number of observations and detailed recommendations o f a fleet wide nature on 
these issues.
MATERIEL STATE OF THE SHIP
57 M ien  WESTRALIA sailed there were a number of deficiencies in the materiel
state o f the ship. The two serious deficiencies, the flexible supply and return fuel hoses 
and the C 0 2 system, were not readily apparent. At that time, the flexible fuel lines gave no 
sum o f  any inherent flaw. The condition of the C 0 2 system, and particularly the tension of
9
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the operating wires, would only have been apparent to an expert on close inspection. At 
0900 on 5 May 98 there was no obvious materiel deficiency that should haw  prevented the 
ship from sailing.
CAUSES OF THE FIRE
Source of fuel and ignition
58. Hie fire was caused by fiiel spraying under pressure from a hole in a newly
fitted flexible fuel hose (Figure 2) on the starboard main engine coming into contact with a 
hot machinery component. A  contributing factor to the size of die fire was probably fuel 
that spilt some minutes earlier from a similar leak from a hose on the port main engine. 
The supply of fuel to the fire was reduced by the prompt shut down of the starboard engine ; 
the isolation o f electrical power to the fuel boost pump and the operation o f the remote fuel 
shut off valves. There is a possibility that fuel draining from the return line fed the fire for 
some time, albeit at a much reduced rate.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Figure 2. Hose S9R. The  inner teflon tube can be seen protruding through the 
wire braid in a fan shape. Figure 48 from Metiabs Report
59 Testing of the failed and other fuel hoses clearly demonstrated that the steel
braiding wires had" failed due to fatigue after less than 40 hours operation. The failed hoses 
had approximately 50 adjacent wires in 5 to 7 braids fractured leaving the internal teflon
tube unsupported.
Spill Pulse Pressure
60. What caused the flexible fuel lines to fatigue9 Diesel engines with jerk pumps
are known to be prone to pressure pulses m the fuel system. The most likely source of the 
fatigue loading was the action of the injector pump which releases spill pressure pulses mto 
the supply and return fines of the low pressure fuel system, with the magnitudes of lugii but 
uncertain peak value. Hie presence of these pulses is well known by the engine
10
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manufacturer and the International Maritime Organisation. There was no consultation with 
relevant experts by the contractor, subcontractor or ship’s staff. Lloyd’s Register o f 
Shipping approval o f the intended arrangements was not obtained as required in  order to 
maintain the ship’s certification, and as requested by the ship.
HOW THE FLEXIBLE FUEL HOSES CAME TO  BE FITTED
61. The new flexible fuel hoses w o e  fitted by a subcontractor to ADI l i mited 
during March and April 98. The flexible fuel hose change to the mam engines was a 
configuration change which bypassed the prescribed processes. It was not approved by 
appropriate authorities and did not comply with Lloyd’s Register o f  Shipping requirements. 
Although the hoses were capable o f  withstanding the expected static system pressure, the 
arrangement was poorly engineered and the design did not take into account dynamic 
considerations.
RAN CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
62. There were some suggestions to the Board that avoidance o f die formal 
configuration change process is widespread within the RAM. Although no real evidence o f 
widespread abuse was presented, the issue is o f sufficient concern to suggest that a review 
o f  the process is warranted.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
63. The principal organisations involved m the fuel hose work (ADI Limited, 
Enzed and Ordering Authority Western Australia) were all accredited to a quality standard. 
Evidence presented to the Board showed that the quality management systems in place 
were either inadequate or inadequately implemented to prevent the provision o f a non­
conforming product.
64. Fart o f the problem seems to be due to a lack o f rigour by both external and
internal quality auditors. The Board suggests that Defence may obtain better value for 
money in the longer term by contracting the accrediting and auditing organisations directly, 
to ensure absolute independence and minimise any possible conflict o f evidence.
SYSTEM SAFETY MANAGEMENT
65. Hie Board has attempted to take a broad view o f the causes o f the accident and
look at system issues as well as the specifics of die flexible hoses. Hie weaknesses 
exposed m evidence are symptomatic o f wider problems within the RAN and ADI Limited.
66. The lack o f knowledge displayed by some personnel is not so much a reflection 
on them personally but is an indication of an inadequate system. The inadequacies 
principally relate to training and selection o f key personnel.
II
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
61- . . Safety management on a system basis is best practice. The Board suggests that
a disciplined, systematic approach to safety be more closely embraced.
COMCARE
68. Comcare requested that the Board address certain occupational health Mid
safety issues not specifically covered by the terms of reference (Comcare letter dated 11 
May 98). These are covered in section 14 of the report.
A  cooperative relationship was established between the Board and Comcare 
representatives, in  his opening address, counsel assisting the Board invited Comcare and 
any other interested person, to bring forward any questions which they wanted counsel to 
raise; Comcare availed themselves o f this request on one occasion. AM requests by 
Comcare to the Board for copies o f documents provided to the Board have been met.
RECOGNITION OF PERSONNEL
70. The Board concluded that among many exceptional performances on the day o f
the fire, some personnel should be singled out for special mention and recognition. The 
proposals relating to such recognition are in section IS of the report.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
71. The fire m HMAS 'WESTRALIA on 5 May 1998 was caused by diesel fuel 
from, a burst flexible hose spraying onto a hot engine component and then igniting. Hie 
hose was one of a number o f new flexible hoses supplied by the ship's support contractor, 
ADI Limited, to replace the original rigid pipes, hi the Board's view, the hoses were not 
properly designed and were unfit for the intended purpose.
72. A  change of this type should have been processed through the RAM 
configuration change process as well as being approved by the ship’s classification society, 
Lloyds Register. Both processes were bypassed, largely as a result o f ignorance and 
incompetence. Key personnel within the RAM1, and more particularly ADI Limited, were 
not adequately trained or qualified for the responsibilities placed on them. Regardless of 
the scrutiny that was avoided by bypassing these approval processes, ADI Limited should 
have taken steps to ensure that a safe, properly engineered product was supplied for a 
demanding application: it demonstrably failed to do so.
73. The four personnel who died m the fire did so as a result of acute carbon 
monoxide toxicity consequent upon inhalation o f fire fumes. From the rapid increase in the 
magnitude o f the fire and consequent production of smoke and fumes, the Board is able to 
conclude that incapacitation occurred within five minutes and death within 10 minutes of 
the outbreak o f the conflagration and well before the CO- drench.
74. Hie dangerous and difficult fire m the main machinery space of WESTRALIA 
was fought heroically and effectively by the ship's crew. There were many acts of bravery 
and exceptional performances on the day. The Board has identified a number of personnel
12
276
in  the recommendations whom it believes should be singled out for special recognition. 
The choke has been difficult.
75. WESTRALIA received excellent support from a wide variety o f  sources and it 
w as most welcome but not used to its frill potential. The ship's crew can take great pride in 
the fact that they saved their ship. Tragically, nothing further could have been done by 
them to save their shipmates.
76. The Board’s many recommendations have been drafted with the dear aim of 
preventing a  re-occurrence and making life at sea safer. Unfortunately, there can be no 
guarantees that fire can be totally avoided in what is inherently a dangerous environment.
77. The Board has made 114 recommendations. "The most important, as far as
WESTRALIA is concerned, are associated with the main engine fuel supply, the fixed 
firefighting system, escape routes from die main machinery space and training of 
personnel. O n a RAM wide basis, the recommendations o f  most significance are filose 
relating to configuration management the use o f fixed firefighting systems and the training
13
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A U T H O R IS A T IO N
The President and Members o f the Board o f Inquiry into die fire in HMAS WESTRATIA 
on 5 M ay 98 confirm that we unanimously support the findings, conclusions and 
recommendations presented in this executive summary and volume 1 of the official report.
L. Cuneo
Assistant Chief Officer,
Fire and Rescue Service of WA 
Member
C.W. Film:
Commonwealth Department of Workplace 
Relations and Small Business 
Member
E G. W alsh 
Commander, RAN 
Member
R.B. Schedlich 
Captain, RAN 
Member
R. Lamacraft 
Commodore, RAN 
President
2 £  August 1998
A ppendix B. A pproval to  undertake project from  the U niversity  o f  
W ollongong/Illaw arra A rea H ealth  Service H um an Ethics com m ittee.
INITIAL APPLICATION APPROVAL 
In reply please quote: HE05/264
Further Enquiries Phone: 4221 445?
28 November 2005
Mr Stephen Rayner 
9 Royee Avenue 
Croydon 2131
Dear Mr Rayner
I am pleased to advise that the Human Research Ethics application referred to below has been 
approved.
Ethics Number: HE05/264
Project Title: A personal construct theory exploration of the impact of
psychological trauma among navy personnel
Name of Researchers: Mr Stephen Rayner
Approval Date: 15 November 2005
Expiryr Date: 14 November 2006
This certificate relates to the research protocol submitted in your original application as modified in 
your letter of 11/11/05. As a condition of approval, the Human Research Ethics Committee requires 
that researchers immediately report:
* proposed changes to the protocol including changes to investigators involved
* serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants
* unforseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project.
You are also required to complete monitoring reports annually and at the end of your project. These 
reports are sent out approximately 6 weeks prior to the date your ethics approval expires. The 
reports must be completed, signed by the appropriate Head of School, and returned to the Research 
Sendees Office prior to the expiry date.
Yours Sincerely,
Dr Garry Hoban 
Chairperson
Human Research Ethics Committee
cc: Prof. Linda Vmey. Psychology
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A ppendix C. A pproval to  undertake project by the Australian D efence H um an Research
Ethics Com m ittee.
Australian Goveroinerii
Department of Defertidc
Defcn.cc Personnel Executive DEFENCE HEALTH 
SERVICES
CP2-7-0&8 Qirrrphrf] piirif 
CANBHRKA A i'f  26IKI
PR 2005/1070655 
ADHREC 404/0.5 
DHSB >2005
Mr Stephen Rsyner
Psychology .
Balmoral Naval Hospital
HMAS PENGUIN - Middle Head Road
VfOSMAN NSW 208-H
I
| Dear M r Rayner
| AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
I (ADHREC) PROTOCOL 404/05!« A PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY
1 EXPLORATION OF THE IMPACT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TRA UMA
| AMONG NAVY PERSON NEU*
j 1. Thank you for providing the requested amendments to your protocol, which
\ have been sited and approved by the Executive. ADHREC has rajw ekaxed your
project to proceed. Please note chat ethical clearance ikua ADHREC does not 
automatically confer access to ADF personnel; this w ill have to 1« sought from the 
relevant military commanders.
2. Your protocol has been allocated ADHREC Protocol Number 494/05* and this 
number should be quisled in all coirespondenec. Your protocol has been approved for a 
period o f three years. I f  your research is m  continue over the three-year approval time, 
ADI 1RHC approval for an extension is to be sought in writing.
3. .41)1 IRIiC requires you to provide six-monthly progress reports are required, the 
first being due on 25 April 2(K)h. ADHREC’ s compliance with the NHMRC National 
Km em ens on Eihfcot C ondua in Research Im olving Himcms requires that your 
progress reports include, where applicable, comment on: the security o f your records: 
compliance with the approved consent procedures and documentation* and compliance
i with any other special conditions thyi ADHREC mav have required.I ' ‘
I 4. I f  your protocol requires any modification, A1>11RKC approval must be sought in
writing, detailing all modifications requited,
5„ For Clinical trials, ADHREC is to be notified in writing of all Serious Advene 
Events within 72  hours of the event occurring
6, For completeness, would you please sign the enclosed researchers agreement 
and return it to me at your convenience. 1 have also enclosed ADHREC !s Guidelines 
for Volunteers, a copy o f which is lo be given k  each study participant.
bafamUtsfi Auftrtflu ¿113 is .''.ofcv'b" V.iVssii
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7. The Committee wishes you well with your research. Please contact me if 1 can 
be of any assistance.
Yours sincerely,
DR R.A LANDY
Executive Secretary
Australian Defence Human Research Ethics Cormriitiee 
CP2-7-068
Campbell Park Offices 
CANBERRA ACT 2600
Tel (02) 62663S3 7 
Fax (02) 62664982 
E-mai 1: A Di i R ECfaideJ encc. gov,a u
01 October 2007
Annex:
A. ADHREC R esearchers Agreem ent 
R. AD1JREC G u id e lin e *  fa r  Vrtfuttteer.s'
ObAhsPng AwtwttS SV .1» iVfiPCiSf
Appendix D. Letter inviting potential participants to volunteer for the project.
Australian Government
Depart merit of Defence
Defence Personnel E&eeutive
Minute
Eels»» -«sir» s&stes*
REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO PSYCHOLOGY FILES FOR RESEARCH 
PURPOSES
1. In Sep 2002 the Maritime Commander sponsored a project to undertake a mental 
health review of all serving RAM personnel from FIMAS WHSTRAIJ A during the fatal 
fire in May 1998. This review was overseas by LEUT Sieve Raynor, a reserve Clinical 
Psychologist, who also conducted the majority of screening and interviews.
2. During the review process, many personnel expressed an interest that some 
research be umten&ken to understand the longer-term psyc hological impact of the lire on 
personnel involved, As Clinical Psychologist, Balmoral Naval Hospital. Mr Steve Raynor 
has commenced a research project to both better understand the impact of the fire on 
WiFSTRAf J A personnel, arid develop a model of psychological Irauma and key 
mitigating factors, using inibnnalkwt from those involved in the fire. This project will be 
jointly undertaken by the ADF Mental Health Strategy and the University of Wollongong, 
where Mr Rayner Is Andy mg toward, a Doctorate of Clinical Psychology.
3. In order to undertake- this project. Mr Rayner would like to access the psychology 
files of personnel who undertook screening between 2002 and 2005. Mr Rayner does riot 
require the involvement of an y person other than to grant permission to access and copy 
data (lest results, questionnaire answers and narratives) contained in individual’s- 
psychology recoivls. Mr Rayner. as principal researcher, will copy data, removing all 
personally identifying information (retaining demographic information such as gender, 
rank-group, age, and department), "this data will then be subject to analysis. A «port 
indicating and discussing the impact of the lire degree of traumatic stress and the process 
of psychological trauma will be produced. The more data made available by personnel, 
the better the outcome of the report.
4. All that is required of personnel is to grant permission for the principal researcher 
to yecos their psychology life* ui cxirua « copy ufdalu for analysis. This proved will be 
subject to ethical scrutiny by the Australian Defence Human Research Ethics Coimiiitxcc 
(ADHREC) and the University of Wollongong's Human Research Ethics Committee.
5. Yo«r part in the Study.
* Participants are asked to giant access to their psychological files to extract dal» 
rebjled In ¡-heir involvement in the lire in WF5TRALIA. Tins is the only 
requirement oipamcipttRb,
0<sfcrt<tong At«tnr4w jnct.fc .NoVoon1 tnre.'&ir
* Participation in the study is entirely voluntary; there is no obligation to take part in 
the study, it'you choose not to participate there wilt he no detriment to your career 
or future health care;
* You may withdraw at any time with no detriment to your career or to your future 
health care;
6, Risks uff participating, The reminder of the Incident, the awareness of its impact 
on yourself and others and the awareness of this study arc the only risks to participants. 
As you arc only granting access to existing files, there i$ no additional interviewing or 
intrusion required. Therefore, it is anticipated that there should be little discomfort to 
participants,
1. On duly. Australian Defence Force members will be considered ‘on duty' during 
participation (that is, while considering participation and completing this consent 
process).
k. Statement of Privacy. Information on ADF Psychology files is “PSYCHOLOGY« 
DN-OONFIDENCB” and stored accordingly. Information used in this study will be 
extracted and stored under the same conditions. As data is copied from ADF Psychology 
files, all personally Identifying information (name, number, date of birth etc) will be 
replaced by the chief foscarcher with a simple and unique code number to ensure 
anonymity especially during interaction with other research personnel (although 
demographic details such as age, gender, rank-grouping and department will lie retained 
to help understand the experience of Ihe fire on difleront groups). The key to this code 
will be classified “PSYCHOLOGY-IK-CONFIDENCE“ and stored accordingly. Mo-one 
other than the chief researcher will have access to this code.
Information used in this study will be used for the purpose of tins study only and no other, 
without the express permission of the individual.
9« Contact Details for tbb study.
Chief Investigator
Mr Stephen Raynor 
Clinical Psychologist 
Balmoral Naval Hospital 
Middle Head Road 
Mosman NSW 2088
Tel: 02 9960 0534
E-Mail: Stephen,rayncrl @dcfcncc.gov.au
Academie Superviser 
Àssociate Profes-sor Linda Viney 
Dept oJ Psychology 
Uni verni ty of Woilongong
NorthfieWs Avenue 
Wollougong NSW 2522
Tek 92 4221 4609 
E-Mail; lvincy@uow.cdu.au
GefwHiïriÿ AtisfraiVa aie1 .fe Ssnx-a.1 *<irsrssr
10, Should you have any comptaims or concerns about the warmer in which this project 
is conducted, piense do not hesitate to contact the researchers in person, or you may prefer 
to contact the Australian Ddence Human Research Ethics Committee at the following 
address:
Executive Secretary
Australia« Defence Human Research Ethics Committee 
CP2-7-66
Department of Defence 
CANBERRA ACT 2600 
Telephone: (02) 6266 3837 
facsimile: (02) 6266 4982 
Email: ADHREC@defence.gov.au
a j cotton
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Appendix E. Impact o f  Events Scale -  Revised (IES-R)
S T U D Y  ID H
IMPACT OF m m t  SCALE-REVISED ...............
Instructions: n»ioltow j»g is a list of difficulties people sonnetimes have oiler stressful life events. Picasc resd 
esefe item, and then indicate bow distressing each difficulty km  been for you i-faring the ptnf 7 days with respect 
to the disaster. How much were you distressed or bothered by these difficulties?
1 Any reminder brought hack feelings about it
Not 
tri ¡di
0
A
linfe
bit
1
Modo
late­
ly
2
Quito a
bit
3
F.*-
tremc-
ly
4
2 I ted trouble staying asleep. 0 ? 2 3 4
3 Other things kept making me think about it 0 1 2 3 4
4 1 fell irritable and angry. 0 1 2 3 4
fi 1 avoided letti ng myse lf got upset when f drought about it or was 
reminded o f it,
0 1 •> 3 4
fi 1: thought about it when I didn’t mean tn. 0 1 2 3 4
7 I felt as if it hadn't happened or wasn't real, 0 1 2 3 4
8 1 stayed away from reminders about it. 0 1 2 3 4
9 Pictures, about it popped into rny mind, 0 1 2 3 4
H) 1 was jumpy arid easily startled. 0 i -> 3 4
li 1 tried not to think a bout it, 0 i 2 3 •1
1 2 1 was aware that ! still ted a lot of feelmp about it but i <Mtf t 
deal with them,
0 i 3 4
13 My feelings about it were k i rid of numb,. 0 Ì 2 2 4
14 I found myself acting or feeling like 1 was back at that time. G 1 2 3 4
IS T had trouble falling asleep. G i 3 ■1
16 I had wtsves of strung feelings about it G l 'S j 4
17 Ï tried to remove k from my memory. G 1 2 3 4
m ! had trouble concentrai ing. G 1 2 - 4
19 RettiiliiJers of it caused me to have physical reactions. £>uch as
sweating, trouble breathing, nausea, or a pounding heart.
G 1 *> 3 4
2 0 i had dreams about it. 0 i 2 J 4
2.1 1 felt wstfhti.il and oa guard. G 1 2 3 4
T? I tried nut to talk about it. G 1 2 j 4
Appendix F. Posttraumatic Check List -  Civilian version (PCL-C)
PS Y  CHO LO G Y-1N-CO N R D E N C E  (a fte r nm t  entry)
SYMPTOMS QUESTIONNAIRE (PCL-C)
2;
3.
4
5,
a.
7
a.
9,
10. 
11.
12.
13.
14.
| 15.
|
!
16.
17.
DimCTtONS: ~~~------------------------------- -
Sstoiv is « Hst affKobtems ami complaints Ifcsipeqpfg $om 8m $ htm  in 
re5pQ75© io stressivi iVfs experiences. P ie s s e  r&ad Sach one and theft 
indicale how much you ham bean bothered by that problem in the past month.
Repeated disturbing ffWiOdes, thoughts m  «rwgeeof i  'ifcSSG häe«?¿ n s i  f.-0 -n 
tbs past?
Repeated, distarbiag dmams of a strsssty  «■persons» from ths past?
Busdenly sctiug of teem s  as ir a sfregatili eogserfense from  ihe psm  were happening 999ÌR fa? ? yoe we reiving K}?
Feeling w y  spserwhsn 'twm&sd'yov s i  3  s i ìs s s fc  sapenero& «tre
the past?
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
o
o
o
o
Kawig mxSons (eg: btwwi poandiag, usui*« breaking, WM&atrigi when
soimeting ratmrdèd yau of a drsääfo! aspettarne frem tee pssi?
AvaHteg ttìhmg aeeuf or ts&togaòsnt-a slressful etòeriertpe tran the pas; or 
a wising tm m s fetóws reatec to it?
AvoMing estMVes or sSsasions because they 'emirdcd y&j of a -slree-sful 
experience from ih» past?
0 0 0 0  0
0 0 0
00
0 0 0 0  0
Trautste rasMcnòeni^r ü s p s ^ r i f /» ife .a# * stressful ©sortene® from the pesi? 
t o s i  o f  vdmtesi in acHviies t M  y p i use® te  e i^ jy?
FsPmg rftstao! or csf off frerp ornar p&opia?
Feeling ermìèmiy numb or fcefcg unable te have iovìng feelings tenhase c»se to you?
o
o
o
o
0 0 0 ■0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Peetog ss if your future aomshcrA- wiit.be cui shorf? 
Troiate fäiYfog or sfeyitg asteea?
Fasiiitg àiHehle Of hairing angry isynhursfs?
Hawing dOfcwity csvwftafàt#?
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Seifig stipsrsAsii'or v̂fdifui or<in guars? 
Feeling iumpy or easily fituiiieff?
OFFICE USE ONLY
O O O O
O O O O
“ 1  ~ I L _
Ü
o
XI X2 XÌ
PS YC H O LO G Y-! N -C O N FID E N C E (after firs t entry)
A ppendix G. G eneral H ealth  Q uestionnaire -  28 item  version
THE
GENERAL HEALTH 
QUESTIONNAIRE
GHQ28
___________________________ David Goldberg
Pî*àsô read this carefully.
We should like to know if you hâve had any medics! complaints and how your health has been in 
general, over the past few weeks. Please answer ALL the questions on the following pages simply by 
underlining the answer which you think most nearly applies to you. Remember that we went to know 
shout present and recent com plaint», not those that y ou had in the past.
It is important that you try to answer ALL the questions.
Thank you vary much for your co-operation.
Have you recently
A1 - been feeling perfectly well and in 
good health?
Bettor . 
than usual
Sams 
as usual
Worse 
than usual
Much worse 
than usu al
■A2 ~ been feeling in need of a good 
tonic?
Not 
at all
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
A » - been feeling run down end not of 
sorts?
Not
at all
No more
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
A4- felt that you era 111? No! 
at a If
No more 
than usual
Bather mors 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
A S - bean getting any pains in 
yourhead?
Not 
at all
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
AS- been getting a feeling of tightness 
or pressure in your head?
Not
stall
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much mom 
than usual
A7 - been having hot or cold spells? Not 
at all
No more
than usual Rather more than usual
Much more 
than usual
81 - lost much sleep over worry? Not
stall
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
82 - had difficulty in staying asleep 
ones you are off?
Not
stall
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
S3 - felt constantly under strain? Notatatl
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
84 - bee» getting edgy and 
bad-tempered?
Not
stall
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
85 - bees getting scared m  panicky for no good reason?
Not 
at all
No more 
than usual
Bather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
88 - found everything getting on top of you?
Not 
at all
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usua?
Much more 
than usual
B7 - bs»?i foaling nervous and strung-up all the time?
Not
at all
No more 
than usual
Bather more 
than usual
Much more 
Ilian usual
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ydu'recently
Cl - b««m managing to keep yourself 
busy and occupied?
More? so 
than usual
Same 
as usual
Rather less 
than usual
Much less 
than usual
€2. bean taking iongerovar the things
you do?
Quicker 
than usual
&arm> 
as usual
Longer 
than usual
Much longer 
than u&uO'
C3 — Lett o r? tbs whole yoy were doing 
things well?
Belter 
than usual
About 
the same
Los« well 
than usual
Much 
lass well
C4 — been satisfied with the way 
you've carried outy our task?
Mora
satisfied
About same 
as usual
Less satisfied 
than usual
Much less 
satisfied
CS — felt that you are playing a useful 
part in things?
Mora so 
than usual
Same 
asusual
Less useful 
than usual
Much less 
useful
C6 — felt capable of making decisions 
about things?
More so 
than usual
Same 
as usual
Less so 
than usuai
Much less 
capable
C? -  been able to enjoy your normal 
day-to-day activities?
Mora so 
than usual
Same 
as usual
Less so 
than usual
Much less 
than usual
PI — b«en thinking of yourself m  a 
wortMo$$ person?
Mot 
at all
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
D2 -  fait that life is entirely hopeless? Not 
at all
No more , 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
D3 -  felt that life isn't worth living? Not 
at all
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
04 -  thought of the possibility that you 
might make away with yourself?
Definitely
not
¡don't 
think so
Has crossed 
my mind
Definitely
have
D5 -  found at times you couldn’t do 
anything because your nerves 
were too bed?
Not 
at ail
Mo more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
M uch more 
than usual
DS— foundyourself wishing yo« were 
dead and away from it ail?
Not 
at all
No more 
than usual
Rather more 
than usual
Much more 
than usual
07  — fbund that the Idea of taking your
own life kept coming into your mind?
Definitely
not
1 don't 
think so
Has crossed 
my mind
Definitely
has
B C S 0  j | TOTAL
______ 1 L_____J :
>)i (X -huMbcrti & The Institute Psychiatry, 1381
!>«?, » y <  may net ha repradut&f oy a??y means, 
even wiliii-t lerns ;i! » ''hiUn^opyinw Licence,
»vi; hoist ¡h i: w r i'le n  siii'ini'.ir.ior; :il ihc  :i>ibl ;;Ii :m .
l-'.iblishr:»: by nlwWii'-sar P.; bln; I liny C:pnpany Lb I, 
r >•..! ch ewier CrMi'rm, 4 U  0 -isw't k I tig- Road, LuiwJini W4  BT7
11f■—t MisH-rm is »  d iv : !ii(;n of t i r a r » U »  L e e i ’ iiiiy  Lirnitsrfl. 
p3 i: u  ‘HisntSii.% (di:.
fi.-i-t cm) isr(e-'j
nferNeison
o m ii.iiri
ncvmcwm<, i7.03)
A ppendix H. A lcohol U se D isorder Identification Test (A U D IT)
P S Y C H Q L O G Y -IN -C D N R D E M C E  ( « f t p  firs t entry]
ALCOHOL QUESTIONNAIRE
in answering ftaa fcdowing qiwasttorra, pisase ««¡rvem&er mat a standard dürfe coßi&vhs I0g ¡¿pure afcabsi
Each of theso is a standard dmk; 1 mfeklyfpot of standard bear; t  glass of 'Aine, 1 glass af sherry-, % -iip ef spirks.
Mtusrr Ohosa 
m em  -a 
tesa
2 te 1 
■srres a 
irwtl*
2to3
Irra* g 
*eek
¿ter
nOT
ii-ness
t. dew often so  you heva a  drink comsifilrg alcohol? 0 O O 0 0
■? sr$ 5 or 6 '  e» S löcr
rupTB
2, How many ‘standard* drinks (sea above} cs-nfaimrtp skahe*
dcj yais have ms 3. typical 4-9’i  wrier yoii ane iMnkirg? 0 0 0 O 0
M»«" Less «fcrmv v\teokiy QÄiV sX
0 ^  $ 
•TWTÍT
éaiîy
3. hOW Ofteé dû y<iti hare s.k or "Pure ùririks un or:« 
occasion'? O O 0 0 0
4, h w  often during the Iasi3 marths have you toui?d that you 
war® not state 1o stop drinking cnoe you bad started? O O 0 0 0
5. how often during the last3 morths hare you failed to so  
•„vhai w st normally expected freer you because of 
drinking?
0 O 0 0 0
Q. bCW Often during the I&S! 3 rnaitks have you needed a 
drhk. in frs n w nm g to get yomrsaif going altar a heavy 
drinking session?
0 O 0 0 0
}
!
7< how often during the teal 3 month® have you had a feeling 
j of guik or remorse after drinking? 0 O 0 0 O
i 8. hew cite« during the Iasi 3 month® have you beets unatoa 
Î ta remsTiber what bapgerasd trié nighj before beer.»®  
i you had been dmkingi
0 O 0 0 0  !
Nc Yes, fefct rc# in 
iflÄ IdÇsT C*
Yfi5. fltring if ö I 
!bsî S nwnihs ;
; 9, have you or someone eise  been Mured as a  resuft of your 
i dmkirrg? 0 0 0  j
? 1D. has a relative, a ftterid, a desdor ¿<r outer heatih
professional been concerted about your drinking or 
BUsxsaâtad you cm down?
0 Q 0  ■
riio HnÆcWy 
r ré
Ursnr® PvMS M;,‘ r̂ *:rîm$$5 ?
v i
? 1 1 . Do ycu think you presently hare 9 sfostem with drinking? 0 O 0 0 °
W y r<jsy her» er hary
sesv eas-y dfflaüt iiTte-n
OQ< Way
VarySîST̂M
1 i  In ih» r«xt J monins. Njw difficult would you fl«<J lt 10 CMt 
dawn ai fitdp drinking ? _____________________ O O O O___O
PSYCHOLOGY-IN-CONFIDENCE (after first entry}
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Appendix I. Psychometric properties of the IES-R, the PCL-C, the GHQ-28 and the
AUDIT.
Table 16.
Psychometric Properties o f the IES-R.
Psychometric and Reference Evidence
IES-R internal consistency
Weiss & Mannar (1997) .92 for Intrusion, .85 for avoidance, and .89 for hyperarousal.
Asukai, Kato, Kawamura, Kim, Internal consistency of the whole scale, and three subscales of a
Yamamoto, Kishimoto, Miyake and Japanese-language version ranged from 0.80 to 0.95
Nishizono-Maher (2002). (Cronbach’s alpha).
Creamer, Bell and Failla (2003) High internal consistency for the whole scale (Cronbach’s
alpha=0.96) and internal consistency between scales ranging 
from 0.52 to 0.94.
IES-R test-retest reliability
Weiss & Marmar (1997) At five months, intrusion subscale = .94, avoidance subscale =
.89 & hyperarousal subscale = .92
Asukai, Kato, Kawamura, Kim, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of r=.86, p=.0001, over
Yamamoto, Kishimoto, Miyake and administration of the questionnaire over a two week period,
Nishizono-Maher (2002). indicating good test-retest reliability.
IES-R predictiveness
Asukai, Kato, Kawamura, Kim, Sensitivity of .75 and specificity of .71
Yamamoto, Kishimoto, Miyake and 
Nishizono-Maher (2002).
Creamer, Bell and Failla (2003) Sensitivity 0.91; specificity 0.82; positive predictive power of
0.90; negative predictive power of 0.84.
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Table 16 continued.
IES-R validity
Weiss & Marmar (1997)
Brandes, Ben-Schachar, Gilboa, 
Bonne, Freedman & Shalev (2002) 
Hull, Alexander & Klein (2002)
Creamer, Bell and Failla (2003) 
Feinstein, Owen & Blair (2002) 
Ohtani, Iwanami, Kasai, Yamasue, 
Kato, Sasaki and Kato (2004)
Berg, Grieger & Spira (2005)
Hughes, Cameron, Eldridge, 
Devon, Wessely & Greenberg 
(2005)
Used to assess PTSD symptoms in US emergency services 
workers and victims of earthquakes.
Distinguished between high and low PTSD symptoms in recent 
trauma survivors.
Used to measure PTSD symptoms in UK survivors of a fatal oil 
platform fire 10 years after the event.
Correlation with PCL of .84
Distinguished between war journalists and controls.
Used to assess PTSD symptoms in victims of 1995 Sarin Gas 
attack of Tokyo subway. Significant correlation between IES-R 
scores and the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS), a 
structured interview to diagnose PTSD (for current PTSD, 
r=0.521, p<0.01 and for lifetime PTSD, r=0.418, p<0.05).
Used to screen for PTSD in US Navy personnel involved in a 
potentially fatal accident.
Used to screen for mental health in UK military personnel 
before and after deployment to Iraq in 2004.
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Table 17.
Psychometric Properties of the PCL-C.
Psychometric and Reference Evidence
PCL-C internal consistency
Keane, Newman & Orsillo (1997) Cronbach’s alpha = .86
PCL-C predictiveness
Newman, Kaloupek & Keane (1996) 
Keane, Newman & Orsillo (1997) 
Andrykowski, Cordova, Studts & 
Miller (1998)
Ventureyra, Yao, Cottraux, Note and 
De Mey-Guillard (2002)
Lang, Laffaye, Satz, Dresselhaus and 
Stein (2003)
Sensitivity of .82, specificity .83 
Excellent sensitivity .94, but poor specificity .48 
In cancer patients, sensitivity and specificity for cutoff of 
50 was .60 and .99, and sensitivity and specificity for 
cutoff of 30 was 1.00 and .83.
Sensitivity and specificity for cutoff of 50 was .84 and .90, 
and for cutoff of 44 was .97 and .87.
Very high sensitivity (.94), tolerable specificity (.68) and 
lowest rate of false negatives, was raw score of 28-30 -  
with female military veterans.
PCL-C test-re-test reliability
Ventureyra, Yao, Cottraux, Note and Test-retest reliability over 1 -2 weeks was .80
De Mey-Guillard (2002)
Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti and 
Rabalais (2003)
Test-retest reliability was established for 1 hour (.92, 
p<.001), 1 week (.88, pc.001) and 14 days (.68, pc.001).
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Table 17 continued.
PCL-C validity
Keane, Newman & Orsillo (1997)
Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich & 
Batres (1997)
Andrykowski, Cordova, Studts & 
Miller (1998)
Forbes, Creamer and Biddle (2001)
Ventureyra, Yao, Cottraux, Note and 
De Mey-Guillard (2002)
Barrett, Doebbeling, Schwartz, 
Voelker, Falter, Woolson & 
Doebbeling (2002)
Creamer, Bell and Failla (2003) 
Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti and 
Rabalais (2003)
Rayner (2003)
Evans, McHugh, Hopwood & Watt 
(2003)
Kang, Natei son, Mahan, Lee & 
Murphy (2003)
Correlates .93 with Mississippi PTSD scale, .77 with 
MMPI-2-PK scale, & .90 with Impact of Events Scale. 
Used with Israeli soldiers deployed in Lebanon and Yom 
Kippur wars.
Used score of 50+ to identify PTSD in US peacekeepers 
from Somalia.
Used score of 50+ to identify PTSD in cancer survivors.
Used to measure change in PTSD symptoms in Australian 
Vietnam veterans. Correlations between the PCL and the 
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS -  described as 
the ‘gold standard’ in assessing PTSD) ranged from .30 
(p<.001) to .62 (p<.001).
Successfully identified PTSD in mostly female adult 
patients seeking hospital treatment for trauma related 
symptoms.
Used to screen for PTSD symptoms in US military 
veterans of the 1991 Gulf war.
Correlation with IES-R of .84
Correlations between total scores on the PCL-C and the 
IES was .77 (pc.OOl) and between total scores on the PCL- 
CandMSC, .82 (p<.001).
Used to screen for PTSD in Australian Navy personnel 
Used the PCL-M to assess PTSD symptoms in Vietnam 
veterans and their partners.
Used to estimate current prevalence of PTSD in US 
veterans of the 1991 Gulf War.
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Table 17 continued.
Steindl, Young, Creamer & Crompton Used to measure current, specific PTSD symptoms in male
(2003) combat veterans predominantly from the Vietnam war.
McKenzie, Ikin, McFarlane, Creamer, Successfully identified PTSD in mostly male, Navy
Forbes, Kelsall, Glass, Ittak, and Sim, members of the Australian Defence Force who participated
(2004) in the 1991 Gulf War, and controls.
Black & White (2005) Used item score of 3 or more to determine DSM-IV
diagnosis of PTSD in cancer survivors.
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Table 18.
Psychometric Properties of the GHQ-28.
Psychometric and Reference Evidence
GHQ-28 predictiveness
Goodchild and Duncan-Jones (1985)
Koeter, van den Brink & Ormel 
(1989)
Goldberg & Williams (1991)
Richard, Lussier, Cagnon & Lamarche 
(2004)
Whaley, Morrison, Payne, Fritschi & 
Wall (2005)
Using CGHQ rather than GHQ scoring increases sensitivity 
(from 73.5% to 84.0%), specificity (from 76.4% to 80.2%), and 
produced a more normal distribution of GHQ scores than the 
traditional scoring system (where the distribution is skewed). 
Sensitivity for patients with and without chronic complaints of 
1.00, and misclassification rate of.27 for patients with chronic 
complaints of .27 and .25 for patients without chronic 
complaints.
Reports 12 studies claiming sensitivity ranging from .44 to 1.00 
(median .86) and specificity ranging from .74 to .93 (median 
.82)
GHQ scoring appropriate for assessing transient conditions, 
while CGHQ scoring more appropriate to assessing chronic 
conditions
Using CGHQ scoring rather than GHQ scoring increases 
sensitivity (from 61% to 85%) and marginally improvement 
specificity (when comparable sensitivity in maintained).
GHQ-28 test-retest reliability
Goldberg & Williams (1991) Reported at .90 for stroke patients, after 8 months.
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Table 18 continued.
GHQ-28 validity
Goldberg & Williams (1991)
Westerink & Giarratano (1999) 
Cardozo, Vergara, & Gotway (2000)
Alexander & Klein (2001)
Hull, Alexander & Klein (2002)
Feinstein, Owen & Blair (2002)
Richard, Lussier, Cagnon & Lamarche 
(2004)
Fraguas, Terân, Conejo-Galindo, 
Medina, Sainz Corton, Ferrando, 
Gabriel, & Arango (2006)
Report three studies comparing GHQ-28 reports to interview 
measures of morbidity, with correlations ranging from .67 to .83 
(median .76).
Distinguishes family of Vietnam veterans from controls 
Used to assess nonspecific mental morbidity among civilians 
Kosovar Albanians, following the 1998 war in Kosovo. GHQ-28 
scores distinguished internally displaced people from those not 
displaced.
Used to assess general psychopathology in UK ambulance 
workers exposed to critical incidents.
Used to assess general psychopathology in UK survivors of a 
fatal oil platform fire 10 years after the event.
Depression subscale distinguished between war journalists and 
controls.
Valid as a screen for disorder in primary health settings.
Used to collect subjective changes in perception of 
psychological health experienced by victims and families of 
2004 Madrid train bombing.
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Table 19.
Psychometric Properties of the AUDIT.
Psychometric and Reference Evidence
AUDIT internal consistency
Daeppen, Yersin, Landry, Pecoud and internal validity .85, reliability .8
Decrey (2000).
Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, describes inter-item reliability at .86
Maristela &. Monteiro (2001)
AUDIT predictiveness
Saunders, Aasland, Babor, de la 
Fuente, & Grant (1993)
Coni grave, Hall and Saunders (1995)
Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders & 
Monteiro (2001)
Reinert and Allen (2002)
Selin (2003)
Sensitivity and specificity for hazardous consumption / 
recurrent intoxication was .97 and .78 respectively; for 
abnormal drinking behaviour, .96 and .81 respectively; for 
alcohol related problems in the last year, .95 and .85 
respectively; and for a combined index of hazardous and 
harmful alcohol use was .92 and .94.
Australian primary health care settings. Using a cutoff of 8+, 
they detected 94.9% of participants with current social or 
medical problems related to alcohol (specificity 87.9%), 
93.6% with hazardous alcohol intake (specificity 80.6%), and 
97.0% with frequent drinking likely to result in intoxication 
(specificity 78.3%).
Sensitivity in the mid- .90s and specificities averaging in the 
.80s, primary health care patients from six countries.
Sensitive and specific, performing at a level at least 
comparable to, if not higher than, other scales. Is relatively 
free of cultural bias, and is reliable, valid and practical 
Sensitivity .91 and specificity .91 in a general population 
sample.
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Table 19 continued.
AUDIT test-retest reliability
Daeppen, Yersin, Landry, Pecoud and Retest reliability over 6 weeks was .88 (p<0.001 ),
Decrey (2000).
Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders & Retest reliability of .86.
Monteiro (2001)
Selin (2003) 91 % of all respondent were classified the same way as either
high risk or not high risk at administrations one month apart.
AUDIT validity
Harnett, Herring, Thom & Kelly 
(1999)
Daeppen, Yersin, Landry, Pecoud and 
Decrey (2000)
Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, 
Maristela &. Monteiro (2001)
Kypri, McGee, Saunders, Langley, 
and Dean, (2002)
Rumpf, Hapke, Meyer and John 
( 2002)
Forbes, Creamer, Allen, Elliot, 
McHugh, Debenam, & Hopwood 
(2003)
Forbes, Bennett, Biddle, Crompton, 
McHugh, Elliot & Creamer (2005) 
McKenzie, McFarlane, Creamer, Ikin, 
Forbes, Kelsall, Clarke, Glass, Ittak, 
and Sim, (2006)
Coulton, Drummond, James, Godfrey, 
Bland, Parrott & Peters (2006)
Used to screen for alcohol problems in young men.
AUDIT maintained good psychometric properties when 
imbedded into a broader health screen and reinforced the use 
of a cutoff score of 8+ to indicate problematic drinking. 
Large correlations with other measures of alcohol abuse (.88 
with MAST, and .78 with CAGE).
AUDIT more appropriate for clinical screening than large 
population sampling due to interpretations of questions. 
AUDIT more appropriate for clinical screening than large 
population sampling due to interpretations of questions.
Used to assess alcohol use in Australian Vietnam veterans.
Used to assess alcohol use and therapeutic improvement after 
treatment, in Australian Vietnam veterans, and peacekeepers. 
Used to assess hazardous or harmful alcohol use in Australian 
Navy veterans of the 1991 Gulf war.
Effective as a screen for alcohol problems in primary care.
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Appendix J. Comparison of mental health in Westralia survivors, with similar samples 
who experienced potentially traumatic events.
Table 20.
Rates o f PTSD in Westralia survivors compared with similar samples.
Study Measurement Sample Rate of PTSD
Westralia IES-R 4 months military -  navy 38.64%
IES-R 11 months military -  navy 30.36%
PCL-C 4-6 years military -  navy 16.00%
APA (DSM-IV) general population 1-14%
high risk community 3-58%
Berg, Grieger and Spira (2005) IES-R 7 months military -  navy 9%
Grieger, Fullerton and Ursano (2003) IES-R general population 14%
Rayner (2005) PCL-C military navy 1.40%
McKenzie, Ikin, McFarlane, Creamer, Forbes,
Kelsall, Glass, Ittak, and Sim (2004) PCL-S 10 years military navy war 7.90%
military navy control 4.6%
Barrett, Doebbeling, Schwartz, Voelker, Falter,
Wool son and Doebbeling (2002) PCL 10 years military army combat 3.40%
military army control 1.40%
Kang, Natelson, Mahan, Lee and Murphy (2003) PCL 10 years military army war 12.10%
military army control 4.30%
military navy war 7.70%
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O’Brien and Hughes (1991) 5 years military army war 22%
military army
Hodson, Ward and Rapee (2003) peacekeeping 15%
Litz, Gray and Bolton (2003) military peacekeeping 8%
Litz, Orsillo, Friedman, Ehlich and Batres
(1997) army peacekeeping 8%
Hull, Alexander and Klein (2002) 10 years civilian oil rig workers 21 %
Table 20 continued
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Rates o f general psychological distress in Westralia survivors compared with similar samples.
Table 21.
Study Measurement Sample
Rate of general 
psychological 
distress
Westralia GHQ-28 (CGHQ) Military - navy 54.17%
McKenzie, Bdn, McFarlane, Creamer, 
Forbes, Kelsall, Glass, Ittak, and Sim (2004) GHQ-12 10 years Military navy war 39.60%
Military navy control 32.50%
O’Brien and Hughes (1991) GHQ-60 5 years Military army war 23.44%
Chung, Easthope, Chung and Clark-Carter 
(1999) GHQ 6 months Civilian 52%
Hull, Alexander and Klein (2002) GHQ-28 10 years
Civilian oil rig 
workers 44%
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Rates o f alcohol disorders in Westralia survivors compared with similar samples.
Table 22.
Study Measurement Sample
Rates of alcohol 
problems
Westralia AUDIT 4-6 years military -  navy 29.17%
McKenzie, McFarlane, Creamer, Ikin, 
Forbes, Kelsall, Clarke, Glass, Ittak and Sim 
(2006) AUDIT 10 years military navy war 25.70%
Erbes, Westermayer, Engdahl and Johnsen 
(2007) AUDIT recent military army war 27%
Mills, Teeson, Ross & Peters, 2006 general population 24.10%
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Appendix K. Psychometric properties of the Positive Affect Scale, the Total Anxiety 
Scale, the Cognitive Anxiety Scale, the Hostility -  Outward Scale, the Depression
Scale, and the Sociality Scale.
Table 23.
Psychometric Properties o f the Positive Affect Scale.
Psychometric and Reference Evidence
Positive Affect -  Inter-rater Reliability
Westbrook (1976) .93
Positive Affect - Validity
Westbrook (1976) Independent of most negative affects 
Negative association with cognitive anxiety 
Independent of gender and background 
Positive affect is a state, rather than trait, 
variable
Viney, Walker, Robertson, Lilley & Ewan Associated with psychological health of dying
(1994) patients
Viney, Henry & Campbell (2001) Responsive to group-work with adolescent 
offenders
Foster & Viney (2006) Responsive to successful group work for women 
experiencing menopause
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Table 24 .
Psychometric Properties of the Total Anxiety Scale.
Psychometric and Reference Evidence
Total Anxiety Scale — Inter-rater Reliability
Gottschalk-Gleser (1969) .84 to .90 (Total Score)
.74 to .93 (Anxiety Subscales)
.75 to.79 (Guilt Anxiety Subscale)
.67 to .90 (Shame Anxiety Subscale)
Viney (1993) .71 to .96
Total Anxiety Scale - Validity
Gottschalk-Gleser (1969) Correlates with psychiatric rating scales 
Correlates with self-report measures of 
anxiety
Distinguishes between psychiatric/patients 
and medical / psychiatrically healthy sample 
Distinguishes between hypertension and 
non-hypertension patients
Viney & Manton (1973) Distinguishes between students and 
psychiatric patients
Gottschalk, Stein & Shapiro (1997) Total score correlates with total SCL-90 
Anxiety scores
Some subscales correlates with SCL-90 
Anxiety and Depression subscales 
Correlates with MMPI lie scale 
Guilt subscale correlates with MMPI 
depression, hysteria, hypocondriasis and 
schizophrenia subscales 
Shame subscale correlates with MMPI
Lane and Viney (2005)
paranoia subscale
Responsive to effective therapy for breast
cancer
304
Table 25.
Psychometric Properties of the Cognitive Anxiety Scale.
Scale and Reference Inter-rater reliability coefficient
Cognitive Anxiety - Reliability
Viney & Westbrook (1976) .93-.99 (two independent raters)
.71-.79 (four independent raters)
Cognitive Anxiety - Validity 
Viney & Westbrook (1976)
Westbrook (1976)
Viney(1980)
Viney, Clarke, Bunn & Benjamin (1985) 
Viney, Henry & Campbell (2001)
Foster & Viney (2006)
Independent of gender and age.
Positive correlation with socioeconomic status 
Positive correlation with anxiety and hostility 
inwards, & ambivalent hostility 
Discriminate people in novel and incongruous 
experiences from those in relatively unchanging 
situations
Associated with state anxiety, but not trait anxiety 
Negative association with positive affect 
Associated with transitions in life 
Distinguishes between patients in crisis who 
receive counseling support and those that do not 
Associated with immediate gains from group-work 
with offender adolescents, but not with long term 
gains
Responsive to successful group work for women 
experiencing menopause
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Table 26.
Psychometric Properties of the Hostility-Outward Scale.
Scale and Reference Inter-rater reliability coefficient
Hostility -  Outward - Reliability
Gottschalk-Gleser (1969) .79 to .98
Hostility Outward - Validity
Gottschalk & Gleser (1969) Distinguished between schizophrenic and autistic 
patients
Responsive to experimental manipulation
Viney, Clarke, Bunn & Benjamin (1985) Responsive to successful intervention with patients 
in crisis
Gottschalk, Stein & Shapiro (1997) Correlates with some MMPI subscales
Viney, Henry & Campbell (2001) Responsive to successful intervention with offender
adolescents
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Table 27.
Psychometric properties of the Depression Scale.
Scale and Reference Inter-rater reliability coefficient
Depression Scale -  Reliability
Gottschalk & Hoigaard-Martin (1986) >.85
Depression Scale -  Validity
Gottschalk & Hoigaard-Martin (1986) Correlates with Zung, Beck and Hamilton scales of
depression
Gottschalk, Stein & Shapiro (1997) Correlates with SCL90 scores for anxiety, phobic
anxiety, and paranoid ideation.
Lane and Viney (2005) Responsive to successful intervention for breast
cancer
Distinguishes depressed patients, from non­
depressed, and alcoholic patients
Foster & Viney (2006) Responsive to successful group work for women
experiencing menopause
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Table 28.
Psychometric Properties o f the Sociality Scale.
Scale and Reference Inter-rater reliability coefficient
Sociality Scale -  Reliability
Viney and Westbrook (1979) .96 (Total Scale)
.85 to .97 (Subscales)
Sociality Scale -  Validity
Viney and Westbrook (1979)
Viney, Walker, Robertson, Lilley & Ewan 
(1994)
Malins, Couchman, Viney & Grenyer (2004)
Independent of gender, age and socioeconomic 
status
Negatively correlated with anxiety and anger. 
Positive correlation with people experiencing 
positive interpersonal relationships 
Positive correlation with people with intrinsic need 
for relationships
Predicts good rehabilitation in people with chronic 
illnesses.
Discrimination on sub-scales, between patients 
dying in palliative care and hospitals 
Responsive to interventions aimed at improving 
interpersonal relationships in aged care workers.
Appendix L. Questionnaire to gather data used in the studies.
P S Y C H O LQ G Y 'IN -C O N FID E N C E  (a fte r firs t en try )
INFORMATION SHEET
MENTAL HEALTH SUPPORT TO PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN 
THE FIRE IN HMAS WESTRAUA, MAY 1998»
Oft 18 Sep 02, ttie Maritime Ccrnmancter initiated a program of offering follow up mental 
health support to personnel involved in the fire in HMA$ WESTRAUA in May 1998. The 
program's primary aim is to support individual seeing personnel, by providing screening for 
ongoing psychological injuries in personnel involved in the fine, providing mental health 
consultation and coordinating any indicated clinfoel services. A  secondary aim is to collect 
information that could be used to assess the overall recovery of the personnel involved in the 
fire in WESTRAU A by summarising data received
To achieve these alms, alt serving personnel involved in the fire in WESTRAUA will be 
approached- All personnel will be asked to complete a saries of quasifomaires. to screen for 
problems and assess recovery. The results of foe screening will be provided to participants at 
individual iftteviaws with a psychologist held soon after. During these interviews additional 
information about psychological Injuries and mental health will be provided. These Interviews 
will also be an opportunity for personnel to discuss any area of concern they have, and/or 
arrange and counselling or further mental health support if requested. The Fleet medical 
Officer has talked LEUT Stephen Rayner, RANR, a  clinical psychologist, ta coordinate this 
program.
Information gathered will remain in-confidence and where information is collected for possible 
summary assessment, no identifying details of any individual will be used.
H s k s e  tk.fc
1 . ( ^ y  ! bave read this information shaat.
Pteav? if â ree
2 . [ j  t grant permission for Navy to collect information for possible
>—'  anonymous summary f comparative analysis.
RANK:__________ ___ INITIAIS: „ ---------------_----—
SU R N A M E : ____________________ _  D O a ‘ — ---------
P M K E Y 8  N O :____________ G EN D ER: «  /  F icIrclB DncJ
CONTACT N U M BER : _ ------------------------------------
PSYCHOLOGY-ÏN-CONFIDENCE (after first ftntry)
PSYCHOLOGY-IN-CONFIDENCE (after first entry)
Section 2
This section help® understand your life &:rsea tie  fire*
“Pd like you to write a short story about your Ms since the Are I n WESTRALIA 
up to the moment; the good things and the bad; what its been like for you. Try 
to write for about 10 minutes or so; maybe write a page or two, and try to write 
it all In one sitting. Don1! spend too much time worrying about what you have 
written - the flow of ideas is more important that being * perfect’. Just write a 
short story about your life at the moment, flue good things and the bad; what 
its like for you.”
PSYCHOLOGY-iN-CONFIDENCE (after first entry)
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PSYCHOLOGY-IN-GONRDENCE (after first entry}
PSYCHGLOGY-IN-CONFiDENCE (after first entry)
PSYCHOLOGY-IN-CONFIDENCE {after first entry)
Please write anything aie© you would like to about the praoass of ©ithor coping with the Ire or 
recovering tom  any problems you experienced or anything else significant about any of your 
experience since th-e fire that you think might help understand how you or other people who 
have had similar experience cope or recover, and might help you or others.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT 
IN COMPLETING THIS QUEST10NA1RE.
PSYCHOLOGY-IN-CONFIDENCE {after first entry)
3 1 2 .
Appendix M. Coding rules with coded exam ples for the Positive A ffect Scale (W estbrook, 1976).
Direct statement of the subject experiencing 
positive affect.
Descriptions of situation or events which imply that 
the subject experienced positive affects.
Description of others which imply that the subject 
experienced positive affect, (not just a positive 
evaluation)
Statement which imply positive affect but do not 
clearly fall into the other category, (implies positive 
affect or uses colloquial expression)
“I was happy (thrilled, excited, delighted, pleased. “Having guests was lots of fun”. “My wife is wonderful. “We smiled and kissed”.
over-joyed)”. “Its great having my own apartment”. Anna is a satisfying companion”. “I wouldn’t change him for anything”.
“I love to be home with the family”.
” 1 enjoyed walking through the streets”. 
"We were very proud parents”.
“It was good news to find that I had passed the 
examination”.
“It was terrific at the concert”.
“The great night came”.
“That's the pretty part of being in hospital, all the 
fuss and flowers and presents”.
“New York is an exciting place”.
DO NOT score
“The doctor did his job well”.
“My husband was very helpful”.
“It’s been well and truly worth it”.
“I’d have 10 babies if they were all going to turn out 
like him”.
3 1 3
Positive affect is NOT scored when the subject makes a positive statement about negative stimuli ceasing or 
lessening.
DO NOT score
“1 was looking forward to getting labor over and done with”. 
"I'm glad I won't have to go through that again”.
DO score
“I am looking forward to watching her grow up”.
“I was glad they could come”.
Good is a word which may or may not imply positive affect. Good is NOT scored if it implies a job well 
done, good behaviour, or health.
DO NOT score
“I was real good after I had the operation”.
“The doctor was good in managing my blood pressure”. 
“He’s a good child, so I have no problems”.
DO score
“I have good memories of my stay”.
“It gave me a good feeling”.
“It was a really good start”.
“It’s been good since I came home”.
We had good times together.
(Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2002).
A ppendix N. Coding rules and w eighting for scores, for the Total A nxiety Scale
314
1. Death anxiety — references to death, dying, threat of death, or anxiety about death experienced by or occurring to:
a. self (3).
b. animate others (2 ).
c. inanimate objects ( 1 ).
d. denial of death anxiety ( 1 ).
2. Mutilation (castration) anxiety — references to injury, tissue or physical damage, or anxiety about injury or threat of 
such experienced by or occurring to:
a. self (3).
b. animate others (2 ).
c. inanimate objects destroyed ( 1 ).
d. denial ( 1 ).
3. Separation anxiety — references to desertion, abandonment, ostracism, loss of support, falling, loss of love or love 
object, or threat of such experienced by or occurring to:
a. self (3).
b. animate others (2 ).
c. inanimate objects ( 1 ).
d. denial ( 1 ).
4. Guilt anxiety — references to adverse criticism, abuse, condemnation, moral disapproval, guilt, or threat of such 
experienced by:
a. self (3).
b. animate others (2 ). 
d. denial ( 1 ).
5 Shame anxiety -  references to ridicule, inadequacy, shame, embarrassment, humiliation, overexposure of 
deficiencies or private details, or threat of such experienced by:
a. self (3).
b. animate others (2). 
d. denial (1).
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6 . Diffuse or nonspecific anxiety - 
source of anxiety:
a. self (3).
b. animate others (2 ). 
d. denial ( 1 ).
- references by word or phrase to anxiety and/or fear without distinguishing type or
3 1 6
Appendix O. Coding rules and coded examples o f text for the Cognitive Anxiety Scale (Viney & W estbrook, 1976).
Ca (Cognitive Anxiety, experienced by the self, as a result of) Cb (Cognitive Anxietv, experienced by others(s), as a result of) Cd (Cognitive Anxietv. expressed but denied, as a result of)
Novel stimuli
(Not having been through it before). “I wondered what would 
happen”.
“I'm not used to doing that”.
“All the courses here are a bit different".
Novel stimuli
“All first mothers are a little bit anxious (about how they’ll get on)”. 
“It’s a novelty (for her to be in the teacher’s position)”.
“He was faced with a new experience”.
Novel stimuli
“I had no thoughts about what it would be like,/ (doing it for the first 
time)”.
“I wasn’t scared/ (although it was all new)”.
Extra constructs needed 
"(You get things)/ you don't expect”. 
"(I asked them;)/ What is happening?” 
” 1 didn't know the first thing about it".
Extra constructs needed 
“She doesn’t seen to be very sure of herself’. 
“You don’t know / (what you are talking about)”. 
“It’s not knowing what to expect”.
Extra constructs needed
“(even though I was anxious) / 1  felt/ I knew it all”.
“I wasn’t worried/ (I knew / 1 had time to work it out)”.
Incongruous stimuli
“The visits to the doctor sometimes left me a bit mystified”.
"I will never work out why (because I had never done anything to her 
in my life)”.
“It was a strange sensation”.
Incongruous stimuli
“(all the little things went wrong)/ that she didn’t understand about”. 
“It didn’t fit in with his beliefs”.
“He was amazed/ (at the way things turned out)”.
Incongruous stimuli
“(things didn’t fit)/ but she didn’t worry about them”. 
“It wasn’t so ridiculous”.
3 1 7
High rate of stimulus presentation 
“It's a bit bewildering,/ (things coming so fast)”. 
“ 1 find a couple of lecturers a bit hard to follow”. 
“Suddenly the room was full of people”.
Unavailable responses
“She wonders/ (what on earth she should do)”. 
“It’s an absolute fluke/ (if you find a book)”. 
“He was not sure/ (what to do about it)”.
Unavailable responses
“(I didn’t know what to do)/ but I didn’t fuss”. 
“Not knowing what to do doesn’t worry him”.
High rate of stimulus presentation 
“She’s lying back there, nonplussed”.
“Tutorials put a great amount of pressure on her”. 
“He couldn’t believe it/ (things happened so fast)”.
High rate of stimulus presentation
“(everything was happening at once)/ but I just relaxed”.
“(there’s a lot of work)/ but I’m not discouraged by that”.
NB: Identify whether there is any amplification, emphasis or repetition within a construct (eg: ‘very upset’, or ‘overwhelmed, quite overwhelmed’).
(Gottschalk & Bechtel, 2002).
A ppendix  P. C oding rules and exam ples for scoring the H ostility  O utw ard Scale
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(I) Hostility Outward — Overt (II) Hostility Outward — Covert
Thematic Categories Thematic Categories
a3 Self killing, fighting, injuring other individuals or 
threatening to do so.
b3 Self robbing or abandoning other individuals, causing 
suffering or anguish to others, or threatening to do so.
c3 Self adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, 
expressing anger, dislike of other human beings. 
a2 Self killing, injuring or destroying domestic animals, 
pets, or threatening to do so.
b2 Self abandoning, robbing, domestic animals, pets, or 
threatening to do so.
c2 Self criticizing or depreciating others in a vague or 
mild manner.
d2 Self depriving or disappointing other human beings.
al Self killing, injuring, destroying, robbing wildlife, 
flora, inanimate objects or threatening to do so.
b i Se lf adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, 
expresing anger or dislike o f subhuman, inanimate 
objects, places, situations.
a3 Others (human) killing, fighting, injuring other 
individuals or threatening to do so. 
b3 Others (human) robbing or abandoning, causing 
suffering or anguish to other individuals, or threatening 
to do so.
c3 Others adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, 
expressing anger, dislike of other human beings. 
a2 Others (human) killing, injuring or destroying 
domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so. 
b2 Others (human) abandoning, robbing, domestic 
animals, pets, or threatening to do so. 
c2 Others (human) criticizing or depreciating other 
individuals in a vague or mild manner. 
d2 Others (human) depriving or disappointing other 
human beings.
e2 Others (human or domestic animals) dying or killed 
violently in death-dealing situation or threatened with 
such.
f2 Bodies (human or domestic animals) mutilated, 
depreciated, defiled.
al Wildlife, flora, inanimate objects, injured, broken, 
robbed, destroyed or threatened with such (with or 
without mention of agent).
bl Others (human) adversely criticizing, depreciating, 
blaming, expressing anger or dislike of subhuman, 
inanimate objects, places, situations.
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cl Self using hostile words, cursing, mention of anger or cl Others angry, cursing without reference to cause or
rage without referent. direction of anger; also instruments of destruction not
used threateningly.
dl Others (human, domestic animals) injured, robbed, 
dead, abandoned or threatened with such from any 
source including subhuman and inanimate objects, 
situations (storms, floods, etc.), 
el Subhumans killing, fighting, injuring, robbing, 
destroying each other or threatening to do so. 
fl Denial of anger, dislike, hatred, cruelty, and intent
to harm.
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Appendix Q. Coding rules for the Depression Scale (Gottschalk & Betchel, 2002).
Content Categories and Scoring Symbols Weight
I. Hopelessness. 1 . References to not being or not wanting to be or not seeking to be the recipient of good fortune, 1
good luck, God's favor or blessing.
2. References to self or others not getting or receiving help, advice, support, sustenance, 1 
confidence, esteem (a) from others; (b) from self.
3. References to feelings of hopelessness, losing hope, despair, lack of confidence, lack of 1
ambition, lack of interest; feelings of pessimism, discouragement (a) others; (b) self.
II. Self-accusation A. Guilt depression. References to adverse criticism, abuse, condemnation, moral disapproval,
guilt, or threat of such experienced by:
a. Self 3
b. Others 2
c. Denial 1
B. Shame depression. References to ridicule, inadequacy, shame, embarrassment, humiliation, 
overexposure of deficiencies or private details, or threat of such experienced by:
a. Self 3
b. Others 2
c. Denial 1
C. Hostility directed inward
1 a. References to self attempting or threatening to kill self, with or without conscious intent. 4
1 b. References to self wanting to die, needing or deserving to die. 4
2a. References to injuring, mutilating, disfiguring self or threats to do so, with or without 3 
conscious intent.
2b. Self-blaming, expressing anger or hatred to self, considering self worthless or of no value, 3 
causing oneself grief or trouble, or threatening to do so.
3a. References to self needing or deserving punishment, paying for one’s sins, needing to atone or 2 
do penance.
3b. Adversely criticizing, depreciating self: references to regretting, being sorry or ashamed for 2 
what one says or does; references to self mistaken or in error.
3c. References to feelings of deprivation, disappointment, lonesomeness. 2
4a. References to feeling disappointed in self; unable to meet expectations of self or others. 1
4b. Denial of anger, dislike, hatred, blame, destructive impulses from self to self. 1
4c. References to feeling painfully driven or obliged to meet one’s own expectations and 1
standards.
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HI. Psychomotor References to general retardation and slowing down in thinking, feeling, or action, 
retardation.
1
IV. Somatic 
concerns.
A. Hypochondriacal component. References to bodily malfunctioning or physical problems in 
total body or any parts or systems.
1
B. Sleep disturbances. References to any disturbances in sleeping. 1
C. Sexual disturbances. References to sexual malfunctioning of any kind, including menstrual 1 
disturbances or complaints.
D. Gastrointestinal disturbances. References to appetite disturbances, changes in bowel habits, 1 
abdominal discomforts.
E. General somatic symptoms, including heaviness in limbs, back, or head, backaches, headaches, 1
muscle aches, loss of energy, fatigibility, and loss of weight.
V. Death and A. Death depression. References to death, dying, threat of death, or anxiety about death
mutilation experienced by or occurring to:
depression.
a. Self. 3
b. Animate others. 2
c. Inanimate objects. 1
d. Denial of death anxiety. 1
B. Mutilation depression. References to injury, tissue or physical damage, or anxiety about injury
or threat of such experienced by or occurring to:
a. Self. 3
b. Animate others. 2
c. Inanimate objects destroyed. 1
d. Denial. 1
VI. Separation References to desertion, abandonment, ostracism, loss of support, falling, loss of love or love
depression. object, or threat of such experienced by or occurring to:
a. Self. 3
b. Animate others. 2
c. Inanimate objects. 1
d. Denial. 1
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VII. Hostility A. Hostility outward — overt,
outward.
la. Self killing, fighting, injuring other individuals or threatening to do so. 3
lb. Self robbing or abandoning other individuals, causing suffering or anguish to others, or 3 
threatening to do so.
lc. Self adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger, dislike of other human 3 
beings.
2a. Self killing, injuring or destroying domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so. 2
2b. Self abandoning, robbing, domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so. 2
2c. Self criticizing or depreciating others in a vague or mild manner. 2
2d. Self depriving or disappointing other human beings. 2
3a. Self killing, injuring, destroying, robbing wildlife, flora, inanimate objects or threatening to do 1 
so.
3b. Self adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger or dislike of subhuman, 1
inanimate objects, places, situations.
3c. Self using hostile words, cursing, mention of anger or rage without referent. 1
la. Self killing, fighting, injuring other individuals or threatening to do so. 1
B. Hostility outward — covert.
1 a. Others (human) killing, fighting, injuring other individuals or threatening to do so. 3
lb. Others (human) robbing or abandoning, causing suffering or anguish to other individuals, or 3 
threatening to do so.
lc. Others adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expressing anger, dislike of other human 3 
beings.
2a. Others (human) killing, injuring or destroying domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so. 2
2b. Others (human) abandoning, robbing, domestic animals, pets, or threatening to do so. 2
2c. Others (human) criticizing or depreciating other individuals in a vague or mild manner. 2
2d. Others (human) depriving or disappointing other human beings. 2
2e. Others (human or domestic animals) dying or killed violently in death-dealing situation or 2
threatened with such.
2f. Bodies (human or domestic animals) mutilated, depreciated, defiled. 2
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3a. Wildlife, flora, inanimate objects, injured, broken, robbed, destroyed or threatened with such 1 
(with or without mention of agent).
3b. Others (human) adversely criticizing, depreciating, blaming, expresing anger or dislike of 1 
subhuman, inanimate objects, places, situations.
3c. Others angry, cursing without reference to cause or direction of anger; also instruments of 1 
destruction not used threateningly.
3d. Others (human, domestic animals) injured, robbed, dead, abandoned or threatened with such 1 
from any source including subhuman and inanimate objects, situations (storms, floods, etc.).
3e. Subhumans killing, fighting, injuring, robbing, destroying each other or threatening to do so. 1
3f. Denial of anger, dislike, hatred, cruelty, and intent to harm. 1
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1979).
A ppendix  R. Coding ru les and exam ples for the Sociality  Scale (V iney & W estbrook,
Solidarity (Sa): Intimacy (Sb): Influence (Sc): Shared Experience (Sd):
In this type o f relationship In this type of relationship In this type of relationship References to one person
people are construed as people are construed as people are considered as (people) relating to another
resources. References to one sources of personal sources of power. Reference (others) but the nature of
person (people) in a satisfaction. References to to one person (people) their shared experience in not
supportive or nurturant one person (people) attracting influencing another (others) clear; ie: it cannot be coded
relationship with another another (others) are scored. are scored. They may imply unambiguously in one of the
(other) are scored. They may They may imply intimacy, status differences or three categories above.
imply that they are working empathy, fellowship, asymmetrical acts of control
towards a common affection, friendliness, or assertion.
commitment or goal or aiding sociability or efforts to
in a mutual attainment, or maintain a close interpersonal
merely inclusion and relationship.
integration.
Sal (reactor) Sbl (reactor) Scl (reactor) Sdl (reactor)
“They gave me painkillers”. “Someone did want me after “He told me to go back to “He could have married me”.
“The group does help me”. all”. work”. “She looked up at me”.
“I thought my ankle was “I appreciate the love of my “She asked me to move “I was brought up in a
broken. The ambulance man family”. over”. church-centred family”.
rubbed it for a while”. “People were very friendly “How long will the doctor
toward me”. keep me here?”
Sa2 (initiator) Sb2 (initiator) Sc2 (initiator) Sd2 (initiator)
“I stayed with my mother / “I was going with this boy”. “I asked them / would they “I was going to take my
when my father died”. “They are very entertaining not cook day and night”. friend along”.
“I can work well with these people”. “I had some trouble getting a “I belong to AA”.
people”. “Those children really removalist to come”. “1 teach handicapped
interest me”. “1 pushed her into the car”. children”.
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Sa3 (reactor / initiator) Sb3 (reactor / initiator) Sc3 (reactor / initiator) Sd3 (reactor / initiator)
“It is up to us / whether we “We like Joe”. “We had to come home when “We had very limited
get better (both scored)”. “My parent can’t wait to see we were told”. musical knowledge”.
“We called a taxi driver to us when we go home”. “We were able to get the “Then it happened to us”.
take us into the city”. ‘Their attitude made us feel committee to pass the “All of us were sleepy, even
“My parents took us for a good”. motion”. me”.
holiday”. “My boss had us clock in”. “My friends and I like to play
bowls”.
NB: Only interactions with people that acknowledge some personal involvement in the interaction are scored. ‘We didn’t go to work 
that day’ is not coded; however, ‘we couldn’t go to work that day’ is (shared experience).
Relationships with supernatural or fantasy figures are NOT coded (such as ‘God’).
Generalisations are not scored ( ‘you need to mix with other people’ or ‘there is always someone around to help’).
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Appendix S. Normative data for content analysis scales.
Scale Sample n Mean (SD)
Positive Affect Scale
Westbrook ( 1976) Mothers 200 1.22 (0.46
Psychiatric patients 29 0.69 (0.31)
Students 32 0.70 (0.25)
Relocated women 27 0.99 (0.44)
Students in transition T1 (beginning transition) 48 0.89 (0.45)
Students in transition T2 48 0.98 (0.50)
Students in transitions T3 48 0.89 (0.47)
Students in transition T4 48 0.77 (0.42)
Students in transition T5 (complete transition) 48 0.79 (0.45)
Viney, Walker, Robertson, Patients in palliative care in small unit 62 1.45 (0.45)
Lilley & Ewan (1994)
Patients in palliative care in large unit 60 1.52(0.51)
Patients in palliative care in hospital 61 1.17(0.54)
Viney, Henry & Campbell Adolescent offenders prior to group work 68 1.21 (0.60)
(2001)
Adolescent offenders at completion of group 68 1.38(0.66)
work
Adolescent offenders at follow-up after group 68 1.28 (0.59)
Viney, Clarke, Bunn &
work
Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis 140 1.41 (0.66)
Benjamin (1985) before crisis-intervention counselling 
Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis 107 1.43 (0.76)
after crisis-intervention counselling 
Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis at 74 1.34(1.28)
follow-up after crisis-intervention counselling
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Scale Sample n Mean (SD)
Threat Scale
Gottschalk & Bechtel (2000) Death Anxiety adult males 0.30 (0.51)
Death Anxiety adult female 0.18(0.34)
Death Anxiety child male 0.55 (0.45)
Death Anxiety child female 0.63 (0.42)
Mutilation Anxiety adult male 0.36 (0.55)
Mutilation Anxiety adult female 0.28(0.51)
Mutilation Anxiety child male 0.79 (0.63)
Mutilation Anxiety child female 0.92 (0.67)
Separation Anxiety adult male 0.30 (0.46)
Separation Anxiety adult female 0.42 (0.52)
Separation Anxiety child male 1.18(0.78)
Separation Anxiety child female 1.16(0.55)
328
Scale Sample n Mean (SD)
Cognitive Anxiety Scale
Viney & Westbrook (1979) University students 32 0.91 (0.62)
Psychiatric inpatients 35 0.89 (0.54)
Incoming students 48 1.32 (0.69)
New mothers 200 1.60 (0.77)
Relocated women 52 1.44 (0.83)
Viney, Henry & Campbell Adolescent offenders prior to group work 68 1.46 (0.86)
(2001)
Adolescent offenders at completion of group 68 1.26 (0.77)
work
Adolescent offenders at follow-up after group 68 1.25 (0.88)
work
Viney, Clarke, Bunn & Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis 140 1.30 (0.83)
Benjamin (1985) before crisis-intervention counselling
Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis 107 1.07 (0.53)
after crisis-intervention counselling
Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis at 74 0.94 (0.56)
follow-up after crisis-intervention counselling
Viney, Walker, Robertson, Patients in palliative care in small unit 62 1.25 (0.71)
Lilley & Ewan (1994)
Patients in palliative care in large unit 60 1.14(0.73)
Patients in palliative care in hospital 61 1.03 (0.52)
Guilt Scale
Gottschalk & Bechtel (2000) Adult male 0.31 (0.49)
Adult female 0.31 (0.47)
Child male 0.41 (0.22)
Child female 0.43 (0 .32)
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Scale Sample n Mean (SD)
Shame Scale
Gottschalk & Bechtel (2000) Adult male 0.42 (0.57)
Adult female 0.70 (0.70)
Child male 0.95 (0.69)
Child female 0.80 (0.59)
Hostility Scale
Gottschalk & Bechtel (2000) Adult male 0.97 (0.50)
Adult female 0.97 (0.50)
Child male 1.15(0.58)
Child female 1.15(0.58)
Depression Scale
Gottschalk & Bechtel (2000) Adult male 5.48(1.87)
Adult female 5.39(1.53)
Child male 6.16(2.82)
Child female 6.37 (2.37)
Lane & Viney (2005) Female survivors of breast cancer at beginning 20 7.86(1.94)
of therapy
Female survivors of breast cancer at completion 20 6.22(1.45)
of therapy
Female survivors of breast cancer at follow up 20 6.26 (0.98)
after therapy
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Scale Sample n Mean (SD)
Sociality Scale
Viney & Westbrook (1979) Street youth, 97 0.49 (0.24)
Successful university students, 32 0.43 (0.23)
Transitional students, 47 0.44 (0.20)
External university students, 48 0.42 (0.19)
Relocated women 52 0.61 (0.15)
Child-bearing women, 200 0.54 (0.17)
Relatives of medical emergency patients 30 0.49 (0.20)
Hospitalised psychiatric patients 35 0.47 (0.18)
Viney, Clarke, Bunn & Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis 140 0.47 (0.21)
Benjamin (1985) before crisis-intervention counselling 
Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis 107 0.50 (0.24)
after crisis-intervention counselling 
Medical patients admitted to hospital in crisis at 74 0.49 (0.22)
Viney, Walker, Robertson,
follow-up after crisis-intervention counselling 
Patients in palliative care in small unit 62 0.53(0.18)
Lilley & Ewan (1994)
Patients in palliative care in large unit 60 0.49 (0.21)
Patients in palliative care in hospital 61 0.55 (0.54)
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